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THE EXCLUSION AND DETENTION OF ALIENS
INTRODUCTION$
In August 1994, thousands of Cuban citizens put to sea in a
flotilla of rafts, hoping to reach the United States.' Many did, and
were released into our country under long-standing practices.
2
Faced with a rising number of refugees, the Clinton Administration
instituted a policy of detention.' Those who managed to reach our
shores would be confined in detention centers in the United States;
others would be interdicted on the high seas and held at the United
States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba and, for a time, at U.S.
facilities in Panama.4 While our government clearly needed to
* The heart of this Article is the story of two people, Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei. This Article relies on unpublished materials to tell Mezei's tale. The
unpublished materials come primarily from three sources. One source is the papers
of Justice Robert H. Jackson. Jackson's papers are archived in the Manuscript
Reading Room of the Library of Congress. Container 180 of Jackson's papers
includes a file on Ignatz Mezei's case before the United States Supreme Court. Cites
to "RHJP" are to documents in that file. Another primary source is the collection of
papers belonging to Ignatz Mezei's late attorneyJack Wasserman. Wasserman's law
firm, Wasserman, Mancini & Chang, has maintained the lawyer's files on Ignatz
Mezei. Cites to "JWP" are to Jack Wasserman's papers. The final source is the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's file on Mezei, portions of which were
disclosed to the author pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Cites to "INS"
are to materials in that file. The author has on file copies of all documents from
these sources that are cited in this Article.
1 See e.g., Concern Rising on U.S. Shores as Cubans Flee, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994,
at Al (estimating that 6000 refugees had already fled by this time);Jon Nordheimer,
U.S. Will Expand Patrols to Stop Cuban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at Al
(stating that 1770 refugees had been picked up by the Coast Guard in one day).
2 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Cubans Who Seized Boat Win Asylum, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1994, at A8 (explaining that the United States has not returned exiles who
have hijacked boats since the defectors are "people who havejustifiably used extreme
measures to escape deplorable conditions and persecution"); Mireya Navarro, Cuban
Exiles Not Pushing for Boatlift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at 20 (noting the Clinton
Administration's position that refugees would continue to be granted political
asylum).
s See, e.g.,John M. Broder, Clinton Halts Special Treatment for Cubans, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1994, at Al (stating that Cuban refugees "will no longer receive preferential
treatment from the United States or special help in resettling in this country"); Steven
Greenhouse, U.S., in New Policy, Intends to Detain Cuban Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1994, at Al (explaining the Clinton Administration's new plan to "detain Cubans
for an indefinite period after they arrive in the United States").
' See Broder, supra note 3, at Al; Mireya Navarro, Resources Strained at Guantdnamo
Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at 12. By the end of September, 1994, over 30,000
Cuban refugees were detained at Guantinamo Bay. See Mike Clary, U.S. Immigration
DoorAjar to Some of3,OOO Cuban Detainees at Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994,
at A19. To relieve the strain at Guantinamo Bay, the government of Panama agreed
to the temporary detention of up to 10,000 refugees at U.S. bases in Panama. Nearly
7500 Cuban refugees were held there. The United States began returning those
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respond quickly to this crisis, the Administration's policy committed
our country to incarcerating thousands of refugees for an indefinite
period of time.5 How, one might ask, does our President have the
power to order the detention of people without a criminal trial?
Can they be confined forever? And what of the Cubans who came
here in the 1980 "Mariel" boatlift? Fourteen years after their
arrival, over a thousand are detained in prison facilities in the
United States because Fidel Castro will not take them back and our
government will not let them go.6 How long may they be held?
This Article addresses the treatment of people at our door. Our
government attempts to return noncitizens to other countries in one
of two fashions, depending upon territorial standing. "Exclusion"
is the mechanism to keep out aliens who seek admission to the
United States from outside the country. "Deportation" is the
procedure to remove aliens who are already in this country.7 The
rights that aliens have in these processes depend upon their classifi-
cation as "excludable" or "deportable." Under current law, aliens
refugees to Guantunamo Bay in February 1995. See Art Pine, Tight Security to Mark
Airlift of 7,400 Cubans, L.A. TIMES, Jan 31, 1995, at A12; Larry Rohter, U.S. Starts
Evacuating Cuban Refugees from Panama Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at A4.
s On September 9, 1994, Cuba agreed to the repatriation of volunteers from the
most recent wave of immigration, and the United States agreed to accept the legal
migration of at least 20,000 Cuban citizens per year. SeeJoint Communique, United
States-Cuba, Sept. 9, 1994, at 1-2. However, those Cuban refugees at Guantinamo
will not be able to apply for an immigrant visa. The United States has announced
that it will only consider applications from potential immigrants in Cuba. See Clary,
supra note 4, at A19 (citing U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno as saying that any
Cuban who wants to enter the United States must apply from Cuba); Daniel Williams,
Appeals Court Overturns Order Blocking Return of Refugees to Cuba, WASH. POST, Nov.
5,1994, at A16 ("Clinton administration officials said that the only path to the United
States for Guantanamo and Panama detainees ran through Havana, where the
refugees could apply for one of the 20,000 yearly visas."). While this announcement
gives the Guantinamo Bay detainees an incentive to return to Cuba, most of those
who will not or cannot return face indefinite detention. The Clinton Administration
has made only limited exception to this policy. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v.
Christopher, Nos. 94-5138, 94-5231, and 94-5234, 1995 WL 16410, at *2 (1lth Cir.
Jan. 18, 1995) (stating that the Attorney General has exercised discretion to admit,
from Guantinamo, only ill or elderly refugees and unaccompanied minors under the
age of 13, and that she has begun to consider, on a case-by-case basis, accompanied
minors and their families); Mike Clary, New U.S. Policy to Allow in Some Cuban Refugees,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at Al (describing new policy to admit some accompanied
minors and their families); Pine, supra note 4, at A12 (reporting that a total of 2300
detainees have been allowed into the United States for humanitarian reasons).
6 See infra notes 333-42 and accompanying text.
'See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1982) (explaining the difference
between a deportation hearing and an exclusion hearing); Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (noting the distinction between exclusion and deportation).
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have no constitutional rights with respect to their exclusion. They
are deemed to be outside of our borders and not entitled to the
protection of our domestic laws, including the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' Deportable aliens, on the other hand, are
considered to be in this country, and they are entitled to the protec-
tions of the Constitution.9 The distinction is driven largely by the
assumption that people already in the United States are likely to
have strong ties to this country. Thus, when the government
endeavors to remove these people, it is thought that they deserve a
different process than those aliens who seek entry from outside our
land. 0
In a simple world, these broad categories might be perfectly
rational. Territorial standing might be an easy way to determine
whether people have a strong connection to the United States or a
substantial interest in admission. Aliens ordered excluded from this
country would promptly return home. But the world is not so
simple. Many "excludable" people at the border have family in the
United States or a substantial interest in admission. Many aliens in
the deportation process, on the other hand, have entered illegally,
have no family in the United States, and have no legitimate interest
in remaining here. Also, sometimes people ordered excluded from
our country cannot return home because their countries of origin
will not accept them. Some, like the Mariel Cubans, are detained
in federal prisons for years. Because these aliens are considered
"excludable," they have few rights even though our government is
incarcerating them inside the United States.
Although one might question whether aliens' rights ought to be
8 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-61 (1993) (noting
the distinction between deportation and exclusion and stating that an alien facing
deportation has "the added benefit of 'deportation proceedings'"); LengMay Ma, 357
U.S. at 187-88; Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213-15
(1953).
9 See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993) ("It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entities aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.");
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32, 33-34 (stating that "once an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly").
0 See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1963) (concluding that a
permanent resident's return to the United States after an afternoon trip to Mexico
should not be construed as an "entry" under § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act so as to render him an excludable alien); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596, 597-602 (1953) ("It is well-established that if an alien is
a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present
there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
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determined by territorial standing, courts have continued to give
effect to the territorial distinction. One reason is that the judiciary
generally defers to the executive in immigration matters. Courts
have come to view the federal immigration authority as inseparable
from the foreign affairs power. In no other area, the Supreme
Court tells us, does the federal government have more power.
11
Thus, as long as the executive acts within the broad boundaries set
by Congress, the judiciary will generally defer to executive decisions
in immigration matters. The concepts of full federal authority and
judicial deference are commonly called the "plenary power
doctrine." The plenary power doctrine and the rule of territorial
standing are exemplified by two leading Supreme Court decisions.
The two cases, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,12 and
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,'8 hold that, with respect to
admission and detention, whatever process the government affords
excludable aliens is due process of law.'4 As part of its examination
of the plenary power doctrine and the principle of territorial
standing, this Article discusses the Knauff and Mezei cases in detail.
Part I traces the history of the territorial distinction and of the
plenary power doctrine and shows that our current doctrines are
not necessarily required by our past. Part II tells the full stories of
Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei. The Court decisions upholding the
government's actions in their cases are well-known. Most people are
unaware, however, that after the Supreme Court decided their cases,
Congress sought to assist Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, and the
press upbraided the government's actions. Knauff and Mezei were
both eventually released into the United States. In addition to
relating an important part of our history, this section of the Article
demonstrates the public's ambivalence about the plenary power
doctrine and the rule of territorial standing and shows the value of
a hearing. Part III of the Article traces the impact of the Knauff and
Mezei decisions and argues that these rulings are inconsistent with
more recent developments in immigration and constitutional law.
Part IV sets forth a normative claim, that all people at or within our
border-or detained by our government-ought to be protected by
the Due Process Clause, and that the courts should not defer to the
executive in all immigration matters. In addition, this section offers
" See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
12 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Is 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
14 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.
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an alternative (and more limited) model of judicial deference, the
political question doctrine. Finally, Part V addresses the conse-
quences that would follow if we were to abandon the territorial
distinction and acknowledge that all people at our door are entitled
to the protection of our laws.
I. THE GROWTH OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL STANDING
A. The Constitution and Early Claims of
Federal Immigration Authority
The plenary power doctrine is a collection of several separate
but related principles: first, that the immigration authority is
reposed in the federal government and not the states; second, that
the authority is allocated in some fashion between the executive and
legislative departments of the federal government; and, third, that
the judicial branch has an extremely limited role in reviewing the
executive's immigration decisions if, indeed, the judiciary may
review those decisions at all. 5 The executive/legislative and the
judicial deference prongs of the doctrine were not developed until
late in the nineteenth century. Until that time there was great
uncertainty whether the immigration power resided with the federal
government at all.
A primary reason for the uncertainty was that the United States
Constitution does not expressly grant the federal government the
power to exclude (or deport) aliens. Perhaps, surprisingly, the
15 Most commentators have identified these three principles as central elements
of the plenary power doctrine, although they do not necessarily characterize the
doctrine solely in these terms. For helpful discussions of the plenary power doctrine,
see generally THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 1-39 (2d ed. 1991); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE
JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 180-222 (1987); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 862, 864-
69 (1989); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 854-63 (1987); David A.
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and
Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 166-80 (1983); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632-50 (1992) [hereinafter Motomura, Curious Evolution];
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990)
[hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Norms]; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1984).
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Constitution contains only two plausible references to immigration.
The Naturalization Clause gives Congress the power to establish "a
uniform Rule of Naturalization."16 But naturalization is different
from immigration; naturalization is the process of making citizens
of those who have already emigrated to the United States. 7 Thus,
the Naturalization Clause has generally been construed only to
permit Congress to describe who may become citizens.18 The only
other plausible reference to immigration in the Constitution is the
clause barring Congress from prohibiting, prior to 1808, "[t]he
Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit." 9 This clause has been
interpreted only to forbid Congress from outlawing the importation
of slaves during the nation's first twenty years.
20
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
"7 "Naturalization" is "the act of adopting a foreigner, and clothing him with the
privileges of a native citizen." Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162
(1892); see also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884) (stating that an immigrant
becomes a citizen of the United States through "such form of naturalization as may
be required by law").
'8 Courts have repeatedly described Congress's power under the Naturalization
Clause as the power to promulgate rules governing the ways that aliens become
citizens. See e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 672 (1898) (noting
that in the exercise of its power under the Naturalization Clause, "Congress... has
made provision for the admission to citizenship of... classes of persons"); Boyd, 143
U.S. at 162 (noting that under the Naturalization Clause, Congress "has enacted
general laws under which individuals may be naturalized"); Lanz v. Randall, 14 F. Cas.
1131, 1133 (D. Minn. 1876) (No. 8080) (stating that laws enacted under the
Naturalization Clause set forth "the only rules by which a citizen or subject of a
foreign government could become a citizen or subject of one of the states of this
Union").
In just the last several years, the Supreme Court has occasionally cited to the
Naturalization Clause as one of the sources of the federal immigration authority. See
infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text. But the Court's cases merely refer to the
Clause without any discussion and without considering the distinction between
naturalization and immigration. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982)
("Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources,
including the Federal Government's power '[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Natural-
ization.'"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (noting that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to regulate the U.S. borders).
'9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
" The Constitution gives the federal government the power to regulate foreign
commerce, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and at the time the Constitution was
ratified, slaves were seen as potential articles of commerce. Under this view, the
Migration and Importation Clause served as a limitation on Congress's power to
regulate foreign commerce, and not as an affirmative grant of power to regulate
immigration. See People v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 62
(1882) (explaining that the Clause refers to slaves only and not to free Blacks);
Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Boston), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
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Another reason for the uncertainty about federal immigration
authority was the issue of slavery. During the antebellum era, a
number of states passed legislation restricting the migration of free
Blacks, both from other states and from abroad.21 Several states
also enacted laws barring the entry of indigent or diseased immi-
grants or immigrants who had been sentenced to "transportation"
by a foreign country.22 If the federal government was deemed to
possess the exclusive power to control immigration, states might
have been forced to admit free Blacks and immigrants whom the
states sought to exclude. Until the late 1800s, Congress simply
refrained from passing immigration legislation,23 and thus avoided
474-76 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the context of the Clause and the
construction that the Framers would have given it "show that it was intended to
embrace those persons only who were brought in as property"); id. at 512-14 (Daniel,
J., dissenting) (arguing that it would not be proper to extend the power of Congress,
under this Clause, beyond the immigration of convicts and foreign slaves); id. at 542-
44 (WoodburyJ., dissenting) (noting that the word "persons" was meant to embrace
slaves alone and thus that the Clause refers only to slaves); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 42, at 281 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (referring to the Clause
as "this restriction on the general government"). Madison noted that, under the
Clause, the power to prohibit the importation of slaves had been postponed until
1808. Madison also pointed out that some critics attempted to argue that the Clause
may be used to prevent "voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to
America," but that this argument was a "misconstruction[]." Id.; see also Walter Berns,
The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198 (1968) (arguing that the
Framers most likely intended the Clause to apply only to slaves, but that many in the
South probably voted to ratify the Constitution with the understanding that the
Clause did not expressly apply to slaves). But see Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 453-54
(McKinley, J.) (arguing that the inclusion of the word "migration" made the phrase
applicable to immigrants as well as slaves, and that, by negative implication, Congress
could regulate immigration after 1808).
21 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1865-80 (1993) (discussing the antebellum tendency
to restrict the movement of Blacks, both free and slave).
22 See id. at 1841-65 (discussing immigration restrictions based on crime, poverty,
disability, and disease).
" The Fifth Congress passed the Alien Act ofJune 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
Part of the Act gave the President the power to order the deportation of aliens
judged dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. See id. § 1. The Act,
however, was only effective for two years. See id. § 6. It was characterized by
President Adams as a war measure and was denounced by Jefferson, Madison, and
others as unconstitutional. See CLEMENT L. BOUVik, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS
GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION AND EXPULSION OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES 53
(1912); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927-38 (1991).
After the passage of the 1798 Act, and prior to 1860, Congress enacted a number of
measures relating to naturalization, but not to immigration. While some members
of Congress were concerned about the immigration of paupers and criminals, no
federal legislation restricting immigration was passed. See generally E.P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 11-46 (1981).
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a conflict with the states over the authority to control immigration.
Given Congress's inaction, the power to control immigration was
first tested in disputes involving assertions of state authority. In the
Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court struck down two state laws that
imposed taxes upon vessel owners for each alien passenger arriving
in the ports of the states.24  The Court split five to four. Only
three of the five Justices in the majority found that the federal
government, not the states, had the power to exclude aliens.
25 All
four dissentingJustices ruled that, under the Constitution, the states
retained the power to exclude aliens.26 Although the exact basis for
the majority's decision is difficult to determine, later decisions in
accord with the Passenger Cases struck down similar state laws as
interfering with foreign commerce (even though the slavery issue
had been resolved by that time).2 1 In the late 1800s, Congress
Congressional inaction has led some to characterize immigration during this
period as wide open, with the ability to emigrate considered to be a "natural right."
Henkin, supra note 15, at 854-56. This view finds some support in public documents
of the time. For example, a 1868 treaty between the United States and China states,
in part, that the two countries
cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his
home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration
and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one
country to the other for the purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent
residents
Treaty of Trade, Consuls and Emigration, China-U.S., July 28, 1868, art. V, 16 Stat.
739, 740, T.S. No. 48. Nevertheless, given the actions of various state legislatures, it
cannot truly be said that immigration was unhindered during this period.
21 See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 392, 409 (opinion of McLean, J.).
5 See id. at 448-52 (opinion of Catron,J.); id. at 454 (opinion of McKinley, J.); id.
at 460-64 (opinion of Grier, J.). The other two justices in the majority based their
decisions primarily upon the federal government's exclusive power to regulate foreign
commerce. See id. at 401 (opinion of McLean,J.); id. at 423-26 (opinion of Wayne,J.).
26 See id. at 466-70 (Taney, C.J., dissenting, joined by Nelson, J.); id. at 509-14
(Daniel, J., dissenting); id. at 522-27 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
27 See, e.g., People v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60 (1882)
(striking down a New York statute that levied a tax of one dollar on each alien
passenger coming by vessel from a foreign port to the New York port); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259,
269-71 (1875). In Henderson, the Court specifically held that a statute that taxed
vessel owners interfered with the federal power over foreign commerce. See id. The
Court reserved the question whether states could enact more narrowly tailored
legislation to protect themselves against the entry of foreign paupers, vagrants,
criminals, and diseased persons. See id. at 275. The decision in Chy Lung is more
curious. The Court stated that "[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission
of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not
to the States." Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280. The Chy Lung Court then tied this authority
to the federal foreign commerce power. See id. And, although the decision seems to
indicate that this is a power placed solely in the federal government, the Court
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became active in the field, passing a law that levied a federal duty
for each alien passenger arriving in the United States from a foreign
port.28  That statute was similarly upheld as part of the federal
government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign commerce.
2 9
B. Governmental Authority and Judicial Deference
It was not difficult for the Supreme Court to think about the
Passenger Cases and their progeny in the context of foreign com-
merce. The statutes at issue levied taxes upon businesses (mainly
vessel owners) that operated internationally. In the Chinese Exclusion
Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States),"0 the Supreme Court faced
a challenge to the government's power to limit immigration in a
context unrelated to business. The Court's decision in that case is
acknowledged to be the real beginning of the plenary power
doctrine. 1
Chae Chan Ping, a citizen of China, came to the United States
in 1875,2 when immigration was encouraged. 3 In 1882, howev-
er, the immigration of Chinese laborers was suspended by a federal
statute. 4 The new law did not apply to Chinese laborers already
in the United States, and those laborers who wished to leave the
country were entitled to certificates of identity that would entitle
reserved, as in Henderson, the question whether the states could enact "necessary and
proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad." Id.
"8 See Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat. 214. The plaintiffs apparently
challenged only § 1 of the Act, which imposed the tax. Other portions of the Act
gave federal officers the power to deny certain immigrants (convicts, the mentally ill,
and those deemed likely to become public charges) permission to land in the United
States. See §§ 2, 4.
2 See Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson & Cunard S.S. Co. v. Robertson), 112
U.S. 580, 591-94 (1884).
30 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
31 See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 184-85; Henkin, supra note 15, at 853-54;
Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 15, at 1633-34 ("The Chinese Exclusion Case
established that the political branches would generally enjoy plenary power over
immigration .... ").
-2 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
" In an 1868 treaty, the United States and China recognized the "mutual advan-
tage" of free immigration, granting residents of each country reciprocal privileges of
travel and residence. See Treaty of Trade, supra note 23, at arts. V, VI.
" See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59. In 1880, China agreed
to a supplementary treaty permitting the United States to regulate, limit, or suspend
the immigration of Chinese laborers. See Immigration Treaty, China-U.S., Nov. 17,
1880, art. 1, 22 Stat. 826. The 1880 treaty was not self-executing. See Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 597. The 1882 legislation executed the treaty, but went further than the
treaty required.
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them to reenter.3 5 In 1887, Chae Chan Ping obtained such a
certificate and traveled to China.3 6 In 1888, Congress passed a law
prohibiting Chinese laborers from returning to this country and
voiding the previously issued certificates.3 7  Chae Chan Ping
returned to the United States a few days after the new law became
effective, and customs officials denied him permission to land."8
He brought a habeas corpus petition, alleging that he was illegally
confined on board the vessel by the vessel master, who acted under
the direction of the customs officials.3 9  Habeas corpus was
probably not the most promising remedy for Chae Chan Ping. At
the time, the federal courts examined habeas corpus petitions
through the lens of "jurisdiction." That is, in deciding whether a
person held under a court order (or executive decree) was lawfully
confined, the federal courts asked whether the committing court or
executive officer had "jurisdiction" over the petitioner.40
The Supreme Court upheld the 1888 law and its application to
Chae Chan Ping. Congress, the Court ruled, had inherent authority
to pass the statute. As Justice Field wrote for the Court, the ability
to enact legislation to exclude aliens "is a proposition which we do
5 See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, §§ 3-4, 22 Stat. at 59-60. These provisions of
the 1882 legislation were consistent with the government's obligations under the 1880
supplementary treaty. Under the terms of the 1880 treaty, laborers then in the
United States would be permitted to leave and return to the United States. See
Immigration Treaty, supra note 34, art. II; see also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 596-97.
S6 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
57See Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, §§ 1, 2, 25 Stat. 504; see also Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 599.
' See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
s See id. at 582-83.
o See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1880) (holding that the lower
court lacked "jurisdiction" to try defendants in a criminal case because defendants
were indicted under an unconstitutional statute); Ex pare Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163,176 (1873) (finding that because of a doublejeopardy violation, the second court
was without "jurisdiction" to impose any further judgment of conviction); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118 (1866) (questioning whether a military commission
hadjurisdiction to try and sentence petitioner); Exparte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 170-
71 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1862) (Nd. 1292) (holding that War Department officials were
without authority to order petitioner's arrest). For general discussions of habeas
corpus and the concept of "jurisdiction," see Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745,
1768 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); WILLIAM F. DUKER,
A CONSTrruTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPuS 225-48 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 748, 754 (1987); Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Supreme Cour4 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARv. L. REV. 84, 103-05 (1959); Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiay Hearings in
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 139-44.
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not think open to controversy."" Although under the Constitution
many matters are left to local authorities, in foreign affairs the
federal government is vested with the powers of independent
nations that allow those nations to maintain their independence and
security.42 Thus, "[t]he powers to declare war, make treaties,
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce,
secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of
other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted...
only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy
and justice."43 The power of exclusion, the Court held, is one of
the sovereign powers belonging to the federal government.44
This argument would not likely persuade a textualist or a
federalist. In describing the powers that inhere to a sovereign and
independent nation, the Court listed powers that were all expressly
enumerated in the Constitution.45 Although the Court described
the authority to exclude aliens as one of the attributes of a sover-
eign nation, it did not identify any specific provision of the
Constitution that gives that power to the federal government. The
Court did not rule, for example, that the ability to regulate
immigration is rooted in either the Foreign Commerce or Natural-
ization Clauses. And Justice Field's assertion that the proposition
is not "open to controversy" would surely have surprised the four
dissenting Justices in the Passenger Cases. Just forty years earlier,
they held that the power to exclude aliens belongs to the states.46
Chae Chan Ping, however, did more than just affirm the federal
power to control immigration. The Court ruled that the judiciary
should not review substantive claims about the application of the
1888 law. Chae Chan Ping contended that the law could not
11 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603.42 See id. at 604.
4
3 Id.
44 See id. at 609.
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (power to declare war); id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1
(power to enter into treaties); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (same); id. art. I, § 8, d. 15 (power
to suppress insurrections and repel invasions); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power to regulate
foreign commerce); id. art. IV, § 4 (duty to guarantee every state a republican form
of government); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (power to establish a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion).
46 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at
190 (citing the ruling of the four dissentingJustices to support his argument that the
Framers' failure to include an express federal power to exclude aliens in the Constitu-
tion was not because "the existence of such a power was too obvious to require
mention").
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constitutionally be applied to him. He had a right to be in the
United States under the laws and treaties in effect at the time he
left.47 As applied to him, Chae Chan Ping argued, the 1888 law was
either a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.4" Yet the Court
refused to decide whether the 1888 law could be applied retroactive-
ly, holding that such claims are not questions forjudicial determina-
tion and that decisions by the federal government in this area are
"conclusive upon the judiciary."" Chae Chan Ping thus stands not
only for the proposition that the exclusion power is an implied
federal power, but also that its exercise is due an extreme form of
judicial deference. The courts may not determine whether the
exercise of the federal exclusion power meets the constitutional
standards that measure most governmental acts.
After Chae Chan Ping, the plenary power doctrine-including the
principle of judicial deference-came into full force. In Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States,50 a Japanese immigrant challenged an exclu-
sion decision. An immigration act authorized officers to greet
arriving vessels and to deny permission to land to "persons likely to
become a public charge."5 1 Nishimura Ekiu was excluded on this
ground.5 2 The Court found that the statute was properly enacted
under the federal government's inherent sovereign authority to
control immigration.5" Under the statute, immigration officials had
sole discretionary authority to make exclusion decisions. 54 Hence,
the Court could only inquire whether the immigration officer was
" See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 586-88 (argument for Appellant).
48 See id. at 589.
49 Id. at 606. Stephen Legomsky argues that the "conclusive on the judiciary"
language was never meant to prevent judicial review of all laws enacted under
Congress's (new) exclusion power. He contends that the language "meant only that
the Court could not interfere because Congress had done nothing unconstitutional."
LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 193. It is true that the Court acknowledged that the
government's inherent sovereign powers were restricted by the Constitution. See Chae
Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604. But Legomsky's argument does not explain why the
Court refused to address Chae Chan Ping's ex post facto and bill of attainder claims.
These were constitutional issues. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."). If the Court had been truly
committed to measuring whether specific exercises of inherent sovereign power
exceeded constitutional limitations, the Court would have decided those issues.
o 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
5 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084-85.
52 See Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656. Customs officials ordered her detained in
a mission pending a final exclusion decision. See id. at 653.
53 See id. at 659.
5 See id. at 660.
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properly appointed under the statute and whether the statute
authorized the officer's actionsF 5
As in Chae Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu challenged her exclusion
order by filing a habeas corpus petition.56 In Chae Chan Ping, the
Court did not indicate whether its decision was influenced by the
procedural posture of the case. By contrast, in Nishimura Ekiu the
Court specifically acknowledged its limited powers of review under
habeas corpus doctrines." Although the scope of judicial review
was restricted by the habeas corpus principle of "jurisdiction,"
58
Justice Gray, writing for the Court, penned an opinion that would
appear to apply to any immigration challenge in any context. The
opinion contains a classic statement of the plenary power doctrine:
"It is not within the province of the judiciary" to order the entry of
foreigners who are neither naturalized nor are residents of the
United States.5 For these people, "the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law."
60
Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu were both exclusion cases.
The Court had more difficulty determining whether to apply all
elements of the plenary power doctrine in deportation matters. In
finding that excludable aliens had no rights, the Nishimura Ekiu
Court compared excludable aliens to resident aliens-people already
on our soil. Thus, Nishimura Ekiu seemingly would afford deport-
able aliens, who may only be removed from the country through the
deportation process, a strong claim to the protections of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court initially applied the plenary
power doctrine equally in deportation and exclusion matters. The
power to deport, the Court held, is "as absolute and unqualified" as
the power to exclude aliens. 6' But the Court later eased its
55 See id. at 662-64.
5 See id. at 652-53; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582-83.
17 See Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 662 (distinguishing a habeas corpus petition
from other civil actions). The Court determined that the immigration inspector had
been properly appointed. See id. at 662-63. The immigration statute did not provide
for judicial review. See id. at 663. The Court concluded that the judiciary cannot
examine the decisions of an immigration inspector "acting within the jurisdiction
conferred upon him." Id.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59 Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660.
o Id. (citing Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1856), and Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884)).
61 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). The Fong Yue Ting
Court was faced with a challenge to yet another statute relating to Chinese laborers.
This newest law required Chinese laborers in the United States to apply for a certifi-
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application of the "judicial deference" element of the plenary power
doctrine in deportation cases. In 1903, it ruled that the actions of
deportation officers must be measured by the Due Process
Clause.6 2 The Court held that a deportable alien must be afforded
an opportunity to be heard and that immigration officials cannot act
arbitrarily.63
Thus, by the start of this century, the Supreme Court had
established the main contours of the plenary power doctrine and of
constitutional immigration law.6 4 During the next fifty years, the
Supreme Court would continue to echo these same basic themes.
Deportable aliens, who were by definition within United States
territory, could raise constitutional challenges in deportation cases.
Nevertheless, the scope of judicial review would be limited to
procedural claims or to assertions that immigration officials acted
arbitrarily.6 5 Excludable aliens received less generous treatment.
cate of residence; those without certificates could be deported. See Act of May 5,
1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25-26. The majority found that deportation is not
punishment and that an alien facing deportation is not entitled to the same
procedural protections as a person facing criminal charges. See Fong Yue Ting, 149
U.S. at 730. The Court refused to decide whether the procedures contained in the
new law were constitutional and, instead, simply deferred to Congress and the execu-
tive. See id. at 712, 731. ThreeJustices, however, would have struck down the statute
as violating due process; these Justices would have distinguished between the power
to deport and the power to exclude. See id. at 733, 736-38 (Brewer,J., dissenting); id.
at 746, 754-60 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761-63 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
62 See The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1903). The decision was driven by the notion that aliens already here are likely to
have strong connections to the United States. In announcing its rule, the Court left
aside the question whether the Due Process Clause would protect an alien who has
clandestinely entered "and who has been here for too brief a period to have become,
in any real sense, a part of our population." Id. at 100.
63 See id. at 101. The Court, however, stopped short of permitting a right to
judicial review. See id. at 102.
4 Hiroshi Motomura writes that these cases "established a classical immigration
law with two significant dimensions-the alien's location and the nature of the
constitutional challenge to an adverse immigration decision." Motomura, Phantom
Norms, supra note 15, at 554 (footnote omitted). Peter Schuck describes "classical
immigration law" as containing "seven central elements": "(1) the restrictive ideal of
national community; (2) the principle ofjudicial deference; (3) the extraconstitutional
status of exclusion; (4) the broad federal power to classify aliens; (5) the civil nature
of the deportation sanction; (6) the detention power; and (7) the integration of
adjudication and enforcement." Schuck, supra note 15, at 7-8.
65 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149, 156 (1945) (holding that in habeas
proceedings, a court limits its review so as to determine only whether there is some
evidence supporting the deportation order); United States ex reL Vajtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) (holding that an alien may
raise a due process challenge to deportation procedures and orders that are not
supported by any evidence; a habeas corpus court will not reweigh the facts, but will
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Since the Constitution stops at the border, aliens could not raise
constitutional challenges to the exclusion process.
66
There was one significant development during the first half of
the twentieth century. Although it was clear that the immigration
power resided with the federal government, it was not entirely
determine whether there is some evidence to support the deportation order); United
States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1924) (holding that an alien cannot
prove denial of a fair deportation hearing merely by proving that an administrative
decision was wrong). There was, however, a statutory exception to even this limited
judicial review. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 164, 173 (1948) (upholding a
statute granting an executive the power to deport, without any hearing, an enemy
alien during time of war, and precludingjudicial review of orders issued under that
power).
" See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (noting that an
excludable alien is regarded "as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdic-
tion" and that no judicial trial is required by the Due Process Clause even when the
alien claims to be a citizen). The era was also marked by a number of decisions that
confused (and sometimes even equated) exclusion with deportation. See Motomura,
Curious Evolution, supra note 15, at 1641 & n.76.
In some exclusion matters, however, the Court was willing to recognize an
exception to the plenary power doctrine. People in exclusion proceedings who
claimed to be citizens could perhaps also raise a due process challenge based on
arbitrary action of governmental officials. The main case establishing this "citizenship
exception" was KwockJan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). The petitioner claimed
to be a citizen and presented substantial evidence that he was born in the United
States. Part of the administrative record was not transcribed, however; the
immigration authorities made a final exclusion decision based on a record that did
not contain the testimony of witnesses who had identified the petitioner as a citizen.
See id. at 459-60, 464.
With this exception, aliens continued to bring habeas corpus petitions
challenging immigration decisions, although it is unclear how many petitions met with
any success on the merits. Henry Hart wrote that, prior to 1950, the courts
recognized their responsibility to ensure that immigrants "were not unreasonably
subjected, even by direction of Congress, to an uncontrolled official discretion."
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953). Under these principles,
Hart wrote, "the law grew and flourished, like Egypt under the rule of Joseph.
Thousands of cases were decided whose presence in the courts cannot be explained
on any other basis." Id. at 1391.
Despite the raw number of cases, it must be acknowledged that even those courts
willing to entertain due process challenges applied a weak standard. Petitioners who
claimed that immigration decisions were "arbitrary" had a heavy burden to meet. See
Martin, supra note 15, at 175 (stating that the standards for fairness "were not terribly
rigorous"). Motomura contends that the federal courts still did not engage in active
judicial review: "Professor Hart must have focused on the rhetoric of the (due
process] decisions .... rather than on the actual results reached." Motomura,
Curious Evolution, supra note 15, at 1639 n.64. As Motomura points out, even Kwock
Jan Fat, where the Court granted relief, may not be "a ringing endorsement of
nonwhite aliens' right to be heard, since the Court's indignation stemmed at least
partly from the fact that white United States citizens' testimony had been all but
ignored." Id. at 1640-41.
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certain whether that power was reposed primarily with the Congress
or with the President. In an early series of cases, the Supreme
Court held that the plenary power over immigration was a congres-
sional power." There was a shift in the late 1930s. In United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,6" the Supreme Court found that the
states could never have possessed sovereign authority in matters of
foreign affairs. 69 The power to expel undesirable aliens, the Court
held, is one of the powers relating to international affairs that is not
expressly affirmed by the Constitution but that is "inherently
inseparable from the conception of nationality." ° Moreover, the
67 See, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329,334
(1932) ("Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, control of the
admission of aliens is committed exclusively to Congress... ."); Lapina v. Williams,
232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914) ("The authority of Congress over the general subject-matter
is plenary; it may exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the terms and conditions
upon which they may come into or remain in this country."); Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339-40 (1909) ("[O]ver no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [immigra-
tion].").
8 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
6 9 See id. at 316. These powers were therefore passed to the federal government
not by the Constitution, but by the signing of the Declaration of Independence. See
id. Justice Sutherland, who wrote for the Court in Curtiss-Wright, had propounded
these same views many years before the Curtiss-Wright decision. See GEORGE
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 35-47, 56-60 (1919).
70 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. The doctrine of inherent federal sovereign
power seems to run counter to the principles under which the Constitution was
adopted. Even if there are certain generally recognized powers of a sovereign, these
powers may be restricted by the "consent of the nation." The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). As Stephen Legomsky argues, the
Constitution, which reposes only limited affirmative powers in the federal government
and restricts other acts, was adopted by the "consent of the nation." LEGOMSKY, supra
note 15, at 185 (quoting ChiefJustice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 136). The constitutional limitations on federal power ought to be
recognized as limitations on federal sovereign power. See id. at 185-90. Ron Garet
has suggested to me that early in our nation's history, most citizens might well have
agreed with the concept of inherent sovereign powers, but would have thought that
any such powers should be exercised by the states and not by the federal government.
See Conversation with Ron Garet, Carolyn Craig Franklin Professor of Law and
Religion, U.S.C. Law Center, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Aug. 1994).
Some have postulated that inherent federal sovereign powers may be implied
from the structure of the Constitution, which, after all, places in the federal
government powers that are usually given to independent nations. See ALEINIKOFF
& MARTIN, supra note 15, at 17-18. But see LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 190-91
(criticizing this proposition). But if the federal government was to have inherent
authority in matters of foreign affairs, it is not clear why the Framers thought it
necessary to enumerate certain specific federal powers that relate to foreign affairs,
but not others. See id. at 191-92; Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 24 n.* (1972).
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President is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations."
71
Between Chae Chan Ping and Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court
was not clear whether the Congress or the executive had primary
authority in matters of immigration. However, it was certain that
the executive's actions would be accorded judicial deference,
whether those actions were taken pursuant to a congressional grant
or an inherent sovereign power.
C. The Parole Power and the "Entry Fiction"
Before turning to the exclusion and detention of aliens in
contemporary law, it is important to consider the relevance of
aliens' physical presence on our land. By the late nineteenth
century, it became impossible to complete all immigration inspec-
tions aboard vessels. Congress therefore passed several immigration
laws to permit inspectors to order the "temporary removal" of an
alien from a vessel for inspection; the statutes also specified that
this removal would not be considered "a landing."72 The "removal"
and "landing" provisions were the beginning of what has come to be
called the "entry fiction."7 Under this fiction, an alien on United
States soil pending admission would be treated as if she was still at
the border, and was not within the United States. 74 Because courts
did not consider the Constitution to reach extraterritorially, the Due
Process Clause would only protect an alien who had managed to
effect "a landing."
71 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
' Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 15, 39 Stat. 874, 885; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch.
1134, § 16, 34 Stat. 898, 903; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085-
86. All three acts contained precisely the same language about "removals" and
"landings."
" See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing the
"entry fiction" as the principle "that excludable aliens are to be treated as if detained
at the border despite their physical presence in the United States"); Augustin v. Sava,
735 F.2d 32, 36 n.8 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining the "entry doctrine");Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957,968-69 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistent-
ly rejected claims that the parole or detention of an excludable alien has any effect
on his status under the law."), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
7" For example, Nishimura Ekiu was removed from a steamship and placed
temporarily in the Methodist Chinese Mission because the vessel was "not a proper
place" to detain her. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 653 (1892).
Placingher in the mission "left her in the same [legal] position ... as if she never had
been removed from the steamship." Id. at 661; see also Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8, 12-13 (1908) ("[T]he petitioner gains no additional right of entrance by
being allowed to pass the frontier in custody for the determination of his case.").
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The entry fiction becomes increasingly strained when "removals"
are extended in time. In Kaplan v. Tod,75 the Court first addressed
the problem of a long-term "removal." Kaplan was ordered
excluded in 1914, but she could not be returned to her home
country due to the war.76 She was held for a year on Ellis Island
and eventually was placed by immigration authorities with a local
charity. 77 The authorities issued a warrant in 1923, seeking to
return Kaplan home.71 Kaplan challenged the warrant. She
alleged that she could not be excluded because she had already
effected an entry into the United States.79 The Court rejected her
claim, ruling that Kaplan's placement did not alter her legal status:
"She was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained
no foothold in the United States."80
The Kaplan Court did not cite to any statute giving the executive
the power to place an alien inside the country. The case contains
no discussion of whether Kaplan's nine-year placement could be
considered a "temporary removal" under the statute, or whether the
power to release an alien during a protracted exclusion process
sprang from some other source. Releasing excludable aliens on
"immigration parole" became an administrative practice, even
though it may not have been strictly authorized by statute."' In
1952, Congress codified the parole power as part of a sweeping
revision of the immigration laws.12 The statute also provides that
parole "shall not be regarded as an admission," 8 meaning that
release on parole does not confer territorial standing.
75 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
76 See id. at 229.
7 See id.
71 See id.
7 See id. at 230.
" Id. (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892)).
81 At least one set of commentators has noted that immigration parole "was
fashioned by administrative ingenuity alone, without statutory sanction." ALEINIKOFF
& MARTIN, supra note 15, at 348.
" See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163,
188 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
That section provides that the Attorney General may, in his or her discretion,
temporarily parole excludable aliens into the United States. See id. The parole may
be under conditions prescribed by the executive and must be for "emergent reasons"
or "reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Id. In Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958), the Court noted that this provision was "generally a
codification of the administrative practice."
s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
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D. History Lessons
One may make several observations from the history of the
plenary power doctrine. First, whatever the source of the federal
immigration authority, it is not an enumerated power. And, for
many years, it was not settled that the federal government had
authority over immigration at all. This point tends to undercut
assertions that the immigration power is so central to the executive's
function that the courts must be disabled from reviewing the merits
of all exclusion decisions. In addition, this point is relevant to a
comparison between the judicial deference prong of the plenary
power doctrine and another rule ofjudicial deference. As discussed
later in this Article, the political question doctrine provides a test
for courts to use when it is claimed that the judiciary must defer to
the executive. One part of the test is whether the text of the
Constitution commits the issue to a coordinate branch of govern-
ment.
8 4
Second, as Nishimura Ekiu makes clear, the restrictions on
judicial review of exclusion decisions were in part due to doctrinal
limits on the reach of federal habeas corpus. At the time, courts
looked to see whether the custodian or the court lacked "jurisdic-
tion" over the petitioner. The Supreme Court expressly abandoned
the "jurisdiction" limitation in 1942.5 To the extent that the
judicial deference prong of the plenary power doctrine may be
based upon the now-repudiated notion of jurisdiction, it is no
longer on sound footing.
Third, the Court in Chae Chan Ping did not explain why the
existence of federal immigration authority meant that the judiciary
could not decide whether immigration officers have violated a
person's enumerated rights. The lack of a clear theory necessarily
weakens the judicial deference prong of the doctrine.
Some observations are also warranted about the entry fiction
and its interplay with the plenary power doctrine. One may readily
understand the need for immigration parole as a humanitarian
device. It is difficult to question Congress's wisdom in codifying the
parole power and the entry fiction. Nevertheless, the statutory
entry fiction has been elevated to constitutional status. As discussed
in the next part of this Article, the fiction has been permitted to
determine who is a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process
8 See infra notes 387, 393-98 and accompanying text.
s See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
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Clause. Statutes do not normally decide the construction of the
Due Process Clause.8 6 What gives the entry fiction its potency is
the plenary power doctrine. Under the doctrine's extreme form of
judicial deference, the courts have been unwilling to examine the
scope of the entry fiction. The plenary power doctrine permits the
entry fiction to be given constitutional significance.
II. THE ZENITH OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
AND STORIES UNTOLD
During the early 1950s, the Supreme Court decided a pair of
cases, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy7 and Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei,8" that together represent the modern
zenith of the plenary power doctrine in the Supreme Court. In
these decisions, the Court reinforced the notions that the Constitu-
tion stops at the border and that the government has absolute and
unreviewable authority in exclusion matters.
This part of the Article explores the full stories of Ellen Knauff
and Ignatz Mezei. The Supreme Court decisions in the two cases
are well-known. The accounts of their lives, however, have either
not been fully told or have been forgotten. They are remarkable.
Knauff and Mezei were both initially excluded from the country
without hearings. In both cases, public pressure forced the
government to hold further proceedings, and Knauff and Mezei
were eventually released into the United States. Their stories are
worth telling for several reasons. They are of historical interest
because Knauff and Mezei are the leading cases on the government's
power to exclude and detain. But the full stories also reveal the
tension between the Supreme Court's pronouncements of abstract
legal rules and the public's acceptance of those rules. Moreover,
they illustrate the importance and value of a hearing.
86 For example, once a court finds that a person has an interest protected by the
Due Process Clause, the process that is due is a matter of federal law. The process
due is not limited simply to the procedures set out by statute. See Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982).
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
88 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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A. Ellen Knauff in the Courts
Ellen Knauff was born in Germany in 1915.9 While Hitler was
in power, Knauff went to Czechoslovakia, where she was married
and later divorced."0 In 1939, she retreated to England as a
refugee. 1 Knauff served as a flight sergeant with the Royal Air
Force in England from 1943 to 1946, and later worked as a civilian
employee of the United States Army in Germany, serving in both
the Civil Censorship and Signal Divisions. 2 In 1948, she married
Kurt Knauff in Germany.13 Kurt Knauff, a United States citizen,
was an Army veteran and fellow civilian Army employee.9 4 Kurt
and Ellen Knauff received permission to marry from the Army's
Commanding General at Frankfurt.9 5 She subsequently took a
temporary leave from her civilian job and traveled to the United
States to apply for naturalization under the immigration laws9 6 and
under the recently passed War Brides Act.
9 7
Ellen Knauff arrived in the United States on August 14, 1948."8
That same day, she was temporarily excluded from the United States
and was detained at Ellis Island.9 Two months later, the Attorney
General ordered Knauff excluded, without a hearing, because "her
admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States.""'0 Knauff brought a habeas corpus petition to challenge
this decision. Both the district court and the court of appeals
denied relief.'
The Supreme Court affirmed.0 2 In a four-to-three decision,
the Court found that the Attorney General was authorized to
exclude Knauff without a hearing for security reasons. 0 3 Under
a 1941 Act, the executive could promulgate regulations restricting
"' See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
9 See id.
91 See id.
' See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, 173 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
93 See id.
9 See id.
" See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
9See Knauff, 173 F.2d at 601.
17 See id. at 603-04 (citing Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1946)).
9' See Knauff, 338 U.S at 539.
9See id.
100 Id. at 539-40.
101 See Knauff, 173 F.2d at 601, 604.
1" See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547.
... See id. at 544. Justices Clark and Douglas did not participate in the case.
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entry into the United States during wartime." 4 The President
issued a proclamation providing that an alien may be excluded if his
or her entry "would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States."'0 5  Under regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General, the alien could be excluded without a hearing on the basis
of confidential information, if disclosure would be similarly
prejudicial. 6 The statutory and regulatory schemes were upheld;
the national emergency, the Court ruled, had never been terminat-
ed, and the power to exclude aliens stemmed from the executive's
inherent authority, as well as from the legislation passed by Con-
gress.
1 07
The plurality opinion went further and reinvigorated the judicial
deference prong of the plenary power doctrine. Admission, the
Court held, is a privilege, not a right.0 8 The executive's exclusion
decision "is final and conclusive."0 9 Thus, "[w]hatever the rule
may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry
into the United States, it is not within the province of any court,
unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of
the political branch of the Government to exclude a given
alien.""0  Citing Nishimura Ekiu,"'1 the plurality gave a classic
statement of the doctrine: "Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned."' 12 In addition to Nishimura Ekiu, the Court relied upon
Curtiss-Wright"5  and its formulation of inherent authority.1
4
The Court also found that the War Brides Act, which would
otherwise have permitted Knauff's entry, did not alter Knauff's
104 See Act ofJune 21, 1941, ch. 210,55 Stat. 252 (1942) (authorizing the President
to promulgate restrictions on immigration during time of war or national emergency).
The President had previously declared a national emergency. See Proclamation No.
2487, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55 Stat. 1647 (1942).
105 Proclamation No. 2523,3 C.F.R. 270-72 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55 Stat. 1696,
1698 (1942), amended by Proclamation No. 2850, 3 C.F.R. 27-28 (1949-1953), reprinted
in 63 Stat. 1289, 1289-90 (1950).
I- See 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (Supp. 1945); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 541 n.3.
107 See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
'03 See id.
109 id. at 543.
11 Id. (citations omitted).
. For a discussion of Nishimura Ekiu, see supra notes 50-63 and accompanying
text.
112 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.
.. For a discussion of Curtiss-Wright, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
14 See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (noting that when Congress passes a law concerning
the admission of aliens, "it is not dealing alone with a legislative power"; rather, "[iut
is [also] implementing an inherent executive power").
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status or remove her from the Attorney General's exclusion
power."
5
ThreeJustices dissented. Justice Frankfurter did not contest the
government's overall authority to exclude aliens. Rather, he argued
that the more specific War Brides Act overrode the general powers
contained in the 1941 legislation." 6  He also suggested that
considerations of national security could be protected by an in
camera hearing."
7
Justice Jackson wrote the primary dissent. Like Frankfurter,
Jackson did not question Congress's ability to authorize immigration
officers to exclude aliens.1" But he believed that Congress would
have to use more specific language than that contained in the 1941
legislation before administrators could break up a family." 9
Because Knauff had been excluded without a hearing, the Court did
not know the basis for the claim that Knauff's admission would
compromise national security. Jackson was willing to believe that
the immigration officers acted from a sense of duty "and no doubt
upon information which, if it stood the test of trial, would justify
the order of exclusion." 2 ° "But," he wrote, "not even they know
whether it would stand this test."'21 Hence, "[t]he plea that
evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because
it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the
meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetect-
ed and uncorrected."
1 22
The rule of Knauff is that the government has absolute power to
exclude. When an official claims that the exclusion concerns the
country's security, no court may examine the government's claim.
"
5 See id. at 546.
See id. at 548-50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
... See id. at 549.
18 See id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting, joined by Black and Frankfurter,JJ.) ("I
do not question the constitutional power of Congress to authorize immigration
authorities to turn back from our gates any alien or class of aliens.").
"9 See id. at 551-52. Knauff has appropriately been called a test of the plenary
power doctrine "against the countervalues of Home and Motherhood." HARRY
KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 438 (1988).
12 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 551 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12 Id.
1I d.
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B. The Rest of the Story (Mrs. Knauff Goes
to Washington)
The Supreme Court's decision did not play in Peoria or on
Capitol Hill. Newspapers across the country condemned the Court's
ruling. 2 ' The St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the New York Post mount-
ed publicity campaigns for Ellen Knauff,'24 and, in the face of this
publicity, Congress rallied to her support. Senator William C.
Langer introduced a private bill for Knauff's relief.'25 Represen-
tative Francis E. Walter, a ranking member of the Judiciary
Committee, introduced a similar measure in the House. 26 The
Attorney General rushed to deport Knauff before Congress could
act on the legislation, but this effort was thwarted by several stays,
including one from Justice Jackson.
127
125 See, e.g., Awe for the Attorney General?, ST. LOUIS PoST-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 1950,
atAl (noting that the case needs rethinking); The Banished WarBride, N.Y. POST, Feb.
14, 1950, at 33, § 1 ("[W]e think Justice Jackson's dissent . . . far more eloquently
voices the American conscience."); The Case of Ellen Knauff, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 18, 1950, at 2C ("[T]he decision against Mrs. Knauff... presented one of the
most unusual spectacles in Supreme Court history."); The Case of the War Bride, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1950, at 16 ("[I]rrespective of a man's citizenship ... he should be
informed of charges against him and should have the opportunity of answering
them."); The G.l.'s Bride, OMAHA SUNDAY WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 19, 1950, at F6
(noting that Mrs. Knauff should have had the right to a hearing); The KnauffAffair,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1950, at 28 (stating that the opinion was most notable for
Jackson's dissent); The Knauff Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1950, at El2 ("We think the
law should be revised ... ."); The Letter Killeth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1950, at 12
(supporting Jackson's dissent).
124 Irving Dilliard wrote a series of 15 editorials for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. See
Woman with a Countiy, TIME, Apr. 17, 1950, at 57-58 (describing the publicity
campaign, and calling the campaign "more effective" thanJusticeJackson's dissent).
Full-page advertisements supporting Knauffalso appeared in the Washington Post and
the Washington Star. See id. at 58; see also ELLEN KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY
101-04, 106 (1952) (describing interviews with the press); Immigration: Case of Ellen
Knauff, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1950, at 24,27 (discussing the publicity). Knauff's book,
though one-sided, contains many helpful and otherwise unavailable details about her
personal life and her case.
125 See S. 2979, 81 Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The bill was introduced in the Senate
on February 2, 1950 and was referred to theJudiciary Committee. See 96 CONG. REC.
1333 (1950); see also KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 99 (describing a meeting between
Knauff and Senator Langer at which he promised to introduce the bill).
126 See H.R. 7614, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). This bill directed the Attorney
General to discontinue exclusion proceedings against Knauff and to consider her as
having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as of the date of her last
entry. See 96 CONG. REC. 6174 (1950).
12 During the course of the Supreme Court proceedings, Knauff was free on
bond, which had been set by Justice Jackson, sitting as circuit justice. See KNAUFF,
supra note 124, at 82-83. The Supreme Court's mandate, denying habeas corpus
relief, was filed in the district court on February 20, 1950. See United States ex rel
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A House subcommittee held hearings on Representative Walter's
bill. 28 In a letter to the Judiciary Committee, the Justice Depart-
Knauffv. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1950). On February 23, immigration
authorities arrested Knauff and prepared to deport her. See KNAUFF, supra note 124,
at 107-12.
Knauff was scheduled to be deported on February 28, 1950. On February 27,
her counsel filed a habeas corpus petition to stay the deportation. See Knauff, 181
F.2d at 840. Counsel alleged that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
invariably suspended deportation proceedings if a private bill was introduced for the
relief of an alien and that, in the Knauff case, the INS improperly determined not to
follow its own policy. See id. The district court denied relief. See id. A split court
of appeals granted a stay and remanded for the district court to conduct a hearing
into the INS's policy. See id. at 843. On remand, the district court denied relief, and
this time the court of appeals affirmed. See United States ex rel. Knauffv. McGrath,
182 F.2d 1020, 1020 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated, 340 U.S. 940 (1951).
The court of appeals decided the second stay case on May 16, 1950. See id. The
INS attempted to deport Knauff on May 17, the very next day. See KNAUFF, supra
note 124, at 147. Knauff's lawyers sought Supreme Court review and asked for a stay.
JusticeJackson issued a stay on May 17. See id. at 152-54 (reprinting the stay order);
96 CONG. REC. A3750, A3750-51 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Franklin D. Roosevelt,Jr.)
(reprinting the stay order). Jackson seemed incensed by the INS's actions in "[b]und-
ling this woman onto an airplane to get her out of this country within hours after the
decision of the court of appeals." Id. at A3751.
Justice Jackson's stay came at the very last second. Knauff was already at the
airport. She learned of the stay just before boarding the plane. In fact, the plane
took off with her luggage. See KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 147-49. The government's
efforts to deport Knauff were quickly and roundly condemned in both the press and
the Congress. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. A3750 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Franklin D.
Roosevelt,Jr.); id. atA3990 (remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler); Max Lerner, One Is Not
Zero, N.Y. POST, May 18, 1950, at 28 (questioningJustice Department policy on the
matter); Whose?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1950, at 2E (same).
12' The first hearing was held on March 27, 1950. See Exclusion of Ellen Knauff:
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judicialy on H.R 7614, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter Exclusion of Ellen Knauff]. Prior to the hearing,
the Subcommittee served a subpoena upon Edward J. Shaughnessy, the district
director of immigration in New York, commanding Shaughnessy to bring Knauff to
Washington. See id. at 1 (statement of Rep. Walter noting the subpoena). TheJustice
Department directed Shaughnessy to disregard the subpoena. See id. at 3 (statement
of McKay, Deputy Commissioner of Immigration). A Supreme Court rule provided
that pending a review of the denial of a habeas corpus petition, the custody of a
prisoner "shall not be disturbed." H.R. REP. No. 1940, 8 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950)
(letter from Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General, quoting former Sup. Ct.
R. 45). TheJustice Department took the position that Knauff could not be brought
to Washington without permission of the Second Circuit, see id., which, ironically, was
deciding whether to stay Knauff's deportation to permit action on Representative
Walter's bill. The House Subcommittee was angered even more because it appeared
that the Second Circuit was willing to consent to Knauff's trip to Washington, but
Shaughnessy would not file the necessary court papers to obtain that consent. See
Exclusion of Ellen Knauff, supra, at 1 (citing an Associated Press story that quoted
Shaughnessy). The hearings were continued to permit the Subcommittee to receive
a report from the Justice Department. See id. at 3.
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ment opposed the bill and asserted that the Attorney General acted
properly in excluding Knauff without a hearing. 2 9 The Depart-
ment's letter reviewed the procedural history of the case, but did
not reveal-even to Congress-the confidential information upon
which the exclusion decision was based.' Knauff testified before
the Subcommittee. She explained that she neither had received an
exclusion hearing nor had been officially told the reasons for her
exclusion.u13 Knauff and Representative Ed Gossett discussed
"gossip" that Knauff had previously furnished secrets to Czechoslo-
vakian officials.1 3 2 Knauff denied ever giving any information to
the Czech government or engaging in any acts of espionage or
disloyalty.' 33 Justice Department officials at the hearing declined
to question Knauff, and they would not provide Congress with any
of the facts supporting the exclusion decision.' Angered by the
Department's position, the Judiciary Committee reported the bill
favorably, and it passed unanimously in the House.
3 5
Although the House acted quickly, the private bill languished in
the Senate until the end of the session. 136 In January 1951, private
bills were introduced again in a new session of Congress. 3 7 That
On March 28, the day after the first hearing, the Second Circuit ruled in the
habeas corpus case and stayed Knauff's deportation. See United States ex rel. Knauff
v. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir. 1950). The next Congressional hearing was
held on April 3, 1950, and Knauffwas brought to Washington to testify. See Exclusion
of Ellen Knauff, supra, at 5.
129 See H.R. REP. No. 1940, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) (letter from Peyton
Ford).
ISO See id.
' See Exclusion of Ellen Knauff, supra note 128, at 7 (testimony of Ellen Knauff).
"'3 See id. at 10-11. Although Knauffhad never been officially notified of the facts
underlying the Attorney General's exclusion order, she was aware of the gist of the
allegations against her. As Knauff explains in her book, her cousin had a friend who
contacted Attorney General Tom Clark in the latter part of 1948. Clark wrote to the
friend that Knauff"was formerly a paid agent of the Czechoslovak Government, and
reported on American Personnel assigned to the Civil Censorship Division in
Germany." KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 54 (quoting letter from Tom Clark).
'" See Exclusion ofEllen Knauff, supra note 128, at 11 (testimony of Ellen Knauff).
134 See id. at 9, 11 (statements of Commissioner Miller, INS, and Deputy Commis-
sioner McKay, INS). At the conclusion of the hearing, Knauff-whom the Attorney
General asserted was a risk to national security-was Senator Langer's lunch guest in
the Senate dining room. See id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Walter noting that Senator
Langer wanted to meet with her); see also KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 137-38.
195 See 96 CONG. REC. 6174 (1950); KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 141.
"29 See KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 158-60 (describing lobbying efforts in the
Senate); M'Carran Unit Acts Against Mrs. Knauff, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1950, at 20
(reporting that Senator McCarran's Subcommittee would recommend that the Senate
Judiciary Committee pigeonhole the bill).
137 The House bill, H.R. 893, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REC. 40 (1951), was
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same month, Knauff's husband met with Attorney General McGrath,
who ordered immigration officials to reopen the case.138 Knauff-
who had been denied entry as a "security risk"-was paroled from
Ellis Island by the Attorney General. 3 9 In March 1951, two and
one-half years after the first order of exclusion was entered,
Attorney General McGrath decided that Knauff should be afforded
a full exclusion hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry. 140 At
that time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service regularly
conducted hearings before three-member panels, called Boards of
Special Inquiry.1
4 '
At the hearing, the government sought to exclude Ellen Knauff
because she allegedly engaged in espionage while she was employed
by the Army's Civil Censorship Division in Frankfurt, Germany.
4 2
introduced by Representative Walter onJanuary 3, 1951. The Senate measure, S.
372, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REC. 128 (1951), was introduced by Senator
Hennings on January 11, 1951. Neither bill was brought to a vote because of the
subsequent actions of the Attorney General.
1 See KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 175-78. At the time, Knauff had pending a
petition for writ of certiorari challenging the administrative proceedings in her case.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Because the Attorney General agreed to
reopen the administrative case, the Supreme Court dismissed Knauff's appeal as
moot. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 940 (1951).
'39 KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 182-83.
140 See Knauff Hearing Slated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1951, at 13. The Attorney
General had the discretion to order a Board of Special Inquiry in Knauff's case. At
the time, the regulations provided that no alien excluded as a security risk could be
afforded a hearing before a Board until directed by the Attorney General. See 8
C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (Supp. 1945). Under the regulation (upheld by the Supreme Court
in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1950)), the
Attorney General could deny a hearingif disclosure of confidential information would
be prejudicial to the public interest. See id. Nothing in this regulation prevented the
Attorney General from directing that a Board of Special Inquiry hear a case if, in the
Attorney General's discretion, a hearing was warranted.
14 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, §§ 16-17, 39 Stat. 886, 886-87 (repealed
1952); 8 C.F.R. § 130.1 (Supp. 1945).
142 The government brought two formal exclusion charges: (1) that Knauff was
excludable under the Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended by
8 U.S.C. § 137 (repealed 1952), because there was reason to believe that Knauff
would be likely to engage in espionage or subversive activity if admitted; and (2) that
Knauff was excludable under 8 C.F.R. § 175.53(k) (Supp. 1945), because even if
Knauff was not a foreign agent or alien enemy, she was of a sufficiently similar
character that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States. See In re Ellen Raphael Knauff, No. A-6937471 (B.I.A. Aug. 29, 1951), 1, 1-2
[hereinafter In re Knauff], reprinted in KNAUFF, supra note 124, app. at 242. A
condensed version of the opinion is published at 1 JAMES A. PIKE & HENRY G.
FISCHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 640 (2d ed. 1952). Because this Article relies upon
sections of the Knauff decision that are not in Pike and Fischer, cites to the Board of
Immigration Appeals decision are to the pages of the typewritten decision as
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The government relied upon three witnesses to prove its case. The
first witness, Anna Lavickova, served as a typist at the Czechoslovak
Liaison Mission in Frankfurt.14 She saw Knauff at the Mission
three times, and observed Knauff visiting the offices of Major
Vecerek and Colonel Podhora."' Lavickova testified that Podhora
was a spy for the Czech government and that Podhora met with
Knauff in the fall of 1947.' According to Lavickova, neither
Vecerek nor Podhora customarily handled passport matters or visas
at the Mission.146 The implication was that there would have been
no reason for Knauff to see these officers unless she was passing
secrets to them.
The government's main witness was Major Vaclav Victor Kadane,
who was attached to the Liaison Mission beginning in August
1947.147 Kadane testified that he saw several intelligence reports
from an agent code-named "Kobyla," including one report about a
new U.S. Army decoding machine, and that in 1948 he received a
message identifying "Kobyla" as Knauff. 48 Kadane admitted that
he had no firsthand knowledge of any espionage work performed by
Knauff, but he asserted that Major Vecerek once told him that
Knauff was a "valuable source of information."
149
The last witness for the government was Captain William
Hacker, a counterintelligence officer at Frankfurt.15  Hacker
asserted that he had received confidential information that Knauff
passed classified information about the Civil Censorship Division to
Colonel Podhora."5 l He also testified that Kadane had told him the
same thing in 1948.152
Knauff was not afforded the same hearing procedures that a
defendant would receive at a criminal trial, 53 but at least she was
reprinted in Knauff.
14 See In re Knauff, supra note 142, at 4.
144 See id. at 5.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 6.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 7.
'-" See id. at 8.
11 See id.
152 See id.
15 For example, the Board considered hearsay evidence on crucial points, such as
messages from unidentified sources naming Knauff as "Kobyla." See id. at 12. The
Board also restricted counsel's cross-examination. Knauff's lawyer was denied
permission to question Captain Hacker about the confidential information given him
or about other alleged information in his dossier on Knauff. See id. at 8.
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able to hear the evidence against her. With this knowledge, Knauff
put forward a defense. Knauff testified that she had indeed visited
the Czechoslovak Liaison Mission; she needed to go there for
passport and visa purposes. 54 Although Anna Lavickova had
claimed that Major Vecerek and Colonel Podhora did not handle
passports and visas, Knauff produced her own passport, which
contained the signatures of both Vecerek and Podhora.1 55 Knauff
had two responses to the allegations that she passed classified
information from the Civil Censorship Division in the fall of 1947
and during 1948. Knauff established that she had left the Division
by early August 1947, and thus had no access to the Division
information after the summer of 1947.156 She also produced
evidence that the Division did not deal in classified or secret
information. 57
The Board, however, ruled against Knauff. She was found to be
excludable as a threat to national security.' Knauff s immigration
parole was revoked and she was once again returned to Ellis
Island.1 59
Knauff appealed the exclusion decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Knauff's
counsel gathered additional affidavits to show that Knauff had no
access to secret or confidential information.
160
The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed. According to the
Board, there was no substantial evidence that Knauff gave secret
information to the Czechoslovakian authorities, nor was there
evidence to support any inference that Knauff would engage in
subversive activities if admitted to the United States.1 6' Uncorrobo-
rated hearsay, the Board held, does not amount to substantial
154 See id. at 9. Ellen Knauff's previous marriage was to a Czech citizen. Prior to
her marriage to Kurt Knauff, she was considered a Czech citizen. See id. at 3.
'ts See id. at 10.
15 See id. at 4, 9.
157 See id. at 11.
" See id. at 2. Edward H. Clark, the chairman of the Board of Special Inquiry,
said that "it was reasonable to suspect" that Knauff would engage in espionage or
other subversive activities if admitted into the United States. Mrs. Knauff Is Called a
Spy; Immigration Unit Bars Her, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1951, at 1, 18.
"' See KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 202-03; Mrs. Knauff Held on Ellis Island, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1951, at 18.
110 The most important item of new information was an affidavit showing that the
U.S. Army's decoding machines were neither secret nor classified. In fact, the Signal
Corps gave the machines to the German government after the war. See In re Knauff,
supra note 142, at 11-12 n.4, 16-17 n.5.
161 See id. at 18.
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evidence to support an exclusion decision. 162 The Board ordered
Knauff admitted to the United States for permanent residence. 63
Attorney General McGrath approved the Board's decision.' 4
The rule of Knauff is that the Attorney General has the unchal-
lengeable power to exclude an alien. But the full story of Ellen
Knauff shows a populace and a Congress unwilling to accept the
exercise of this sort of raw power. And the story illustrates the
value of a hearing. Once the government was required to justify its
exclusion decision with substantial and reliable evidence, in an open
proceeding, Knauff gained admission into the United States.
C. Ignatz Mezei in the Courts
Ellen Knauff was held at Ellis Island during long portions of her
fight for entry into the United States. But she had a choice. If she
wished to abandon her claim for admission, she could leave Ellis
Island and return to Frankfurt, Germany. Ignatz Mezei did not have
that option. His case added a poignant dimension to the Knauff
decision.
Mezei was "born in Gibraltar of Hungarian or Rumanian par-
ents."'6 5 He came to the United States in 1923 and lived in
Buffalo until May 1948.166 He married an American citizen and,
during World War II, sold war bonds and served as an air-raid
warden. 67  In 1948, Mezei left the United States to visit his
162 See id. at 14.
"65 See id. at 18. Ellen Knauff was admitted as a lawful permanent resident.
However, after her admission, Knauff sought to become a U.S. citizen. The INS
fought her petition for naturalization. The Service again raised the old espionage
allegations, and presented new testimony by Colonel Hacker and a counter-
intelligence officer that Knauff had allegedly visited Communist Party headquarters
in Frankfurt for fifteen minutes in 1947. Rather than continue through expensive
and protracted litigation, Knauff gave up her quest for citizenship. See GLENDON
SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON 206 (1969) (citing letter from Knauff's attorney, Alfred
Feingold); Mrs. Knauff Walks out of Hearing on Bid to Obtain U.S. Citizenship, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1953, at 6.
" The Attorney General's order, dated November 2, 1951, is reproduced in
KNAUFF, supra note 124, at app.
165 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953). The
Supreme Court and the district court both discerned "a certain vagueness" about
Mezei's family history. Id.; United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp.
66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd in par; rev'd in part, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
" See Mezei, 101 F. Supp. at 67.
167 See id.
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dying mother in Romania. 6 He was denied permission to enter
Romania, and he remained in Hungary for nineteen months due to
problems in securing exit papers. 69 Mezei obtained a quota
immigrant visa in Budapest and traveled to France, where he
boarded a ship to return to the United States.170 Upon arrival at
Ellis Island in February 1950, Mezei was temporarily excluded under
the same statute and regulations applied to Knauff.17 1 In May
1950, the Attorney General ordered Mezei excluded without a
hearing, based upon confidential information. The Attorney
General determined that disclosing the information would be
"prejudicial to the public interest." 7 2
Mezei repeatedly attempted to leave the United States. Twice
he tried to return to Europe. France and Great Britain both refused
him permission to land.17  The State Department was unable to
negotiate Mezei's readmission to Hungary. 74  Mezei wrote a
dozen Latin American countries for visas, but was turned down.
1 75
I" See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
... See id. Mezei claimed to be a citizen of Great Britain, due to his birth in
Gibraltar. SeeMezei, 101 F. Supp. at 6'7. The record contains evidence that Mezei lost
whatever claim he might have made to derivative Hungarian citizenship. See Tran-
script of Record at 15-17, United States ex rel. Mezel [sic] v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d
964 (2d Cir. 1952) (No. 22263) (affidavit of Alexander Glattstein). The record does
not indicate whether Mezei could claim Romanian citizenship, though that point
seems unimportant since Romania would not allow him to enter.170 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
17' See id.
" Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (Supp. 1945); see also supra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
17' See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208-09. Mezei had traveled through France in 1950
before embarking for the United States. France twice denied Mezei permission to
return because Mezei had never resided in France and was there in transit status only.
See Transcript of Record at 18, Mezei, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952) (No. 22263) (letter
from Pierre Basdevant, Secretary of French Embassy); id. at 20-22 (letter from C. Di
Maria, Manager, Legal Department, Compagnie G~nrale Transatlantique).
Compagnie G~n~rale Transatlantique, which owned the vessel on which Mezei had
traveled to the United States, arranged meetings between Mezei and the British
Consul in New York. See id. at 21 (letter from Di Maria). Mezei was apparently never
able to satisfy the British Consul that he was a British subject. See id. The French
Embassy even asked the U.S. State Department to intervene with the immigration
authorities to allow Mezei to enter the United States. See id. at 18 (letter from Pierre
Basdevant).
171 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
1'75 See id. Compagnie G~nrale Transatlantique also unsuccessfully approached
consulates of different European countries on Mezei's behalf, and solicited the help
of the International Refugee Organization. See Transcript of Record at 22, Mezei, 195
F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952) (No. 22263) (letter from Di Maria).
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Because no country would take him, Mezei remained in custody on
Ellis Island.
Interspersed with his efforts to find a country that would take
him, Mezei filed a series of five habeas corpus petitions. The first
four were summarily denied without addressing the government's
power to exclude and detain an alien who could not leave the
United States. 7 6 The fifth petition was successful. Judge Irving
R. Kaufman ruled that the Constitution "applies even to aliens on
Ellis Island"; under the Due Process Clause, detention pending
exclusion proceedings must still be reasonable. 17  The court
found that Mezei's detention-then twenty-one months long-appear-
ed unreasonable, but that the confinement might be justified if the
government could establish that Mezei's release would endanger
public safety. 17 ' The court offered to review the government's
confidential information in camera.' 79 The government, however,
refused to disclose the evidence and the district court ordered
Mezei released on bond.' The court of appeals affirmed, over
Learned Hand's dissent.' For both the district court and the
majority in the court of appeals, the lengthy detention and the
17
1 See Order, United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 58-211 (S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 1950); Order, United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 61-272
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1950); Order, United States ex teL Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No.
64-156 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1951); Order, Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 67-108
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1951).
177 United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), affid in par4 rev'd in part, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 206
(1953).
178 See id. at 70.
179 See id.
180 See Mezei, 195 F.2d 964, 967, 970 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 206
(1953).
181 See id. at 970. Mezei was unable to raise the necessary funds for release under
the bond set by the district court. The court of appeals remanded for a new bond
hearing to facilitate Mezei's release. See id. The court also denied the government's
motion to stay the issuance of the mandate (pending Supreme Court review). See
Order, United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, C.A. No. 22263 (2d Cir. Apr. 14,
1952).
Judge Hand dissented because he found no constitutional question. See Mezei,
195 F.2d at 970-71 (Hand,J., dissenting). JudgeJohn Noonan has called the dissent
"one of Hand's worst opinions." John T. Noonan,Jr., Master of Restraint, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1994, at 7 (book review). Judge Noonan, in turn, authored the majority
opinion in Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, which distinguished the Supreme Court's (and
Learned Hand's) ruling in Mezei. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314,315-16
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that eight-year detention of excludable alien differed from
detention of Mezei and was not authorized by law), vacated en banc, No. 93-56682,
1995 WL 9709 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 1995).
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prospect of permanent incarceration distinguished this case from
Knauff.1
82
The Supreme Court did not agree. In a five-to-four decision,
the Court held that Mezei was properly excluded and detained
without a hearing."s  Justice Clark wrote for the Court.
18 4
Clark's majority opinion stands as the Court's strongest statement
of the plenary power doctrine and the entry fiction. Citing Chae
Chan Ping and Knauff, the opinion states that the power to exclude
aliens is a "fundamental sovereign attribute" that is "largely immune
from judicial control."185  The Court reiterated the holding in
Knauff that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process."18 6  The majority rejected the argument that
Mezei's indefinite incarceration distinguished the case from Knauff;
no additional rights accrued from his extended stay on Ellis Island.
Mezei had simply not made a "landing" in the United States; for
immigration and constitutional law purposes, Mezei must be treated
"as if stopped at the border."' Further, to admit a person barred
from entry on national security grounds would "nullif[y] the very
purpose of the exclusion proceeding[s]."8's
As in Knauff, Justice Jackson authored the primary dissent.
18 9
Jackson was displeased with the government's conduct in the case.
Indeed, he initially voted to deny the government's petition for a
writ of certiorari, which would have allowed the court of appeals
" See Mezei, 101 F. Supp. at 68 (holding that although Knauff establishes the
power to exclude without a hearing, detention must still be reasonable); Mezei, 195
F.2d at 967 (affirming the lower court's holding).
8 See Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1953).
184 As Attorney General, Tom Clark personally.reviewed (and affirmed) Ellen
Knauff's exclusion order. See KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 54. Justice Clark did not
participate in the consideration or decision of Knauff in the Supreme Court. See
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547 (1950).1 sMezei, 345 U.S. at 210.
"DId. at 212 (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544).
'a
7 Id. at 215 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,661-62 (1892);
United States v.Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230
(1925)).
188 Id. at 216.
189 See id. at 218 (Jackson, J.,joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Black
wrote a separate dissent, agreeing with many of'Jackson's points but emphasizing the
unfairness of imprisonment on the basis of secret information. See id. at 216-18
(Black,J.,joined by Douglas,J., dissenting). Justice Black felt strongly about the case.
He read his dissent from the bench. According to one ofJustice Douglas's law clerks,
Black's reading "was an oration. It went from a whisper to a thunder. The court-
room was transfixed." ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 410-11
(1994) (quoting Douglas's law clerk, Charles Ares).
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decision to stand.' He penned his dissent over the strong
contrary views of one of his law clerks, William H. Rehnquist.
191
'® One of Jackson's law clerks, Donald Cronson, wrote a memorandum to
Jackson, recommending thatJackson vote to deny the government's petition for a writ
of certiorari. See Memorandum from "DC," Clerk, to Justice RobertJackson 1 (no
date) (RHJP) (titled "No. 139 Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex. rel. Mezei"). Cronson thought
that the lower courts' decisions were correct and that "this case tends to point up the
horrors of Knauff." Id. at 1. He was in favor of granting certiorari if Mezei could be
used to overturn Knauff. See id. But Cronson was afraid that the Supreme Court
would reverse the court of appeals, "in which case we are well on our way toward the
institution of the letter de cachet." Id. After counting the votes, he recommended
that Jackson vote to deny review. See id. at 1-2.
FromJackson's handwritten notes on the margin of Cronson's memorandum, it
appears that Jackson followed his law clerk's advice. See id. at 1. Jackson's notes
indicate that he voted to deny certiorari (along withJustices Black, Frankfurter, and
Clark), but at least fourJustices (Reed, Burton, Minton, and Vinson) voted to grant
the government's petition. See id. At the bottom of Cronson's memorandum, the
Justice wrote of his dissatisfaction with Mezei's treatment: "Shame that gov't most
stable[,] powerful and prosperous in world asks France [to] take one whom we fear.
France-exploited by conquor [sic], divided by collaborator[,] shaken by strong
communist power." Id. at 2. These same sentiments found their way intoJackson's
published dissent: "Since we proclaimed him a Samson who might pull down the
pillars of our temple, we should not be surprised if peoples less prosperous, less
strongly established and less stable feared to take him off our timorous hands."
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
191 After certiorari was granted, Rehnquist wrote a memorandum to Jackson,
which was "submitted in great deference" because Rehnquist's opinion was contrary
to Cronson's "and also to some of the views which [Jackson] expressed in Knauff."
See Memorandum from "whr," Clerk, toJustice RobertJackson 1 (no date) (RHJP)
(titled "No. 139 Reflections on Shaughnessy v. Mezei"). Rehnquist raised the entry
fiction, noting that Mezei was legally in the same position as someone attempting to
enter the country for the first time. See id. He attempted to sway Jackson by
distinguishing Knauff as a case mostly about the construction of the War Brides Act.
See id. Rehnquist wrote:
But when we come to this guy, who seeks entry under the provisions
of the general immigration law, I have some trouble crying. He was in this
country twenty-five years and never bothered to become a citizen, and in
this respect the case is sharply distinguishable from Knauff, where Mrs.
Knauff had never had a chance to become a citizen. His case has no
connection with the War Brides Act, and therefore your statutory con-
struction in Knauff would not necessarily carry over here. I think Con-
gress... has provided that this man was exdudible [sic] without [a] hearing.
That it had the power to do so I have not the slightest doubt.... That the
majority on occasion must be checked when proceeding against a minority
of its fellow citizens is inevitable and probably salutary; but that the majority
must be checked in proceeding against hostile aliens by a judge, simply
because he doesn't think deportation is a good idea, is intolerable. If
Congress plainly said that all aliens with green hair shall be excluded, I
know of nothing in the Constitution which would prevent them.
Id. Rehnquist concluded that Mezei's detention at Ellis Island did not affect the case.
Mezei "is perfectly free to get on the first outbound boat that comes along.... I
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Justice Jackson attacked the application of the entry fiction to
Mezei. He acknowledged the "impeccable legal logic of the Govern-
ment's argument" supporting detention, but recognized that such
logic "leads to an artificial and unreal conclusion" when an alien
cannot be returned to another country.192 Although the government
correctly pointed out that Mezei was free to leave Ellis Island,
Jackson wryly noted that "[t]hat might mean freedom, if only
[Mezei] were an amphibianl" "' For Jackson, the touchstone was
reasonableness.' A real threat to the nation could justify deten-
tion, and so Jackson sided with the majority in rejecting Mezei's
substantive due process claim. The Court must uphold the deten-
tion of an enemy alien if the danger is real and the alien is afforded
a reasonable chance to defend himself-that is, if the alien is given
procedural due process. 195 But because Mezei had been given no
chance to defend himself, Jackson split with the majority on the
procedural due process issue.
In ruling that Mezei had been denied procedural due process,
Jackson compared Mezei's detention with the system of "protective
custody" in Nazi Germany.9 6 Jackson argued that Mezei was enti-
tled to notice of the charges against him, the opportunity to
think the government is right." Id. at 2.
192 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).19
3 Id.
'9 See id. at 222-24.
195 See id. at 224.
"' Id. at 225-26. The Mezei dissent quotes portions of Hermann Gaering's
testimony at the Nazi war crimes trials in Nuremberg. According to G6ering, those
who committed acts of treason were turned over to the German courts. Those who
had not committed treason, but "of whom one might expect such acts," were placed
in "protective custody" and were taken to concentration camps. Id. at 225-26 & n.8
(quoting testimony of Hermann G6ering); see also 9 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 420-21 (1947). Jackson
had served as Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg. In this role, he personally cross-
examined Hermann Gaering. See 9 id. at 417-56, 512-71 (cross-examination of
GSering). The Nuremberg prosecutors, includingJackson, considered the system of
"protective custody" to be an important political tool of the Nazi Party. The
Nuremberg indictment alleged that the defendants used "protective custody" to make
the Nazis "secure from attack and to instill fear in the hearts of the German people."
2 id. at 34-35 (reprinting the indictment). In his opening statement,Jackson pointed
out that, less than a month after becoming Chancellor, Hitler had obtained a
suspension of portions of the constitution of the Weimar Republic. One of the
suspended provisions was Article 114, which had restricted the government's ability
to detain individuals. See 2 id. at 110-11. According toJackson, "[s]ecret arrest and
indefinite detention, without charges .... became the method of inflicting inhuman
punishment on any whom the Nazi police suspected or disliked. No court could issue
an injunction, or writ of habeas corpus, or certiorari." 2 id. at 112.
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confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the chance to
produce evidence in his favor.' These rights are "especially
necessary where the occasion of detention is fear of future miscon-
duct, rather than crimes committed."' As in Knauff, Jackson
assumed that the government would act in good faith. Nevertheless,
a fair hearing is "the best insurance" against governmental errors
that "are bound to occur on ex parte consideration."' 99 Jackson
noted that Ellen Knauff was saved by administrative and congres-
sional hearings, and he called her case "a near miss."
200
Despite Justice Jackson's dissent, the rule of Mezei is simple and
straightforward: Mezei came to the border without permission to
enter. Based upon the executive's national security concerns, he
was properly excluded and detained without a hearing. Though
Mezei had made it to U.S. soil, he would be treated the same as
someone who had not. Indefinite detention may be regrettable, but
the length of confinement does not diminish the executive's power
to detain.
D. The Rest of the Story (Shuffled off to Buffalo)
At first, the aftermath of the Mezei decision seemed a replay of
Knauff. Once again, many newspapers excoriated the opinion.
2 0 1
197 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 225 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 224-25.
2" Id. at 225. Jackson's dissent, which was joined by Justice Frankfurter,
emphasized the reality of Mezei's predicament. Of all theJustices, Frankfurter could
perhaps best empathize with Mezei's plight. Frankfurter himself emigrated to the
United States through Ellis Island in 1894. See DAVID M. BROWNSTONE ET AL., ISLAND
OF HOPE, ISLAND OF TEARs 246 (1979); MICHAEL E- PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND
HIS TIMES 10 (1982).
201 See, e.g., Abridging Due Process, TOLEDO BLADE, Mar. 26, 1953, at 16 ("Is the
United States so insecure that it must resort to the kind of 'protective custody' which
has put millions of individuals behind the walls of German and Russian concentration
camps?"); Deprived of Liberty, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1953, at 12 ("Aside from all
questions of law, this result is most unfortunate in a country that lays great store
upon freedom of the individual."); Detention for Life-on Undisclosed Charges, I.F.
STONE'S WEEKLY, Mar. 28, 1953, at 4 ("It remains to be seen whether individual
liberty is that highly prized in the cowed and confused U.S.A. of 1953."); Ignatz and
Eveiybody's Freedoms, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Mar. 28, 1953, at 12 (claiming that this
"decision put before the nation a splendid example of one of the faults in our
immigration laws"); The Stoiy ofIgnatz Mezei, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 1953,
at 2F (questioning "[h]ow... anyone [can] know these facts and not worry about
what they may foretell for our country").
At least one future member of the Supreme Court was also offended by the
decision. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), Chief Justice Warren called the
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Once again, the Supreme Court's ruling and the public response led
to the introduction of private relief bills in Congress.20 2 Like Ellen
Knauff, Ignatz Mezei was returned to custody at Ellis Island.2 3 As
with Ellen Knauff, the Attorney General determined that the Justice
Department would review the matter and decide whether to grant
a hearing.204 But Mezei did not have the same support in Congress
that Ellen Knauff enjoyed. In Knauff's case, the INS had angered
Congress by refusing to disclose the evidence supporting her
exclusion. This time the Justice Department shared some of its
information with Congress, which dampened some members'
enthusiasm for a hearing on the private bills.205 As a more public
signal of the evidence supporting exclusion, Mezei was moved to the
"Communist Ward" at Ellis Island.
206
Despite the softening of congressional support for Ignatz Mezei,
Attorney General Brownell announced in December 1953 that he
memory of the Mezei case "still fresh," and he characterized as "intolerable" Mezei's
extended confinement without judicial review. Id. at 102 n.36 (plurality opinion).
' On March 23,1953, Senator Langer-who had previously sponsored legislation
for Ellen Knauff-introduced a bill for Mezei's relief. See S. 1414, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953); supra text accompanying note 125. Representative Celler introduced a similar
measure on April 24. See H.R. 4858, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
' Mezei had been released on May 10, 1952, on a $3000 bond set by District
Judge Kaufman, and on April 22, 1953, one month after the Supreme Court's ruling,
Mezei was returned to Ellis Island. See Walter Froehlich, Mezei on Way to Ellis Island
Exile, BUFFALO CouRIER-ExPRESS, Apr. 22, 1953, at 1; Kalman Seigel, Stateless, He
Faces Life on Ellis Island, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1953, at 1.
204 The INS initially resisted the request for an administrative review of Mezei's
case. See Letter from Commissioner Mackey, INS, toJack Wasserman (Mar. 26, 1953)
(JWP). One month later, however, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.
announced that the Justice Department would look at the case anew. See Hope for
Stateless Man, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1953, at 12; Sixty-Two Units Are Added to Subversive
List, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1953, at 19. During a press conference, Brownell said that
"You can be sure justice will be tempered with mercy in this department." Bert
Andrews, Brownell Studying Aid for Ellis Island "Lifer," N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30,
1953, at 1. Calls for further review came from a number of sources including the
American Legion. See Letter from Miles D. Kennedy, Director, American Legion, to
Herbert Brownell, Jr., U.S. Attorney General (June 11, 1953) (JWP).
205 Senator Arthur V. Watkins, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
discussed Mezei's case with the Justice Department. Based upon the Department's
information, Watkins found that the case involved "very serious matters of security."
The Senator deemed it "unwise" to convene a hearing before the Immigration
Subcommittee. Letter from Senator Arthur V. Watkins toJack Wasserman (Apr. 2,
1953) (JWP).
2 See Letter from P.A. Esperdy, Deputy District Director, INS, to Jack Wasserman
(July 22, 1953) (JWP) (stating that "[iln view of the basis for Mr. Mezei's exclusion,
the present detention quarters in which he is kept is considered the appropriate
one"); Letter from Jack Wasserman to INS (July 10, 1953) (JWP) (protesting the
transfer).
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would grant Mezei an exclusion hearing before a Board of Special
Inquiry.207 This was the same type of hearing afforded to Ellen
Knauff. Brownell also took the unusual step of appointing
distinguished private citizens to Mezei's Board. Mezei's case would
be heard by William Dean Embree, former president of the New
York City Bar Association, Russell Niles, dean of New York
University Law School, and Elliott Cheatham, a law professor at
Columbia University.
20 8
Because Mezei's original exclusion order was entered without a
hearing, Mezei did not know the full extent of the government's
case. But Mezei was surely aware of the reasons why the govern-
ment sought to exclude him. In 1924, Mezei had joined the
Hungarian Working Sick Benefit and Education Society in New
York City.2 9 The Society merged in 1930 with other groups and
became a Hungarian lodge of the International Workers Order
(IWO). 210  While the IWO described itself as simply a fraternal
society that provided insurance and benefits to its members,
211
20 See Alien to Get a Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1953, at 62; Hearing Granted Ex-
Buffalonian Barred by U.S., BUFF. EVENING NEWS, Dec. 10, 1953, at 54; Press Release
from the Department of Justice 1 (Dec. 9, 1953) (JWP). Brownell was quoted as
stating that while the Attorney General has the statutory authority to exclude without
a hearing, "this power should be exercised sparingly." Id.201 See THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC., DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF
COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1955) (listing the makeup of the Board);
Hungarian Who Jumped His Ship in '23 to Enter U.S. Is Declared Security Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1954, at 9 (same); Ruling Due on Deporting Man Held on Ellis Island 3
Years, EVENING STAR (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 20, 1954, at A-i1 (same). Brownell had
originally announced that a New York lawyer, recommended by the New York Bar
Association, would preside at the hearing. See Press Release from the Department of
Justice, supra note 207, at 1 (announcing the selection of Edward W. Bourne to
preside). But Mezei would not waive his right to a hearing before a three-member
Board of Special Inquiry, and so a full Board was appointed. See Letter from Andrew
Reiner, Attorney, tojack Wasserman 1 (Dec. 16, 1953) (JWP) ("I have... advised Mr.
Mezei not to sign the waiver."). The appointments to Mezei's Board were highly
unusual. Indeed, while one might understand why the Attorney General would wish
to appoint a particularly distinguished Board, it was not entirely clear that the
Attorney General had the power to do so. The governing immigration statute and
regulations permitted private persons to be appointed to a Board only in ports where
permanent Boards were not functioning and then only when it was "impracticable"
to detail another Board from some other INS station. See Immigration Act of 1917,
ch. 29, § 17, 39 Stat. 887 (repealed 1952); 8 C.F.R. § 60.29(c) (1949). In contrast,
while Ellen Knauff's hearing was held in Washington, the members of her Board were
the same immigration officers who regularly sat in hearings at Ellis Island. See
KNAUFF, supra note 124, at 193-94.
o See In re Ignatz Mezei, No. A-2024778, at 3 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP).
210 See id. at 4.
211 In its own internal documents, the IWO stated:
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others took a different view. In 1947, Attorney General McGrath
listed the IWO as a communist organization in documents submit-
ted to the Loyalty Review Board.212 According to the Attorney
General, the IWO operated under the direction and control of the
Communist Party, and regularly disseminated communist propagan-
da.
213
Although Mezei asserted that the IWO was not a communist
organization, 24 he would have difficulty persuading the INS to
agree. At the time, the INS was one of several government agencies
leading an attack against the IWO and its members. For over ten
years, INS officials had been instructed to give IWO members "extra
scrutiny" in immigration proceedings. 215  In 1950, in a highly
The IWO provides sick, disability and death benefits. It organizes for its
members medical aid and other forms of fraternal services. It pledges aid
and comfort to its members in case of need. The ranks of the International
Workers Order and its societies are open to all regardless of sex, nationality,
race, color, creed or political affiliation.
ARTHUR J. SABIN, RED SCARE IN COURT: NEW YORK VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS ORDER 11 (1993) (quoting the IWO Declaration of Principles). For a
general description of the IWO, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951). As explained in that case, the IWO was incorporated under New
York insurance laws in 1930. See id. at 134. Although it was formed as a corporation,
the IWO was organized under a lodge system and had a representative form of
government. See id. By late 1947, the organization had some 185,000 members. See
id. at 128, 134. The IWO provided life insurance and other benefits for its members.
See id. at 134.
212 SeeJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 128-29 ("The Attorney General
included [the IWO] in the list he furnished to the Loyalty Review Board November
24, 1947."). In 1954, shortly before Mezei's Board hearing, the IWO was listed as a
"Communist-front organization" by the Subversive Activities Control Board. Notice,
19 Fed. Reg. 424 (1954).21
3 SeeJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 567,569-71 n.2
(D.D.C. 1952) (summarizing affidavit of Attorney General McGrath), affld inpar rev'd
in part sub nom. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 870 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 911 (1953).
214 In one of his pro se pleadings, Mezei wrote that"[t]he Hungarian Brotherhood
of the Sick and Death Benefit Society, Lodge 1013 of the Internationaf Workers
Order was not a Communist front organization." Addendum to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 67-108 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1951).
2 The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that when IWO membership
is alleged, INS examiners should give the case "extra scrutiny" to determine whether
the alien is affiliated with the Communist Party. See In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 450, 453
(B.I.A. 1943) (quoting In re C- Z-, No. 56106/708 (unpublished decision)). For
examples of this "extra scrutiny," see, for example, United States ex reL Kaloudis v.
Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 490 (2d Cir. 1950) (involving the Board of Immigration
Appeals refusal to suspend alien's deportation order because of his IWO affiliation);
Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474, 476 (1st Cir. 1948) (involving an INS examiner
who testified that alien was a Communist largely because of his IWO membership);
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publicized case, the INS deported an IWO officer, Andrew Dmytry-
shyn, on the grounds that he was active with the IWO, which the
INS claimed was affiliated with the Communist Party.216 In that
same year, the New York Superintendent of Insurance obtained a
court order dissolving the IWO, essentially because the IWO was
politically "hazardous" to its policyholders. 217 The INS gave its
evidence from the Dmytryshyn hearing to the New York Superinten-
dent of Insurance, and the INS's coterie of witnesses formed the
backbone of the Superintendent's case against the IWO.
211
With this background, it is easy to see why the INS sought to
exclude Mezei. Mezei was more than a mere member of the IWO.
He served as secretary and president of the IWO's Hungarian lodge
in Buffalo. 219 During Mezei's detention at Ellis Island in 1950, he
was repeatedly questioned by an INS examiner about the IWO and
the Communist Party.220 Mezei acknowledged that about half of
the members of the Buffalo Hungarian lodge were communist
sympathizers and that Communist Party speakers sometimes came
to lodge meetings. 221' He denied, however, that he was a member
of the Communist Party himself or that he was a communist
Vergas v. Shaughnessy, 97 F. Supp. 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (involving the Board of
Immigration Appeals's refusal to suspend alien's deportation order because of his
IWO officership).
216 See SABIN, supra note 211, at 64. Dmytryshyn's immigration appeal is published
as In re D-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 578 (B.I.A. 1951). Dmytryshyn was a national committee
member of the Ukranian section of the IWO, and he helped organize IWO lodges.
See id. at 579.
217 See In re Bohlinger, 106 N.Y.S.2d 953, 976-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd sub
nom. In re International Workers Order, 113 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952), affJd
sub nom. In re Bohlinger, 112 N.E.2d 280 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 857 (1953). The
state trial court also determined that the IWO's business practices were hazardous
because the IWO was too liquid, and funds could therefore be expropriated in the
event of a conflict between the United States "and the world of Communism." Id. at
979.
218 See SABIN, supra note 211, at 64 (describing an interview with the attorney for
the New York Superintendent of Insurance).
219 See In re Ignatz Mezei, No. A-2024778, at 4 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP). Mezei
explained that he was elected president of the lodge because he could write. Most
of the other lodge members were illiterate. See Sworn Statements of Ignac [sic] Mezei
to William Fliegelman, INS Hearing Examiner 15 (Feb. 10, 13, & 14 1950) (JWP).
"' The INS transcribed four of these sessions. See Sworn Statements of Mezei,
supra note 219; Examination of Ignac [sic] Mezei (Nov. 7, 1950) (JWP).
"t See Sworn Statements of Mezei, supra note 219, at 13, 17.
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sympathizer.2 2 Mezei also denied that he had ever personally
invited Communist Party members to speak at lodge meetings.
223
While Mezei knew that the INS wanted to exclude him because
of his IWO activities, Mezei did not know the formal charges against
him. Prior to the exclusion hearing, Mezei's attorneys met with a
Justice Department official, who disclosed the charges.2 24  The
government alleged that Ignatz Mezei was excludable on three
grounds: (1) that he was a member of the Communist Party at least
some time during the period from 1929 to 1945; (2) that he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (petty larceny)
during his previous period of residence in Buffalo; and (3) that he
gave false information to consular officers in Hungary to obtain an
immigrant quota visa.225  The government did not, however,
disclose the specific facts on which these charges were based. At
the Board hearing, Mezei's attorney, Jack Wasserman, objected to
the nondisclosure. He asserted that the lack of specificity about
dates and events denied Mezei a fair hearing.
2 26
Mezei's Board hearing was not to be a replay of Knauff's. The
two grounds for excluding Knauff focused upon her alleged
activities in Germany. Because the INS could not prove that Knauff
engaged in espionage, she defeated the exclusion charges and was
admitted to the country under the War Brides Act. Mezei, on the
other hand, denied being a Communist and giving false information
to consular officials. But he could not deny his prior criminal
conviction, and the prior conviction-standing alone-was a sufficient
ground for exclusion. Mezei therefore turned his Board of Special
Inquiry hearing into a trial in mitigation. He had no chance of
disproving all of the exclusion charges, but he could show that his
former activities with the IWO were insignificant and that he did
not deserve what would amount to a life sentence on Ellis Island.
Mezei attempted to use the hearing before the Board to convince
the Attorney General to grant him discretionary relief, immigration
' See id. at 5. When an INS officer asked Mezei whether he was elected president
because he was a communist sympathizer, Mezei denied the allegation, saying "[o]n
that question I am as white as the wall." Id. at 16.
"' See id. at 14-15.
2 See Letter from Jack Wasserman to Ignatz Mezei 1 (Jan. 6, 1954) (JWP).
' See id.; Reporter's Transcript of Exclusion Proceedings Against Ignatz Mezei at
7, File No. A-2 024 778 (N.Y. 0300-307995) [hereinafter cited as Tr.] (opening
statement of Alfred P. O'Hara, Assistant U.S. Attorney).
226 See Tr. at 10-12. The government pointed out that it was the practice in
exclusion cases not to disclose specifics. See id. at 12-13. Wasserman conceded the
practice, but would not concede that the practice should be the law. See id. at 13.
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parole, even if the Board found that he was legally excludable.
Ignatz Mezei had lived in the United States for twenty-five years.
Apart from the petty larceny conviction, he had no criminal
record. 227 He worked as a carpenter and was father to his four
stepchildren. 22' And Mezei had maintained good conduct during
the year he was released on immigration bond in Buffalo.
229
The Board of Special Inquiry convened in February 1954.280
The government introduced copies of Mezei's criminal convic-
tion.8 1 In 1935, Mezei was charged with receiving seven bags of
stolen flour. He pleaded guilty to petty larceny, and he was fined
ten dollars.23 2 The government argued that this offense was a
crime involving moral turpitude, a ground for exclusion.
233 Al-
" There was a dispute in the evidence on this point. The INS claimed that Mezei
had been arrested in 1927, while distributing communist literature in Pennsylvania.
See id. at 380-83 (summary of criminal charge). Mezei denied this arrest. See id. at
93-99 (testimony of Ignatz Mezei). The government did not assert that this arrest
resulted in a conviction.
" See id. at 41 (testimony of Ignatz Mezei); id. at 560-61 (testimony of Louis L.
Long).
' Mezei lived in Buffalo on bond from May 10, 1952 to April 22, 1953. See supra
note 203. He maintained good conduct during that period. See Letter from Richard
C. Haberstroh, INS, to Ignatz Mezei (Aug. 27, 1952) (JWP) (containing notations for
each week that Mezei reported to an INS officer). At the hearing, the INS stipulated
that there was no evidence that Mezei had engaged in activities detrimental to the
United States while on parole. See Tr. at 800.
" See Tr. at 1; see also Alien Faces "Exile" on Ellis Island, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1954,
at 9.
"' See Tr. at 83-84.5-2 See Summary of Exhibits 2 (JWP) (summarizing Exhibits 7-9 regarding Mezei's
information, docket sheet, and police records).
Julia Mezei, Ignatz Mezei's spouse, once prepared an affidavit with a detailed
(and somewhat exculpatory) version of the offense. According to Mrs. Mezei, two
young men brought a large bag of flour to their house. Mrs. Mezei was not home at
the time, and Mr. Mezei paid for the flour, believing that Mrs. Mezei had ordered it
from the grocer. The flour turned out to be stolen. Mr. Mezei was arrested, along
with about ten women from the neighborhood, all of whom had purchased flour from
the two men. Everyone was convicted and fined ten dollars. See Affidavit of Julia
Mezei (Jan. 15, 1954) (JWP). On February 4, 1954, Ignatz Mezei applied for a pardon
for this offense. See Letter fromJack Wasserman to Executive Clemency Bureau of
the Division of Parole, State of New York Executive Chamber (Feb. 4, 1954) (JWP)
(containing Mrs. Mezei's affidavit). At the hearing before the Board, Mezei gave a
rather confused account of the offense; about all that he was able to communicate
was that the offense involved a single bag of flour. See Tr. at 66-67, 77-78 (testimony
of Ignatz Mezei). Julia Mezei was not questioned about the incident at the hearing.
" See Memorandum Re Exclusion ofIgnatz Mezei 8-9 (JWP) (government's post-
hearing brief submitted to the Board of Special Inquiry). One ground for exclusion
under the Immigration Act of 1917 was conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3,39 Stat. 874,875 (1917) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. V 1993)). The case law was clear
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though Mezei contended that a petty larceny conviction should not
be a basis for exclusion, the law was decidedly in favor of the gov-
ernment.234 With the conviction established, Mezei would most
likely be deemed excludable. Most of the remainder of the hearing
was devoted to the main event, Mezei's alleged communist activities.
The government relied primarily upon two witnesses, Manning
Johnson and Louis Reed, who testified that Mezei had been an
active member of the Communist Party. Manning Johnson was a
district organizer of the Communist Party in Buffalo from 1932 to
1934.235 Johnson testified that Mezei was an active member
during that period and had attended closed Party meetings.
23 6
Reed was the former national secretary of the Hungarian Federation
of the Workers Party of America, which later became the Commu-
nist Party of the United States. 2 7 Reed claimed that he recruited
Mezei into the Federation in 1924, and that he later saw Mezei at
that larceny, whether grand or petty, was a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g.,
Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 83-84 (lst Cir. 1929) (holding that petty theft of
15 dollars was a crime of moral turpitude); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30
F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that all degrees of theft involve moral turpitude),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929); Bartos v. United States Dist. Ct., 19 F.2d 722, 724
(8th Cir. 1927) (holding that petty theft is malum in se and that it involves moral
turpitude).
Mezei's exclusion proceeding was governed by the Immigration Act of 1917
because that law was in effect in 1950, when Mezei attempted to reenter the United
States. While Mezei's case was pending, Congress revised the immigration laws.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude remained a ground for exclusion
under the new law. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(9),
66 Stat. 182 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. V 1993)).
Congress has since created a minor offense exception to this ground of exclusion.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. V 1993).
2
2" See Memorandum Re Exclusion of Ignatz Mezei 1-2 (JWP) (Mezei's post-hearing
brief submitted to the Board of Special Inquiry). Jack Wasserman, Mezei's lead
counsel, previously served as a member of the INS's Board of Immigration Appeals.
During his tenure, the Board decided In re T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22, 27 (B.I.A. 1944),
holding that the theft of a three-dollar automobile coil was a crime of moral
turpitude. Wasserman dissented, arguing that the statute must be construed to
distinguish between serious and nonserious crimes. See id. at 39-41 (Wasserman,
member, dissenting). He would have held that the INS must examine the circum-
stances of petty thefts, especially when only a fine or suspended sentence is imposed.
See id. at 41 n.10. In the brief he submitted for Mezei, Wasserman could cite only his
own prior dissent. See Memorandum Re Exclusion of Iguatz Mezei, supra, at 1-2. The
weight of the law was against him.
" See Tr. at 512 (testimony of Manning Johnson); see also In re Mezei, No. A-
2024778, at 4 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP).
2' See Tr. at 504-06, 512-15 (testimony of ManningJohnson).
237 See id. at 337-38, 341 (testimony of Louis Reed); see also 2 Ex-Red Officials
Identify Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1954, at 7.
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closed meetings of the Federation and the Party."' Reed also
testified that he sent Mezei to other cities for the Party on small
jobs."9 Although the government had no direct evidence that
Mezei was active in the Party after 1934, three other government
witnesses stated that Mezei had made statements indicating his
support for communism as late as 1948.240
Mezei denied that he had ever been a member of the Commu-
nist Party.241 Three family members testified that he was not a
Party member.242 Mezei presented letters and affidavits from thirty-
nine character witnesses. 24  But Mezei could not present conclu-
sive evidence to refute Johnson's and Reed's specific allegations,
244
238 See Tr. at 345-48, 400-01 (testimony of Louis Reed); see also In re Mezei, No. A-
2024778, at 4 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP).
239 See Tr. at 349-52 (testimony of Louis Reed); see also Trial Notes of Jack
Wasserman (JWP).
240 See Tr. at 671-74 (testimony of George Chaba); id. at 725-32 (testimony ofJohn
Acs); id. at 761-62 (testimony ofJulius A. Weigh). Weigh's testimony was typical. He
owned a curtain and drapery business in Buffalo. See id. at 760. According to Weigh,
Mezei would look at Weigh's stock and make statements such as "[t]here will be
plenty to divvy up here when the time comes." Id. at 761. Mezei also allegedly stated
that Weigh would get "the lamp post treatment." Id. at 762.
24' See id. at 59 (testimony of Ignatz Mezei); see also In re Mezei, No. A-2024778,
at 4 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP).
242 See Tr. at 441-42 (testimony of Susan Bodi, the mother of Mezei's daughter-in-
law); id. at 562-63 (testimony of Louis Long, Mezei's stepson); id. at 594-97 (testimony
of Julia Mezei, Mezei's spouse). Julia Mezei was impeached by her two prior
bootlegging convictions. See id. at 643-47.
245 See id. at 667-68 (discussion of the exhibits); see also Summary of Exhibits 5
(JWP). Although Wasserman's files contain an assortment of letters of recommenda-
tion, neither Wasserman's files nor the hearing transcript indicates who wrote the
letters and affidavits that were submitted to the Board. Wasserman's file indicates
that Ellen Knauff, who had met Mezei at Ellis Island, did not think that Mezei was a
Communist. According to Knauff, "anyone who spent as much time reading the
Bible as Mezei did could not possibly be a Communist." Letter fromJack Wasserman
to Ellen Knauff (Jan. 6, 1954) (JWP). Knauff did not testify before the Board, and it
is unknown whether she submitted her views in writing as one of the 39 character
witnesses.
244 At the conclusion of the hearing, Wasserman was forced to concede that "[a]t
the present time ... we can not disprove what the government has placed in
evidence, other than the denial of Mr. Mezei." Tr. at 830 (closing statement ofJack
Wasserman). While it is impossible to say whether Mezei could have ever produced
conclusive proof to refute the charges, it appears that Mezei had difficulty preparing
his defense. Mezei tried to show that he had been a member of the IWO only and
not of the Communist Party. According to one of Mezei's supporters, the FBI had
frightened Hungarian members of the IWO, making it difficult to find witnesses who
could testify on Mezei's behalf:
Approximately 100 Hungarian members of[the IWO insurance association]
have been visited by the F.B.I. and questioned relative to Mezei and they are
all scared to death ... especially the older members. The mention of
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and so the hearing turned into a credibility battle between Johnson
and Reed on one side and Mezei on the other.
Mezei lost the battle for two reasons. First, Mezei proved to be
a terrible witness. 245  He was impeached with his own prior
inconsistent statements 46 and with several previous false claims
to citizenship. 247  Second, Mezei's counsel, Jack Wasserman, did
"Communists" terrifies them and they want no part of it or any investigation
concerning Mezei and their chief plea is "Keep me out of this. I know
nothing about Communism."
Letter from Esther B. Mueller to jack Wasserman 1 (Jan. 18, 1954) (JWP) (ellipses in
original).
245 Mezei was called by the government as the first witness in the hearing. See Tr.
at 24. His testimony was riddled with inconsistencies, and he seemed to have great
difficulty understanding and answering many questions. Several of his statements
lacked credibility. For example, he was asked about a still that was found in the home
that he shared withJulia Horvath (laterJulia Mezei). See id. at 295-97. Mezei testified
that the still was used only to distill water forJulia, on the orders of her doctor. See
id. at 297-98. That claim must have been difficult for the Board to believe, especially
after the government proved that Julia had been convicted of possession of an
unregistered still and for manufacture of mash. See id. at 646. Jack Wasserman kept
Mezei off the stand as much as possible. After the government finished its direct
examination of Mezei, Wasserman postponed his cross-examination until the
conclusion of the government's case. See id. at 313. Wasserman told the Board that
he would still have to recall Mezei after the government's case, and it would save time
if Wasserman questioned Mezei only once. See id. Wasserman never put his client
back on the stand.
246 For example, in 1950, Mezei was interviewed by an immigration officer (under
oath and with counsel) about some lodge meetings he arranged. Mezei stated that
the Communist Party sent a newspaper editor, Emil Gardos, to Buffalo to speak to
lodge members and that Mezei had set the attendance at those meetings. See
Statement of Ignatz Mezei to INS Officials 5 (Nov. 7, 1950) (JWP). During the
hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry, Mezei denied arranging the meetings
and even denied making the prior statement to the immigration officer. See Tr. at 57-
58, 260-66 (testimony of Ignatz Mezei); see also In re Mezei, No. A-2024778, at 4
(B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954) (JWP). Moreover, even though Mezei had a criminal conviction
for petty larceny, he made several statements denying that he had ever been guilty of
a criminal act. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, United States ex rel.
Mezei v. Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 64-156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Ignatz Mezei, Barred Alien's
Case Stated, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 1, 1954, at 22. These were used effectively against Mezei
at the hearing. See Tr. at 129-35.
247 Mezei had claimed on several occasions that he was born in the United States.
See Tr. at 69, 213-15; see also Summary of Exhibits 1-3 (JWP) (summarizing Alien
Registration Form, Air Warden application, and Selective Service Registration Card,
all of which indicate that Mezei asserted he was born in Illinois). At the hearing,
Mezei testified that he had lied about his place of birth on the Air Warden application
and on the draft form out of a sense of duty to the United States. See Tr. at 216-17.
The false statements about his birthplace proved especially harmful at the hearing,
as one of the charges against Mezei was that he made a false statement to the
American Consulate in Budapest to obtain an immigrant quota visa. Mezei told
consular officials that he was born in Gibraltar and was, therefore, a native of Great
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not have sufficient information to impeach Manning Johnson.
Johnson was a professional witness who figured in some of the most
notorious loyalty cases of the day. Between 1942 and 1954,Johnson
testified for the government in numerous congressional and
administrative hearings and court cases, including Dmytryshyn's
deportation hearing and the New York IWO trial. 24  He was paid
as much as $4500 per year to testify for the government. 249
Johnson was loyal to the government; indeed, as he admitted in
other cases, he would lie under oath to assist the FBI.25 ° His
Britain. Had Mezei claimed birth in Romania, he would have been unable to obtain
an immigrant visa, because the quota for Romania was oversubscribed. See In re
Mezei, No. A-2024778, at 5.
248 See SABIN, supra note 211, at 134-36. Sabin accurately describes Manning
Johnson as a "professional ex-Communist." Id. at 135. Johnson testified in some 25
court cases, in addition to administrative and congressional hearings. See Frank J.
Donner, The Informer, NATION 298, 305 (Apr. 10, 1954). Johnson was a witness for
the government in Harry Bridges's 1949 perjury trial. See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT
FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 129 (1978);
VINCENT HALUNAN, A LION IN COURT 253-59 (1963); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING
NAMES 14 (1980). Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC),
Johnson testified that Paul Robeson was a member of the Communist Party;Johnson
even claimed that Robeson wanted "to be the Black Stalin among Negroes." Hearings
Regarding Communist Infiltration of Minority Groups-Part 2: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Un-American Activities, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1949) (testimony of
ManningJohnson); see also MARTIN B. DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON 359 (1988) (quoting
Johnson's HUAC testimony that Robeson "had 'delusions of grandeur,' and was
'desirous of becoming the Black Stalin'"); Investigation of the Unauthorized Use of United
States Passports-Part 3: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Un-American Activities, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4497 (1956) (statement of Committee Director Arens, reading
Johnson's prior testimony). Johnson also named Langston Hughes as a Communist.
See NAvASKY, supra, at 191.
The government vigorously defended its use of ex-communist witnesses.
According to the former director of the FBI, "[it is through the efforts of [ex-
communist] confidential informants that we have been able to expose the Communist
conspiracy in the past, and through them we must stake much of the future security
of the United States." J. Edgar Hoover, Why U.S. Uses Ex-Reds as Informants, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1955, at 106 (reprinting an extract from Hoover's
address, "Our Common Task"); see also J. Edgar Hoover, A Comment on the Article
"Loyalty Among Government Employees, "58 YALE L.J. 401,409-10 (1949) (defending the
"FBI's refusal to identify confidential sources").
249 See CAUTE, supra note 248, at 129; SABIN, supra note 211, at 135; Richard H.
Rovere, The Kept Witnesses, HARPER'S, May 1955, at 25, 28.
250 Manning Johnson gave the following testimony in another administrative
proceeding:
Q. In other words, you will tell a lie under oath in a court of law rather
than run counter to your instructions from the FBI. Is that right?
A. If the interests of my government are at stake. In the face of enemies,
at home and abroad, if maintaining secrecy of the techniques of methods
of operation of the FBI who have responsibility for the protection of our
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downfall came in May 1954, only three months after the Mezei
hearing. Johnson testified before the International Employees
Loyalty Board against Dr. Ralph Bunche, the U.N. diplomat and
winner of the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize.251 The Board unanimously
cleared Bunche.252 In July 1954, the Justice Department an-
nounced that it would investigate Johnson for perjury.2 53 Johnson
people, I say I will do it a thousand times.
Rovere, supra note 249, at 33 (quoting Johnson's testimony before the Subversive
Activities Control Board). In a sedition trial,Johnson was questioned as follows about
prior testimony he had given in a deportation case:
Q. That testimony was not correct, was it, Mr. Johnson?
A. No, it wasn't, precisely, because I could not at that time reveal that I had
supplied information to the FBI .... I think the security of the government
has priority over... any other consideration.
Id. Although Rovere does not identify the sedition trial in which Johnson gave this
testimony, it was apparently the first prosecution of Communist Party leader Steve
Nelson in Pennsylvania state court in 1951. See CAUTE, supra note 248, at 129;
MURRAY KEMPTON, AMERICA COMES OF MIDDLE AGE 14 (1963); see also Common-
wealth v. Nelson, 92 A.2d 431, 444-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) (sustainingjury verdict
against Nelson after second trial), rev'd, 104 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 497
(1956).
25 See BRIAN URQUHART, RALPH BUNCHE: AN AMERICAN LIFE 253 (1993);Joseph
Alsop & Stewart Alsop, Matter of Fact: The Bunche Informers, WASH. POST, July 2,
1954, at 23; A.M. Rosenthal, Bunche Inquiry Called a "Farce," N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1954, at 22. Johnson and another witness, Leonard Patterson, claimed that Bunche
was a party member. See URQUHART, supra, at 253. They also asserted that Bunche
had met with publisherJohn P. Davis to discuss communist policy. See id. Both Davis
and Bunche rebutted this claim. See id. at 253-54.
12 See URQUHART, supra note 251, at 254; A.M. Rosenthal, Dr. Bunche Cleared by
Loyalty Board, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1954, at 1.
' See URQUHART, supra note 251, at 254; Alsop, supra note 251, at 23. The
Bunche matter was not the only case in whichJohnson apparently committed perjury.
During the 1949 Harry Bridges trial,Johnson testified that Bridges was in New York
City onJune 28, 1936, attending the Communist Party's national convention. Bridges
proved conclusively that he was in Stockton, California on that date, meeting with
union officials. See HALLINAN, supra note 248, at 254-58; Donner, supra note 248, at
305. Bridges's lawyer asked that Johnson be charged with perjury. Although the
judge toldJohnson to hold himself in "readiness for the processes of this court," no
action was taken against Johnson. Id.
One issue concerning Manning Johnson's perjury also reached the Supreme
Court. Johnson had testified before the Subversive Activities Control Board, which
ordered the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action" organization. See
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 116 (1956).
While the case was on appeal, the Party submitted evidence showing thatJohnson and
two other witnesses "committed perjury, are completely untrustworthy and should be
accorded no credence." Id. at 120 (referring to the Party's motion). The government
did not deny these allegations, see id. at 121, and the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Board. See id. at 124-25. On remand, the Board struck the testimony of
Johnson and the other two witnesses and modified its prior order. See Communist
Partyv. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 277 F.2d 78,80 (D.C. Cir. 1959), aff'd, 367
1995]
982 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 933
was never again used as a government witness. 254  Wasserman
knew that Johnson had testified in a number of other cases, but
Wasserman was unaware of the full extent ofJohnson's work for the
government. 5 5 He was unable to cross-examine Johnson effective-
ly. The Board never learned any details about Johnson's work for
the government, or about any claims that Johnson gave false
testimony in other proceedings.
256
U.S. 1 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314,
318 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
21 See SABIN, supra note 211, at 135-36. After he was discarded by the govern-
ment in 1954, Johnson became an insurance salesman. See CAtrrE, supra note 248,
at 129; SABIN, supra note 211, at 135-36. Within a year, Attorney General Herbert
Brownell announced that the Justice Department would no longer keep its full-time
former communist witnesses on retainer. See Brownell Drops Informant Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, April 16, 1955, at 28.
25 Wasserman took copious trial notes and prepared assiduously for cross-
examination. Wasserman's trial notebook contains the notations "F.B.I. undercover"
and "professional witness" in the section for Manning Johnson, but there is no
indication in the notebook, in Wasserman's correspondence, in the hearing exhibits,
or in the hearing transcript that Wasserman knew about the payments toJohnson or
the extent ofJohnson's work for the FBI and the INS.
Wasserman was handicapped by the lack of formal prehearing discovery.
Although Wasserman learned of the charges in advance of the hearing, no rules
required the government to disclose the names of its witnesses or documents
containing the witnesses' statements. At the hearing, Wasserman objected to the lack
of notice of the facts. See Tr. at 10-12. According to Wasserman, the lack of notice
about dates of alleged Communist Party membership and about Mezei's alleged crime
"left us to search the man's record from the time of his birth on." Id. at 11.
Wasserman's trial notebook does not contain any indication that he was told, in
advance of the hearing, who would testify for the government. Indeed, a letter from
Wasserman's co-counsel reports Ignatz Mezei's speculations about who might testify.
Mezei was off the mark; he did not foresee the testimony of ManningJohnson, Louis
Reed, or any of the witnesses from Buffalo. See Letter from Andrew Reiner to Jack
Wasserman 2-3 (Dec. 16, 1953) (JWP). It would have been difficult for Wasserman
to conduct a full background investigation of the government's witnesses when he did
not learn the identities of the witnesses until the hearing itself, and when he never
received any prior statements of the witnesses.
2 On direct examination, Johnson described himself as 'a consultant in the
investigation section" of the INS. Tr. at 501. He testified that, prior to 1950, he was
employed as a labor official, served in the Navy, and worked for the FBI as an under-
cover agent. See id. Wasserman's cross-examination on this point was brief and
generalized:
Q [Wasserman]: You are a professional witness on this particular subject,
are you not? You have testified in other cases?
A [Johnson]: I have testified in other cases, yes.
Q: And you are continually testifying in immigration cases now; is that
right?
A: I testify in immigration cases when I am called upon.
Id. at 515-16.
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The Board of Special Inquiry ordered Mezei excluded from the
United States.257  The Board found that Mezei had made false
statements in immigration documents about his criminal record and
place of birth.258  With respect to the allegations of communist
activity, the Board determined that Mezei was a member of the
Communist Party from 1925 to at least 1934259 (the last year that
ManningJohnson testified that Mezei had been active in the Party).
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the ruling.
260
Although Mezei was found excludable, the "trial in mitigation"
proved successful. In his closing argument, Jack Wasserman,
Mezei's attorney, contended that even if Mezei was excludable, he
should not be forced to live out his life on Ellis Island. 261  The
Board did not have the authority to grant Mezei any form of
discretionary relief, such as parole.26 2 Nevertheless, the Board went
out of its way to make one important finding: it determined that
Mezei never played more than a minor role in the Communist
Party because he did nothing more than attend meetings and
demonstrations, and distribute literature.263  At Wasserman's
request, the Board also made a separate (and off-the-record)
recommendation to the Attorney General that Mezei be released on
immigration parole.264 On August 9, 1954, the day the exclusion
decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the
See id. at 849 (Board's conclusion of law).
" See id. at 848 (Board's findings of fact).
259 See id. at 847.
260 See In re Mezei, No. A-2024778 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1954), at 6. The affirmance,
which relies upon ManningJohnson's testimony, came one month after the Justice
Department announced that it would investigate Johnson for perjury.
11 See Tr. at 825-28 (noting that no countries had agreed to allow Mezei entry,
thus precluding his deportation); see also Memorandum Re Exclusion of Ignatz Mezei
2-4 (Mezei's post-hearing brief submitted to the Board of Special Inquiry) (JWP).262 See Tr. at 846 ("The Board understands that under the terms of the reference
by the Attorney General it is confined to the single issue of admissibility of the
alien.") (statement of Chairman Embree).
21 See id. at 849 (Board's findings of fact).
2
1 See Kenneth C. Davis, TheRequirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REV.
193, 251 & n.220 (1956) (recounting a conversation with a member of the Board of
Special Inquiry, Elliott Cheatham, who revealed that the Board recommended to the
Attorney General that Mezei be released and allowed to return to Buffalo); Letter
fromJack Wasserman to Rabbi Paul Richman (Nov. 1, 1954) (JWP) (noting that the
Attorney General released Mezei after the Board of Special Inquiry found that no
useful purpose would be served by Mezei's continued detention and that the Board
recom-mended Mezei's release). In his closing argument, Wasserman asked the
Board to make a parole recommendation. See Tr. at 828, 831. The government
argued that the Board had no power to make any such recommendation. See id. at
831-33. The Board thus sided with Wasserman.
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Attorney General announced that Mezei would be paroled.2 65
Ignatz Mezei was never admitted to the United States as a citizen or
permanent resident, but he was at least able to avoid life imprison-
ment on Ellis Island.266
E. More History Lessons
The stories of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei illustrate several
points. Both show the lack of congruence between the Supreme
Court's willingness to render abstract rulings and the public's
willingness to accept them when the results seem particularly unjust.
The stories also show the value of a hearing, though in very
different fashions.
Ellen Knauff prevailed because the government could not
produce substantial evidence linking her to espionage. With a
hearing comes at least some formalized process, which includes the
requirement that one side prove its case by some specified standard.
Without a hearing, INS officials would never have been required to
examine the evidence against Knauff under an articulated standard
of proof.
There is another traditional purpose of a hearing, illustrated by
the case of Ignatz Mezei. When a decision-maker enjoys at least
some measure of discretion, a hearing provides perhaps the best
forum to seek mercy. While the Board of Special Inquiry did not
265 See Alien, Long Held, Freed, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1954, at 10; Exclusion Order
Valid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1954, at 10.
2166 Under the terms of the parole order, Mezei was required to remain within 50
miles of Buffalo and to report monthly to an immigration officer. See Order of
Conditional Parole Under Outstanding Excluding Order No. 0300-307993 (Aug. 11,
1954), at 1. He was also ordered to disassociate himself from the Communist Party
and people who promoted communism. See id. at 2.
Ignatz Mezei spent the rest of his life on immigration parole. See Telephone
Interview with Mark Mancini, Wasserman's former law partner (July 1, 1993).
Because Mezei could not become a citizen or permanent resident, he was unable to
join the Carpenters Union and he struggled with low-paying, nonunion jobs. See
Letter from Esther B. Mueller to jack Wasserman (Aug. 1, 1956) (JWP); Letter from
Jack Wasserman to Esther B. Mueller (Aug. 3, 1956) (JWP). Over the next few years,
Mezei dutifully sent modest payments to Wasserman to be applied against the
outstanding legal fees. Mezei also wrote Wasserman several rather sorrowful letters,
describing his financial worries and asking for help in gaining permanent legal
residence. Wasserman continued to look for legal avenues to help Mezei, but Mezei
simply remained on immigration parole. See Letter from Ignatz Mezei to Jack
Wasserman (undated but probablyJan. 1960) (JWP); Letter from Ignatz Mezei to jack
Wasserman (July 17, 1959) (JWP); Letter from Jack Wasserman to Ignatz Mezei (Jan.
22, 1960) (JWP); Letter fromJack Wasserman to Ignatz Mezei (July 20, 1959) (JWP).
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have parole authority, the hearing officers examined the govern-
ment's evidence critically. They found no proof that Mezei had
been an active member of the Communist Party after 1934 and that,
even when he was an active member, he was no more than a minor
player. The Board weighed the evidence and made a parole
recommendation to the Attorney General. Until he was afforded a
hearing, Mezei was unable to show that he posed no danger to
national security.
III. THE DOCTRINES LEFT BEHIND
Americanjurisprudence has been anything but static since 1953,
when Mezei was decided. We have witnessed virtual revolutions in
constitutional, immigration, and other areas of our law. Despite
these significant developments, the Supreme Court has essentially
followed the formulations of the plenary power doctrine and the
entry fiction set forth in Knauff and Mezei. When compared to
other advances in our law, the plenary power doctrine and the entry
fiction have become the doctrines left behind. Part A of this section
discusses the growing inconsistency between Knauff, Mezei, and
other decisions relating to aliens. Part B examines the conflict
between Mezei and the substantive due process limitations that have
been placed upon other forms of administrative detention. Part C
gives one reason why the plenary power doctrine and the entry
fiction have enjoyed continued support, even though the Supreme
Court has long been aware of the dissonance between those
doctrines and more recent legal developments.
A. Knauff, Mezei, and the Rights of Aliens
Knauff and Mezei are the Supreme Court's fullest statements of
the plenary power doctrine and the entry fiction. Legal commenta-
tors have disparaged the rulings from the moment they were
issued." Nevertheless, over the last forty years, courts have
267 The cases were roundly criticized at the time they were decided. See e.g., Hart,
supra note 66, at 1390-96; Richard E. Hodge, Case Note, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 315-
21 (1954); HenryJ. Hoye,Jr., Comment, 34 B.U. L. REV. 85, 89-90 (1954); Ronald W.
Hunter, Recent Cases, 33 NEB. L. REV. 94, 96 (1953); Mildred M. Mangum, Recent
Decision, 15 OHIO. ST. L.J. 78, 79 (1954); Decision, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1042, 1044
(1953); The Supreme Court 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 97-102 (1953). The
criticism has not abated. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 200-01; Louis Henkin,
The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our
Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 27-34 (1985); Martin, supra note 15, at 166-80;
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continued to cite the two cases to underscore the breadth of the
executive's immigration authority and the limited scope of judicial
review. Knauff and Mezei have been the champions relied upon by
the Supreme Court to uphold an immigration preference that
discriminates against unwed fathers, 268 to deny relief from depor-
tation based upon confidential information, 269 and to deny a visa
to a visiting speaker. 7  More recently, the Court has used the two
decisions and the plenary power doctrine to sustain the interdiction
of Haitians seeking political asylum in the United States.271 In the
lower federal courts, Mezei and Knauff are regularly relied upon to
curtail challenges to the detention of excludable aliens.2 12 The cases
are also cited to limit judicial review of other types of immigration
judgments, such as in matters relating to asylum and exclusion.
273
Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 15, at 1642-43; Schuck, supra note 15, at 20;
see also TamaraJ. Conrad, Note, The Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens: Histoiy
Provides a Refuge, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1461-64 (1986); Developments in the Law-
Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1322-24 (1983);
Christopher R. Yukins, Note, The Measure of a Nation: Granting Excludable Aliens
Fundamental Protections of Due Process, 73 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1509-30 (1987).
268 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mezei).
269 See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1956) (citing Mezei and Knauffl.
271 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762, 766 n.6 (1972) (citing Mezei and
KnaufD).
71 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-63 (1993) (citing
Mezei).
27 See, e.g., Gisbert v. United States Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1440, 1442-
43 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Mezei and Knauff and finding that denial or revocation of
parole does not implicate Due Process Clause); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1558
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing Mezei and Knauff and finding that parole decisions are
discretionary and cannot give rise to liability under Bivens); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1, 4, 17 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Mezei and deferring to INS's decision to deny
parole); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11 th Cir. 1984) (citing Mezei
and finding that parole is part of the admissions process and its denial or revocation
does not implicate Due Process Clause); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103, 105-
06 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Mezei and Knauff and deciding that there should be no
review of parole decision, except to see if Attorney General complied with statute);
Petition of Cahill, 447 F.2d 1343, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Mezei and Knauff and
allowing no judicial review of parole decision); Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d
656,657 (2d Cir. 1964) (citingMezei and noting that the INS may revoke immigration
parole without affording a hearing), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); Ahrens v. Rojas,
292 F.2d 406,408 (5th Cir. 1961) (citingMezei in determining that the INS can detain
excludable alien when parole would be prejudicial to the public interest); Fragedela
v. Thornburgh, 761 F. Supp. 1252, 1255, 1257 (W.D. La. 1991) (citing Mezei and
Knauff and allowing the Attorney General to detain a Mariel Cuban); Sanchez v.
Kindt, 752 F. Supp. 1419, 1423, 1433 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (citing Mezei for the same);
Chin Ming Mow v. Dulles, 117 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (citing Mezei and
allowing no review of parole denial).
2" See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Mezei in
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This adherence to the holdings of Knauff and Mezei is contrasted
with the development of rights of aliens in matters unrelated to
immigration. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has affirmed
that all aliens are "persons" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.274 Thus, undocumented children must receive the same
education as citizens and permanent residents.275  The Civil
Service Commission cannot deny federal employment to aliens, at
holding that there is limited review of a visa denial); Ukranian-Am. Bar Ass'n v.
Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1382, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Mezei in finding no
requirement that INS advise excludable aliens of availability of free counsel); United
States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Mezei and
holding that excludable aliens are not entitled to formal hearing to establish claim of
political asylum), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 935 (1968); United States ex rel. Stellas v.
Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1966) (citing Mezei and Knauff in upholding
exclusion without a hearing); Montgomery v. Ffrench, 299 F.2d 730, 734, 735 (8th
Cir. 1962) (citing Mezei and Knauff and allowing no review of Attorney General's
decision that orphan was not entitled to enter United States); United States ex rel.
Wulfv. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537,539 (2d Cir. 1960) (citingMezei and Knauffin deciding
that there is no right to hearing on order of exclusion based upon medical
certificate); Avila v. Rivkind, 724 F. Supp. 945, 948, 950 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (citing Mezei
and notingMezei's citation of Knauffin upholding summary exclusion of alien claimed
to be a security risk); Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881, 891, 892 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(citing Mezei and Knauff and finding no standing to challenge exclusion procedures
prior to entry of final orders of exclusion); Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F.
Supp. 217, 220, 221 (D.P.R. 1976) (citing Mezei and allowing no review of consular
officer's decision to deny immigrant visa); United States ex rel. Nicoloff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 139 F. Supp. 465,467 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (citing Mezei and Knauffand finding that
Attorney General may exclude without a hearing on basis of danger to public
interest); Sayelis v. Vlachos, 137 F. Supp. 389, 395, 399 (E.D. Va. 1955) (citing Mezei
and Knauff and allowing no review of INS's decisions regarding seamen's landing
permits), aff'd, 248 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1957).
24 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Aliens, even aliens whose
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaran-
teed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that Due Process Clause protects even an alien
"whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory"); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences ... of nationality").
The Fifth Amendment forbids the federal government from depriving "any
person" of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The phrase "any person" does not permit any distinction between citizens and
aliens. In this respect, the Fifth Amendment differs from the Fourth Amendment,
which protects "the people" from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme
Court has noted that, unlike the term "any person" in the Due Process Clause, "the
people," as used in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, "refers
to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of the
community." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
2 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
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least not without adequate justification."7 6 Alien corporations are
protected by the Due Process Clause.277 Municipal ordinances
cannot be enforced in a fashion that discriminates against
aliens.
278
In addition, the Supreme Court has created an exception to the
territorial principles epitomized by Knauff and Mezei, and the
exception cannot be reconciled with the holdings in those two cases.
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,79 the Court ruled that a resident
alien could not be excluded without a hearing. Chew was a
permanent resident who served aboard a merchant vessel of
American registry.280 The Court ruled that this temporary over-
seas travel could not deprive Chew of his right to notice of the
charges and a hearing.28 1 Kwong Hai Chew was followed by Rosen-
berg v. Fleuti.28 2 In Rosenberg, the Court held that a resident alien
returning to the United States after an "innocent, casual and
brief"23 trip abroad could not be subjected to the same exclusion
criteria that apply to other aliens seeking entry for the first
time.2 84 Landon v. Plasencia8 5 further blurred the line between
exclusion and deportation proceedings. In that case, Maria
Plasencia, a permanent resident, was stopped at the border while
attempting to smuggle aliens into the country. 8 The INS sought
to exclude her. It was difficult for Plasencia to avoid exclusion
under Fleuti, in that her smuggling adventure was not considered
"innocent." The Court determined that Plasencia could properly be
placed in exclusion, rather than deportation proceedings, but that
she was entitled to a full hearing that comported with due pro-
cess.
2 87
Kwong Hai Chew and Fleuti were decided on nonconstitutional
grounds. The Kwong Hai Chew Court took a regulation that
' See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (holding the
United States liable for compensation for requisition of ships owned by plaintiff).
' See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).
278 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369, 373-74.
279 344 U.S. 590 (1953). Kwong Hai Chew was decided after Knauff but shortly
before Mezei.280 See id. at 592.
21 See id. at 601-03.
282 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
213 Id. at 461.
214 See id. at 460-63.
2a5 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
286 See id. at 23.
287 See id. at 32-37.
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addressed the exclusion of aliens and construed it to apply only to
aliens entering for the first time."' In Fleuti, the exception was
created by interpreting Fleuti's exit and return to the United States
as something other than a formal departure and a new "entry"
under the statute; as a result, the strict admissions criteria used in
exclusion proceedings would not apply.289 By creating its own
definition of "entry," the Court preserved the strict territorial
fiction and, at the same time, afforded relief to some aliens who had
strong ties to the United States. A real leap from the territorial
doctrine came in Pasencia. The Court could have modified the
Fleuti test and construed Plasencia's return as something other than
a new "entry," as the Court did in Fleuti itself. Had it done so,
Plasencia would have been deemed to be in deportation proceed-
ings and entitled to all the process due an allegedly deportable
alien. The Court would then have maintained the territorial fiction
without reaching any constitutional issues. Instead, the Court said
that Plasencia was properly in exclusion proceedings, but, given her
ties to the country, she was entitled to the protection of the Due
Process Clause.
290
Plasencia directly conflicts with Mezei and Knauff. While still
ruling that Plasencia was legally outside of the United States, the
Court held that Plasencia's connections with the country gave her
rights under the Constitution. In both Knauff and Mezei, the Court
found that these sorts of ties did not give any rights to an exclud-
able alien. Ellen Knauff was married to a United States citizen,
employed by the United States armed forces, and would have been
entitled to enter the country under the War Brides Act-yet she was
excluded without a hearing. Ignatz Mezei had resided in the United
States for twenty-five years and was married to a U.S. citizen-yet he
was excluded and detained without a hearing. Knauff's and Mezei's
ties to the country were deemed entirely irrelevant; what mattered
was that they stood at the border. Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei
were on the outside looking in, and so they had no rights at all.
291
28 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,598-600 (1953). The term "exclud-
able" aliens was taken to refer to "entrant aliens and to those assimilated to their
status." Id. at 599. The decision may seem ambiguous as to whether the Court was
stating a constitutional principle. TheJustices noted that Chew's voyage would not
terminate his rights under the Due Process Clause, even if he were to be treated as
an entrant alien. See id. at 600. But the Court expressly stated that it did not need
to reach the constitutional question. See id. at 602.
2 9 See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1963).
2" See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982).
2" Knauffand Mezei are the culmination of a line of decisions beginning with the
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This conflict remains in our law. In 1985, the Court passed up
an opportunity to decide how much of Mezei survived Plasencia. In
Jean v. Nelson,29 2 Haitian refugees asserted that the INS discriminat-
ed on the basis of race and national origin in its parole deci-
sions.293 Because the refugees were in exclusion proceedings, the
government argued that they were legally outside of the United
States, without any rights, and that the refugees were therefore
unable to contest their parole decisions. 294  The Court granted
certiorari on a petition that directly questioned the continued
validity of Mezei.295 Over a strong dissent, the Court decided the
case on nonconstitutional grounds and did not reach the Mezei
issue.
296
Thus, the federal courts have continued to apply Knauff and
Mezei, although the rights of aliens have expanded in matters
Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Chae
Chan Ping had previously lived in this country, and, before departing, he obtained
a certificate entitling him to reenter. See id. at 582. The Court was nevertheless
unmoved by his previous lawful residence in the United States and he was barred
from reentering. See id. at 603. Professor Motomura writes that Plasencia looked
beyond the statutory categories of exclusion or deportation "and thereby extended
procedural due process in immigration law to a wider circle of aliens." Motomura,
Curious Evolution, supra note 15, at 1653 (footnote omitted); see also Martin, supra
note 15, at 214-15 (discussing Plasencia's extension of procedural due process
protections to lawful permanent residents).
472 U.S. 846 (1985).
2' See id. at 848.
29 See id. at 854.
"95 The questions presented in the petition directly confronted Mezei, the entry
fiction, and the plenary power doctrine. The questions were the following:
(1) Is invidious discrimination on basis of race and nationality ... in
incarceration of excludable black Haitian refugees in detention camps,
wholly beyond constitutional scrutiny? (2) Doesjudicial deference to actions
of Congress and President in exercising their authority to admit or exclude
aliens preclude constitutional review.., in regard to non-admission ques-
tions? (3) Does Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), have
continuingvalidity and should it be extended to permit invidious discrimina-
tion ... in incarceration of aliens pending determination of their asylum
claims?
Jean v. Nelson, 53 U.S.L.W. 3442, 3442 (1984).
' The Court ruled that the INS's regulations already prohibit the Service from
making parole decisions based upon race and national origin, and so there was no
reason to reach the constitutional questions in the case. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854-57.
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. They would have limited Mezei to cases with
national security concerns because, when national security is at stake, parole may
indeed be the same as entry. See id. at 877-80 (Marshall,J., dissenting). They would
have held that detained excludable aliens are protected by the Constitution. See id.
at 875.
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unrelated to immigration. And, within immigration law, the
Supreme Court has deviated from the uniform application of the
entry fiction and plenary power doctrine. The returning resident
exception, formulated in Plasencia, cannot be reconciled with the
holdings in Knauff and Mezei.
B. Mezei and the Limits of Detention
Under the entry fiction, excludable aliens are not considered to
be "here." Legally, they are not within the United States and they
have no constitutional rights with respect to their admission. The
Supreme Court upheld Ignatz Mezei's incarceration at Ellis Island,
finding that his detention was part and parcel of the admissions
process. 97 Mezei contended that he was being punished without
a criminal trial. Because no country would accept him, Mezei could
not be deported. Thus, Mezei argued that his confinement could
not reasonably be considered detention pending exclusion and must
therefore be considered punishment.298 Relying upon the entry
fiction and the plenary power doctrine, the majority did not reach
this issue.
When the Supreme Court decided Mezei, the "punishment
doctrine" was only partly developed. At the end of the nineteenth
century, the Court had struck down a portion of one of the Chinese
exclusion laws, ruling that it unconstitutionally permitted punish-
ment without a criminal trial. The statute had directed that any
person of Chinese descent, who was determined by immigration
authorities not to be entitled to remain in the United States, should
"be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one
year" and then deported. 9 In Wong Wing v. United States,3'0 the
Court invalidated the provision authorizing imprisonment.
3 0'
Immigration officials could impose "detention, or temporary
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to ... the
exclusion or expulsion of aliens." 02 But imprisonment at hard
labor was an infamous punishment, and it could not be imposed
2 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213-16.
' See Brief for Respondent at 7-25, and Memorandum in Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (No. 139).
2 Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25.
- 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
301 See id. at 242-44.
" Id. at 235.
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without a criminal trial.8 0 3 Even excludable aliens could not be
punished without an indictment and a criminal trial." 4
A court commissioner had ordered Wong Wing imprisoned at
hard labor for 60 days. 0 5 To both nineteenth and mid-twentieth-
century jurists, Wong Wing's incarceration would clearly seem
punitive. Imprisonment at hard labor is, after all, a classic criminal
sentence. 806 Ignatz Mezei, on the other hand, could leave Ellis
Island if he found a country to accept him. And while Mezei was
held on Ellis Island for twenty-one months, he was not ordered to
remain in custody for a definite term, nor was he committed to hard
labor. 3 7 Unfortunately for Mezei, in 1953 the Supreme Court had
not yet fully developed a test to sort out subtle distinctions between
regulatory and punitive sanctions. It was difficult for Mezei to
argue that Wong Wing applied to conditions of confinement that did
not include a clearly recognized criminal sanction.
Ten years after Mezei, the Supreme Court reformulated the
punishment doctrine. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,s0 8 the Court
struck down a law30 9 that permitted immigration officials to divest
sos See id. at 237.
' See id. at 238 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
m5 See id. at 234.
' See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 (1885) ("For more than a century,
imprisonment at hard labor in the State prison or penitentiary or other similar
institution has been considered an infamous punishment in England and America.");
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370 (1769)
(listing various criminal punishments, including "perpetual or temporary imprison-
ment" and "hard labour in the house of correction").
' Although Mezei was not sentenced to hard labor, his confinement at Ellis
Island could not have been easy. Following the passage of the Internal Security Act
of 1950, Ellis Island became severely overcrowded. See 3 HARLAN D. UNRAU, ELLIS
ISLAND/HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY 973-74 (1984). The overcrowding strained the
facility's resources. The population grew from 400 to 1500, while the dining hall, for
example, sat only 300 people. See 3 id. at 974-75. The number of detainees remained
high during most of Mezei's stay. See 3 id. at 998.
Ellis Island residents were granted a fair measure of freedom on the island; many
slept in dormitories, and they could socialize as they wished. See generally A.H.
Raskin, New Rolefor Ellis Island, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1950, (Magazine), at 20, 76, 78
(describing conditions); Richard Thruelsen, The Things That Happen on "The Island!",
SAT. EVENING POST,July 21, 1951, at 32, 86 (same). Nevertheless, a high wire fence
served as a reminder that the residents were detainees and not invited guests. See id.
at 85. Escapes from Ellis Island were accompanied by all of the high drama that
marks breaks from maximum security prisons. See 2 Ellis Island Aliens Captured in
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1953, at 11 (describing an escape in which the detainees
tied sheets and blankets together, slid from the third floor of a dormitory, dodged
guard patrols, and swam to Jersey City).
a 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
in Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, § 1, 58 Stat. 746 (amendingThe Nationality Act
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an American of citizenship for leaving the country to avoid the
draft. The Court deemed loss of citizenship to be a punitive and
not merely a regulatory sanction. The sanction could not be
imposed "without providing the safeguards which must attend a
criminal prosecution.
"310
Mendoza-Martinez sets out the test to determine whether a civil
sanction should be considered criminal, and therefore not imposed
without the rights afforded criminal defendants.3 ' Under the
Mendoza-Martinez test, a court should first look for evidence of an
intent to punish.1 Absent this intent, a court should then
consider a multitude of factors, including the nature of the sanction
and the government's interest in imposing it.313  More recent
decisions have isolated the most critical elements of the Mendoza-
Martinez test. If there is no direct punitive intent, the punitive/
regulatory distinction depends upon whether there is a rational
alternative purpose for the sanction and whether the sanction is
excessive in relation to that alternative purpose.314
These two elements of the Mendoza-Martinez test impose a rule
of reasonableness upon regulatory confinements. The elements
parallel the analysis developed in a separate strand of due process
cases. In the landmark decision of Jackson v. Indiana,315 the
of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168, 1168-69).
310 Mendoza.Martinez, 372 U.S. at 184.
311 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6 (1993).
3
2 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
"s See id. at 168-69. The Court described the various factors as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.
Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature
of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on
its face.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). These factors provide guidance, but they
are neither exhaustive nor dispositive. See United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 & n.7 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in Cooper v.
Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249
(1980).
114 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 269 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-39 (1979).
315 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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Supreme Court ruled that criminal defendants may not be commit-
ted to custody as incompetent to stand trial for more than a
reasonable period necessary to determine whether they will become
competent in the foreseeable future. 16 Jackson affirms the basic
principle that, under the Due Process Clause, "the nature and
duration of commitment [must] bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed."
3 17
The majority upheld Ignatz Mezei's detention because it
considered his confinement to be part and parcel of the exclusion
process, a process in which Mezei had no rights whatsoever.
18
Had Mezei been decided after Mendoza-Martinez and Jackson, the
Court would have been required to measure Ignatz Mezei's
confinement by the rule of reasonableness. It is clear that Mendoza-
Martinez and Jackson apply to excludable aliens as well as to citizens.
At least since Wong Wing v. United States,3 19 it has been established
that aliens are entitled to the same procedures that citizens receive
in criminal prosecutions. Excludable aliens may not be subjected to
criminal sanctions without a full trial. 2 ° Had the Supreme Court
applied the Mendoza-Martinez test, or the more generalized require-
ment of reasonableness set forth in Jackson, Mezei might well have
been decided differently.
It would have been difficult for the government to assert a
rational, nonpunitive purpose for Mezei's extended confinement.
He was held for deportation. Thus, once it became established that
Mezei could not be deported, no rational, nonpunitive purpose
remained. In that respect, Mezei is similar to Foucha v. Louisi-
ana,21 in which the Court invalidated the hospitalization of an
insanity acquittee who was determined to be dangerous but no
longer mentally ill. 322 Foucha was acquitted of a crime; therefore,
he was committed to a mental health facility for treatment, not
316 See id. at 738.
317 id.
318 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953).
319 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
321 See id. at 238; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278
(1990) (Kennedy,j., concurring) ("The United States is prosecuting a foreign national
in a court established under Article III, and all of the trial proceedings are governed
by the Constitution. All would agree... that the dictates of the Due Process Clause
... protect the defendant."); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 912-14 (5th Cir.
1979) (explaining that excludable aliens may raise Miranda violations in criminal
proceedings).
321 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
32 See id. at 1784-85.
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punishment.3 2 Because Foucha was no longer mentally ill, the
Court held, he could no longer be held on that basis and further
confinement became unreasonable.
3 24
The government might have characterized the purpose of
Mezei's detention as "keeping him out of our society." This might
have served as a rational, nonpunitive purpose that could have been
accomplished by detention. Nevertheless, Mezei's confinement
probably still would have failed underJackson and the second prong
of Mendoza-Martinez. Courts regularly examine commitments that
are for facially legitimate purposes, such as pretrial detention under
the federal bail statutes25 and the commitment of defendants who
are found mentally unfit to stand trial.
3 26
The statutes authorizing these sorts of confinements routinely
provide for limited periods of detention and full evidentiary
hearings. 27 When a person alleges that his or her confinement is
excessive, even under these process-laden statutes, courts carefully
balance the need for detention with the conditions and length of
confinement. Lower courts have scrutinized the length of pretrial
detention under the Bail Reform Act.3 21 Similarly, courts and
323 See id. at 1785 ("As Foucha was not convicted, he may not be punished."); see
also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (stating that confinement of
insanity acquittees "rests on continuing [mental] illness and dangerousness").
24 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 ("Due process requires that the nature of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
is committed.").
325 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3145 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (discussing detention under the federal bail statute); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253 (1984) (discussing detention ofjuveniles under a New York statute).326 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1780.
127 Indeed, these limits and procedures may be required by the Due Process
Clause. The Court upheld the pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3145, in Salerno. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. The length
ofpretrial detention is necessarily limited because defendants have a right to a speedy
trial. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161. A detainee is also entitled to a
full adversarial detention hearing within a few days of the first court appearance. See
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (1988). In upholding the Bail Reform Act, the Court cited
these protections. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747; see also Schall, 467 U.S. at 274-81
(upholding the pretrial preventive detention ofjuvenile delinquents and noting that
the juveniles received a panoply of procedural protections, including a formal
adversarial probable cause hearing). Strikingly, the statute at issue in Schall limited
detention to 17 days. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 270.
In Foucha, the Court compared Louisiana's detention of insanity acquittees with
the federal pretrial detention upheld in Salerno. Striking down the Louisiana statute,
the Foucha Court determined that the Louisiana law failed to provide for an ad-
versarial hearing, and the statute also lacked any limit to the length of detention. See
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87.321 Salerno upheld the provisions of the Bail Reform Act against a facial challenge.
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legislatures have scrupulously limited the duration of the commit-
ment of defendants held as unfit to stand trial, as required by
Jackson v. Indiana."9
The Court expressly left open the opportunity for a defendant to assert a due process
violation in his or her individual case, such as when pretrial detention has "become
excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4. When
such a claim is raised, a court is more likely to find a due process violation where the
charge is less serious, the government's case is weak, the government is responsible
for some or all of the pretrial delay, or the end of confinement is speculative. See,
e.g., United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a 10-month
pretrial confinement raised due process concerns and required a remand for a-
hearing); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
continued detention after 32 months violated due process when defendant agreed to
all release conditions, including the use of an ankle bracelet); United States v.
Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 10-month confinement
pending a racketeering trial did not violate due process because the government was
not responsible for the delay); United States v.Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that potential pretrial detention of over eight months did not violate due
process when there was a great flight risk and the defendant was partially responsible
for the delay of the trial); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56, 59-61 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that confinement for 19 months was not a denial of due process
when there was no prosecutorial delay and the defendants were members of a
paramilitary terrorist group that claimed responsibility for a number of extremely
violent acts); United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1986)
("Detention that has lasted for fourteen months and, without speculation, is
scheduled to last considerably longer, points strongly to a denial of due process."
(citation omitted)), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986).
3- 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The federal courts engage in a fact-based, case-by-case
inquiry to determine what is a "reasonable period" of mental health commitment, and
at what point that confinement ceases to have any rational relationship to its original
purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 485-87 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a three-year confinement of defendant who has no chance of becoming
competent is unreasonable), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); United States v.
DeBellis, 649 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that it is unreasonable to hold an
incompetent defendant committed for competency determination beyond the
duration of the maximum possible sentence he could receive if convicted (30 days));
United States v.Juarez, 540 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (noting that "once
it [is] determined that the chance of the accused achieving competence is remote, the
committing court must" order a civil commitment hearing or release the defendant);
United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Conn. 1973) (holding that the
three-year detention of a defendant not likely to become competent violates due
process and "surpasse[s] any reasonable period of time permitted").
About half of the states have implementedJackson by enacting laws that set an
absolute maximum period of commitment. The periods allowed by these state
statutes range from as low as 90 days (Washington) to as high as three years
(Oregon). See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.370(6)(a) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.77.090 (West 1994); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370.1(c)(1)(A) (West 1994)
(providing for a maximum of six months); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d(i) (West
1993) (providing for a maximum of 18 months); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(5)(a) (West
1993) (providing for a maximum of 12 months).
Other states have drafted vague statutes and have left it to the courts to imple-
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Ignatz Mezei was kept from our society because of his alleged
communist activities and because he had previously been convicted
of petty theft."' 0 Given Mezei's minimal risk to our community,
his indefinite confinement would seem excessive in relation to the
danger that he posed to us. Had a majority of the Supreme Court
in Mezei recognized any constitutional limitation upon Mezei's
confinement, the majority might well have sided with Justice
Jackson. Justice Jackson's prescient dissent sought to impose on
Mezei's detention the same rule of reasonableness that was
expressed later in Mendoza-Martinez and Jackson. For Justice
Jackson, Mezei's confinement "no longer [could] be justified as a
step in the process of turning him back to the country whence he
came."331  Mezei's incarceration was, instead, a substitute for
exclusion. Impermissibly, it became "an end in itself."
331
Since Mezei preceded Mendoza-Martinez and Jackson, the Supreme
Court did not judge Mezei's detention by the reasonableness stan-
dard. Nevertheless, Mezei is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
more recent due process pronouncements. This inconsistency has
caused problems for the lower federal courts, which have been
called upon to decide numerous challenges to the detention of
excludable aliens. The issue has been raised most consistently in
litigation over the confinement of "Mariel" Cubans.
In 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban refugees came to the
United States in the "Mariel" boatiift.333 Most of the immigrants
mentJackson. The courts in those states have strictly limited the periods of commit-
ment. See e.g, State ex rel. Lockhart v. Armistead, 351 So. 2d 496, 498 (La. 1977)
(finding two-year confinement unreasonable, even though statute allowed confine-
ment for up to the maximum possible sentence of nine years); People v. Miller, 489
N.W.2d 60, 65 (Mich. 1992) (following statute and limiting confinement to 15
months); State v. Bias, 352 S.E.2d 52, 57 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that one-year
confinement is "primafacie unreasonably long" under the statute and a prior decision
applyingJackson).
For a general discussion of the states' implementation ofJackson, see MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILrrY LAW §§ 14.14-.16 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
s See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
331 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 227 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
3
3 2
1d.
" During the spring and summer of 1980, approximately 125,000 to 129,000
Cuban citizens arrived in South Florida on the boatlift from Mariel, Cuba. See
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the
Cubans were being excluded from the United States and that the Cuban government
refused to allow them to return); Mariel Cuban Detainees: Events Preceding and
Following the November 1987Riots: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 100th Cong., 2d
1995]
998 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 933
were excludable because they arrived at the U.S. border without
proper entry documents or because they had committed crimes in
Cuba."3 4 Apart from limited agreements reached in 1984 and
(perhaps) 1993, the United States has been unable to repatriate
Mariel Cubans ordered excluded from the country.-3 5 The over-
whelming majority of Mariel Cubans have been paroled into the
United States, and most have taken advantage of special legislation
to become permanent residents.3 6 However, the INS is presently
Sess. 32 (1988) [hereinafter Mariel Cuban Detainees Hearing] (testimony of Michael G.
Kozak, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep't of State). For a general description of
the boatlift and the subsequent treatment of the Mariel Cubans, see Mark D. Kemple,
Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans:
Constitutiona4 Statutoy, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1733, 1735-44 (1989).
" See Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 578; Kemple, supra note 333, at 1736.
Estimates vary widely, but it has been reported that as many as 23,000 of the refugees
had criminal records in Cuba. See Cuban Detainees and the Disturbance at the Talladega
Federal Prison: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991)
[hereinafter Talladega Hearing] (opening statement of Chairman Hughes); Detention
of Aliens in Bureau of Prisons Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration ofJustice, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1982) (testimony of Rudolph W. Giuliani, Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't
ofJustice) (noting that Fidel Castro emptied several prisons "to the tune of maybe
15,000 to 20,000 criminals").' But see Virginia I. Postrel, Let Cubans in, and Watch
Castro Rot, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at M5 (noting that of the 125,000 Cubans who
fled, only 5,000 Mariel Cubans were prisoners and mental health patients).
" In December 1984, the United States and Cuba concluded a migration
agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Cuba consented to the return of
excludable aliens that the INS was able to identify at the time the agreement was
reached. See Mariel Cuban Detainees Hearing, supra note 333, at 31-34. Some 2746
Mariel Cubans were covered by the agreement. See id. at 83 (statement of Arnold I.
Burns, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice). As ofJanuary 11, 1995, 1208
Mariel Cubans were repatriated to Cuba under the 1984 agreement. See Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Mariel Cuban Factsheet (Jan. 11, 1995) (unpublished
memorandum, on file with author) [hereinafter Mariel Cuban Factsheet].
In 1993, the United States announced a new agreement with Cuba to return an
additional 1500 excludable Mariel Cubans. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S.-Cuba Accord
Limited to Convicts, WASH. PosT, Oct. 2, 1993, at A14 (discussing generally the
agreement reached between the United States and Cuba); Larry Rohter, U.S. Pact to
Return Inmates to Havana Alarms Emigr&s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A16
(discussing agreement to return 1500 6migr6s, at a rate of 50 per month). Cuba,
however, renounced the agreement. See Despite Dea Cuban Inmates Still Awaiting
Deportation, CORRECTIONs DIG., Dec. 1, 1993, at 8, 8 (citing INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner and reporting that Cuba denied the existence of the 1993 agreement).
"s The legislation to adjust the status of Mariel Cubans was passed in 1986. See
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 202, 100 Stat.
3359,3404-05 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988)). According to the
State Department, "[tihe overwhelming majority of [Mariel Cubans] eventually
integrated themselves successfully into U.S. society." Mariel Cuban Detainees Hearing,
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detaining over a thousand "nonparolable" Mariel Cubans in U.S.
prison facilities."3 7 Although they are not serving criminal sentenc-
es, Cuba will not take these detainees back, and the INS will not
release them into U.S. society.
Five circuit courts have considered whether incarcerating
excludable Mariel Cubans amounts to impermissible punishment.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the aliens'
confinement; in each of these decisions, the courts of appeals have
not undertaken the full Mendoza-Martinez and Jackson analyses. 3 8 A
Ninth Circuit panel found that eight years of imprisonment is
impermissible. 3 9 However, an en banc panel vacated that decision
and found that the Supreme Court's opinion in Mezei made the
punishment cases "irrelevant." 40 The Tenth Circuit has held that
supra note 333, at 32.
3 Over the years, the number of detainees has fluctuated between about 1400
and 3000. In 1984, when the migration agreement was reached with Cuba, the INS
had identified 2746 excludable detainees. See Mariel Cuban Detainees Hearing, supra
note 333, at 83. In November 1991, 2363 Mariel Cubans were in INS custody. See
Talladega Hearing, supra note 334, at 293 (reprinting Justice Department's Mariel
Cuban Report). As ofJanuary 11, 1995,1409 Mariel Cubans were in INS custody, 919
were held in Federal Bureau of Prisons facilities, and the remainder were detained
in INS centers, state prisons or jails, and St. Elizabeth's Hospital. See Mariel Cuban
Factsheet, supra note 335.
' See Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441-42 (5th Cir.
1993) (determining that protection of society is a rational alternative purpose for the
sanction, but failing to discuss in any detail the conditions of confinement or whether
indefinite incarceration may be excessive in light of the alternative purpose), opinion
amended by 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993);Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 967-72 (lth
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (upholding confinement of Haitian detainees on basis of Mezei
and failing to apply the analyses of Mendoza-Martinez and Jackson), affd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1982)
(citing Wong Wing but failing to discuss the punishment doctrine).
"'5 See Barrera-Echavarriav. Rison, 21 F.3d 314,317 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We need not
draw the line exactly as to when attempted exclusion becomes punishment. Over
eight years of prison are too many. Over eight years of such deprivations constitute
punishment."), vacated en bane, No. 93-56682, 1995 WL 9709 (9th Cir.Jan. 12, 1995).
A previous Ninth Circuit panel upheld a three-year confinement without applying the
full punishment analysis. See Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir.
1991) (concluding that detention is not an excessive means of "[p]rotecting society
from a potentially dangerous alien," but failing to examine circumstances or length
of confinement), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 127 (1992).
Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, No. 93-56682, 1995 WL 9709, *6 (9th Cir.Jan. 12,
1995) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Barrera's punishment analysis:
We do not view the constitutional question in these terms.... Consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, and in light of
the annual parole reviews provided [by the INS], we find that Barrera has
no constitutional right to immigration parole and, therefore, no right to be
free from detention pending his deportation. The punishment cases he
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indefinite detention may amount to punishment. 4 The overwhelm-
ing majority of district courts have upheld indefinite confinement,
relying upon Mezei and its predecessors (including Knauff).
42
These have been challenging cases for the circuit and district
courts. 41 Instead of undertaking the full due process/punish-
ment analysis, many lower courts have simply applied Mezei's bright-
line territorial rule. The Supreme Court has failed to resolve
whether Mezei has been eroded by the Court's subsequent due
process decisions. This failure has complicated the work of the
federal courts.
C. Justice Frankfurter's "Clean Slate"
and the Fortunes of War
If the plenary power doctrine and the constitutionalization of
the entry fiction are inconsistent with our overall treatment of
aliens, if they conflict with Landon v. Plasencia,344 and if they
relies upon are therefore irrelevant to our decision.
Id. Because the INS could consider Barrera for release every year, the Ninth Circuit
characterized his incarceration "as a series of one-year periods of detention followed
by an opportunity to plead his case anew." Id. at *8. Viewing the detention in this
fashion, the court held, "we have no difficulty concluding that Barrera's detention is
constitutional under Mezei." Id.
"' See Rodriguez-Fernandezv. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981)
("[D]etention is permissible during proceedings to determine eligibility to enter and,
thereafter, during a reasonable period of negotiations for their return.... After such
a time.., the alien would be entitled to release."). Though it did not citeJackson,
the court analogized detention of Mariel Cubans to detention pending trial, and
noted that such confinement can be justified "only as a necessary, temporary
measure." Id. at 1387. Detention pending exclusion is impermissible "if there is to be
no trial." Id. In the case of Mariel Cubans, detention pending exclusion is impermissi-
ble after reasonable efforts to expel the person have been exhausted. See id. at 1390.
42 See e.g., Rodriguez v. Thornburgh, 831 F. Supp. 810,813 (D. Kan. 1993) (citing
Knauff, and ruling that detention is administrative, not punitive; court does not apply
Mendoza-Martinez or Jackson tests); In re Cuban, 822 F. Supp. 192, 195-97 (M.D. Pa.
1993) (same); Pena v. Thornburgh, 770 F. Supp. 1153, 1158-59 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (cit-
ingMezei; same holding); Fragedela v. Thornburgh, 761 F. Supp. 1252, 1255-57 (W.D.
La. 1991) (citing Mezei and finding that confinement is temporary because of yearly
administrative parole review; court did not apply Mendoza-Martinez or Jackson tests);
Barrios v. Thornburgh, 754 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (citing Knauff,
same holding); Sanchez v. Kindt, 752 F. Supp. 1419, 1422-23 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (citing
Mezei; same holding). But see Report and Recommendation of Stephen L. Verkamp,
U.S. Magistrate Judge, Mendinueta v. Reno, Civ. No. 90 1082 PHX PGR (SLV) (D.
Ariz. Sept. 30, 1993), at 18-19 (finding the incarceration of Mendinueta, a Mariel
Cuban, "excessive," thus constituting impermissible punishment).
" For further discussion, see infra notes 456-65 and accompanying text.
4 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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cannot be harmonized with contemporary principles of substantive
due process, how have they survived? Part of the answer lies in the
power and momentum of precedent.
The Supreme Court is aware that the plenary power doctrine
and the entry fiction are inconsistent with the Court's more recent
decisions. The Court granted certiorari in Jean v. Nelson 45 to
assess the continuing validity of Mezei, althoughJean was eventually
decided on nonconstitutional grounds.3 46 As early as 1954, the
Court acknowledged the tension between the plenary power
doctrine and our developing due process jurisprudence. That year,
Justice Frankfurter-a wordsmith of the first order-wrote for the
Court:
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process
as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power,
... much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean
slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political
discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in
regulating the entry and deportation of aliens.... But the slate is
not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under
review, there is not merely "a page of history," ... but a whole
volume .... [T]hat the formulation of [immigration] policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly
imbedded in the legislative andjudicial tissues of our body politic
as any aspect of our government.
3 47
Subsequent decisions have echoed Frankfurter's plaint that the
"slate is not clean" and have similarly declined litigants' invitations
to revisit the doctrine.348  But as Louis Henkin has observed,
"[s]inceJustice Frankfurter's statement, many other slates have been
cleaned."349 Why not this one as well?
It is too simplistic to say that precedent alone accounts for the
longevity of the entry fiction and the judicial deference prong of the
plenary power doctrine. The plenary power doctrine is premised on
34 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (citations omitted).
34See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 n.4 (1977) (quoting Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Galvan and stating that the Court is not now inclined to
reconsider this line of cases); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1972)
(same).
"' Henkin, supra note 267, at 29. David Martin makes much the same point. See
Martin, supra note 15, at 235 ("[T]he Supreme Court has shown itself quite capable
of throwing over the ancient writings in the name of current conceptions of due
process, whenever it is persuaded that it has good reasons for such an overruling.").
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the not unnatural belief that the executive should be given a
relatively free hand in international affairs, so long as she acts
within broad bounds set by Congress. What makes the doctrine
unreasonable is the extent to which the executive has sought that
free hand, and the failure of the doctrine to keep pace with
advances in the rest of our law. Yet the doctrine is appealing. And,
particularly when our country is engaged in war or is in a state of
national emergency, there is a strong inclination to defer to the
executive.
35 0
Alexander Aleinikoff disputes the notion thatjudicial deference
in immigration matters is based primarily upon foreign policy
concerns. He argues that foreign affairs is "a convenient excuse"
for our treatment of immigrants.3 5 ' He asserts that courts are less
inclined to come to the aid of aliens because, by definition, aliens
lack full membership in our national community. 52 Aleinikoff is
certainly right in perceiving this undercurrent in many judicial
decisions. However, a lack of membership in the national commu-
nity does not, for instance, justify the courts' failure to enforce
rights under the Due Process Clause, where the Clause itself does
not distinguish between citizens and aliens. Nor does it explain why
certain aliens are granted more process than others. For example,
an alien who enters illegally and is arrested a mile inside the border
has territorial standing and thus has greater rights than an alien who
is married to a United States citizen but who stands at the bor-
der. 53 The heightened protection afforded to the illegal entrant
is not supported by any measure of membership in our national
community. In the end, one must return to the foreign policy
explanation-the reason given most often by the Supreme Court for
deference to the executive.3 54  After all, the Supreme Court
" For an example of the Supreme Court's deference to the executive in time of
war, see Exparte Quirin, 317 U.s. 1 (1942). There the Court denied habeas corpus
petitions brought by aliens to challenge their trials, which were conducted by military
commissions pursuant to a presidential proclamation. The Court held that detentions
and trials that are ordered by the President as Commander in Chief in time of war
"are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress." Id. at 25.
351 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 12 (1990).
352 See id. at 12-20.
35sSee Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 867.
-" See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) (discussing the
executive's power to exclude aliens as necessary to maintain international relations);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (noting that policy toward
aliens is "intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the
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determined that the federal government has authority over
immigration primarily because of its nexus to foreign affairs.
3 55
This inclination to defer to the executive in foreign affairs,
particularly during times of conflict, helps explain the vitality of the
entry fiction and the judicial deference element of the plenary
power doctrine. These doctrines were reinvigorated and reached
their modern zeniths in Knauff and Mezei. These decisions were
rendered at the height of the Cold War, when thejudiciary's desire
to defer to the executive was manifest. In extrajudicial writings,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist has acknowledged this point. He has noted
that the end of World War II and the existence of the undeclared
war in Korea affected the work of the federal courts:
[T]he influence [on the courts] is aptly expressed in the Latin
phrase "silent Leges inter arma'-in time of war, the laws are silent
and the guns speak. Put in a more jurisprudential and restrained
fashion, it is the not unfounded belief that in times of military
crisis other branches of the government must uphold the action of
the executive if it is reasonably possible to do so.
6
To magnify this influence, Knauff and Mezei both also involved
allegations that judicial intervention would undermine the nation's
security."' Even if the Court's holdings in those cases were stated
broadly and have since been applied outside the context of threats
to national security, it is important to understand the settings in
which the decisions were rendered.5 8
During war, governments act in ways that would be unthinkable
during peace. We are no longer in the state of emergency that
marked the end of World War II and the Korean conflict. That is
not to say that the world is no longer a dangerous place. But we
should take stock of immigration doctrines that became fixed
conduct of foreign relations"); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 542-44 (1950) (stating that the right to exclude aliens "is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation").
s"- See Chae Chan Pingv. United States, 130 U.S. 581,605-06 (1889); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). For a discussion of Chae
Chan Ping and Curtiss-Wright, see supra part I.B.
11 William H. Rehnquist, Robert H.Jackson: A Perspective Twenty-Five Years Later,
44 ALB. L. REV. 533, 538 (1980).
57 SeeShaughnessyv. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,216 (1953);Knauff,
338 U.S. at 546-47.
"55 SeeJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 879 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the procedural due process holding in Mezei "had less to do with Mezei's status
as an alien than with the Court's willingness to defer to the Executive on national
security matters in the midst of the Cold War").
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during a time of war and consider carefully whether they must
necessarily be applied in a time of peace.
IV. RECASTING THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
AND THE TERRITORIAL FICTION
A. The Due Process Clause and Judicial Review
The thesis of this Article is that we should revisit the plenary
power doctrine and the territorial fiction. All people at or within
our borders ought to be deemed "persons" within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause; we should no longer give constitutional
effect to the territorial fiction. We should also consider abandoning
the judicial deference prong of the plenary power doctrine, which
would ameliorate the harsh impact of Knauff and Mezei. It would
also harmonize the law of detention and exclusion with the Plasencia
exception and the Mendoza-Martinez/Jackson tests. More fundamen-
tally, however, it is the right course for our nation.
We bear a responsibility to human beings at our door. We are
accountable for how we treat immigrants, regardless of the
problems that have brought them here. Once people arrive at our
border (or are interdicted on the high seas and held in United
States facilities abroad), they become subject to actions by our
government's officials. These actions are taken by representatives
of the United States and not agents of a foreign nation. Questions
about our treatment of arriving immigrants are, at their heart,
questions about us and not questions about them. Do we want our
government to exclude people without hearings? Should our
government confine human beings in prisons or detention camps
for lengthy periods of time without affording them criminal trials or
evidentiary hearings? Are we comfortable with the notion that our
government's treatment of immigrants is not constrained by the
Due Process Clause?
359
What drove the public and congressional response to Knauff and
Mezei was the notion that this is the United States of America. As
leader of the free world, we have a responsibility to hold ourselves
to the highest standards. These sentiments led Judge Herbert Stern
to afford constitutional protections to German citizens tried in a
"9 See e.g., Harold H. Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33
VA.J. INT'L L. 483, 488 (1993) (arguing that the policy of returning Haitian refugees
to the former military regime "converted our own Coast Guard into agents of a brutal
dictatorship that we ourselves have repeatedly called illegitimate").
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United States court in Berlin.6 ° Whatever the rule for courts
convened by other governments, "[w]e deal here," Judge Stern
wrote, "with an American court."361 Applying the same logic, one
federal district court found that the protections of the Due Process
Clause extend to Haitians detained at the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantfinamo Bay.6 2 The Station is operated by our government
and is on land leased from Cuba. 6' More recently, a federal
district judge in Miami (later overturned on appeal) temporarily
restrained the government from repatriating Cubans from Guan-
thnamo Bay until the refugees had an opportunity to consult with
counsel and had sufficient information to make an informed
decision about whether to return to Cuba voluntarily.- 64  What
moved the court was the fact that the Cubans were not on the high
seas, but rather were within United States territory at Guantinamo
Bay and were subject to actions by U.S. officials.
3 65
There is another reason to grant due process protection to
aliens, at least with respect to their detention. When we examine
our treatment of immigrants, we must look beyond our domestic
laws. Our nation's actions must also be measured by international
"0 See United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 260 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (holding
that civilians charged with nonmilitary offenses in a U.S. court in Berlin shall be
provided with the same constitutional safeguards that are given to civilians in any
other United States court).
" Id. at 249. In the Insular Cases-Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304 (1922);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1903); and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
287 (1901)-the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution applies in U.S. territories
in varying degrees, depending upon the status of the territories. Judge Stern
distinguished the Insular Cases to the extent that they address whether the Constitu-
tion applies in territorial courts not operated by the United States government. Stern
ruled that the Insular Cases "do not apply whefi the United States is acting as
prosecutor in its own court." Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 249.
6 2 See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1041-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
s See id. at 1036.
s" See Order, Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, No. 94-2183-CIV-ATKINS, at
13 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1994) (granting plaintiffs' emergency motion for temporary
restraining order) [hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order], dissolved, 1995 WL
16410, at *13 (11th Cir.Jan. 18, 1995).
' See id. at 8-10. The court of appeals was not similarly moved. In Cuban
American Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, Nos. 94-5138, 94-5231, and 94-5234, 1995
WL 16410 (11th Cir.Jan. 18, 1995), the court dissolved the temporary restraining
order entered by the district court. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the district
court erred in concluding that Guantinamo was a United States territory. See id. at
*8. The court of appeals determined that "control andjurisdiction" is not equivalent
to sovereignty and that the plaintiffs could only prevail if they could show that
statutory or constitutional rights had extraterritorial application. Id.
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law, which establishes certain norms of governmental conduct.
Customary international law prohibits prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion. 66 All major human rights instruments recognize a right to
be free from arbitrary arrest or detention. 6 The United States
s" The most authoritative compilation of international law principles, as applied
in our country, is contained in the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Section 702 provides that "[a] state violates international law
if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones... prolonged,
arbitrary detention." Id. § 702.
Our federal courts have periodically recognized this human rights norm in cases
involving detention within the United States. See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622
F. Supp. 887, 902 (N.D. Ga. 1985) ("Even the government admits that customary
international law of human rights contains at least a general principle prohibiting
prolonged, arbitrary detention."), rev'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir.
1986); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,798 (D. Kan. 1980) ("Our review of
the sources from which customary international law is derived clearly demonstrates
that arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary international law."), affd sub nom.
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (observing,
in dicta, that "[n]o principle of international law is more fundamental than the
concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment").
The federal courts have been more than willing to acknowledge the norm in
litigation concerning detention in other countries. See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985) (identifying the right "not
to be arbitrarily detained" as a human right incorporated into the law of nations);
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (recognizing
that illegal detention may constitute a tort in violation of the "law of nations"); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("There is case law
finding sufficient consensus to evince a customary international human rights norm
against arbitrary detention." (citing Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795-98)); Von Dardel
v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 257 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that the prolonged arbitrary
detention and death of diplomat constituted clear violation of the law of nations),
vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (noting that prolonged
arbitrary detention violates current norms of international law and citing RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED) § 702 (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1982)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
In international judicial fora, our executive has argued that arbitrary prolonged
detention is a violation of international law. In the Iranian hostage case, the United
States urged, and the International Court ofJustice agreed, that
[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them
to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incom-
patible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as
with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
United States v. Iran (In re United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran),
1980 I.CJ. 3, 42 (May 24).
' See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, para.
3, 9 I.L.M. 673, 677 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978) ("No one shall be
subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment."); Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5, para. 1,213 U.N.T.S.
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recently ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 6 ' which contains not only a prohibition against arbitrary
detention, 69 but also states that international law requires judicial
review: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of
his detention and order his release if the detention is not law-
ful."370  The concepts of arbitrary detention and lack of judicial
review are interrelated. Cases in international fora hold that
noncriminal detention that is unreviewable by a competent court is
"arbitrary."371  Our practice of confining excludable aliens for
prolonged periods of time without full judicial review amounts to
arbitrary detention, in violation of customary international law and
the express language of international agreements.
3 72
222, 226 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]
("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person."); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. art 9, at 137,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or
exile."). Whether or not these instruments are themselves enforceable in domestic
courts, they evince international support for the norm prohibiting prolonged arbitrary
detention.
3" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 168, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter International Covenant] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). President
Carter signed the International Covenant on behalf of the United States on October
5, 1977. See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting Human Rights Treaties,
1 PUB. PAPERS 395 (1978). The Senate ratified it on April 2, 1992. See 138 CONG.
REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). However, the Senate attached a series of
reservations, including a declaration that the International Covenant would not be
self-executing. See id. at S4784.
9 See International Covenant, supra note 368, art. 9, para. 1.
3
7o Id. art. 9, para. 4; see also European Convention, supra note 367, art. 5, para. 4
(containing similar requirement of judicial review). The rights described in the
International Covenant apply to everyone, regardless of nationality or statelessness.
See International Covenant, supra note 368, cmt. 15.
-71 See Camargo v. Colombia, 71 I.L.R. 317, 325 (U.N. H.R. Comm'n 1982)
(holding that confinement under domestic law authorizing emergency detention,
without habeas corpus review, violates Article 9 of the International Covenant);
Massiotti v. Uruguay, 71 I.L.R. 310, 316 (U.N. H.R. Comm'n 1982) (holding that
detention past end of criminal sentence is arbitrary and violates Article 9 of the
International Covenant where there is no appeal to a competent court); see also
Winterwerp Case, 58 I.L.R. 653, 674-77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1979) (holding that continued
mental health commitment violates Article 5, paragraph 4 of the European Con-
vention where review of confinement is conducted by government administrators and
not by a court).
37 Detained excludable aliens may bring habeas corpus petitions in federal court
to challenge their continued confinement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The
problem is that in reviewing these petitions, the courts consider their powers to be
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Whether or not our domestic courts are willing to enforce these
human rights norms and instruments,~5 they represent the
extremely limited if, indeed, the courts admit to any powers of review at all. See supra
notes 47-60, 65-66, 102-15, 183-88, and accompanying text. Thus, although there is
the appearance of judicial review, in practice the right of review is virtually
meaningless.
"' From the earliest days, courts have recognized that the United States is bound
by international law. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793)
(explaining that, by taking its place among nations, the United States became subject
to the law of nations); In re The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,423 (1815) ("[T]he
Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.").
Domestic courts have not, however, always enforced international law.
Customary international law is treated as federal common law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 366, § 111 cmt. d. In In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900), the Supreme Court noted that customary international law must be
administered by our courts, but that it may be ousted or repealed from the body of
domestic law by a "controlling executive or legislative act orjudicial decision." The
Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes such a controlling act or decision.
One might wonder how the executive or the courts could act in derogation of
international law. The President has the duty to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S.
(8 Cranch) 110, 125, 128 (1814) (under international law, property of the enemy is
not immediately confiscated; absent an act of Congress, the executive does not have
the power to confiscate enemyproperty); Louis Henkin, The President and Internation-
al Law, 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 930, 934 (1986) (arguing that the executive must enforce
international law unless it has ceased to be a law or has been superseded by another
law that the President has a duty to execute). Similarly, the courts have the same
function of "finding" customary international law-that is, construing the law's
dimension-that they otherwise have in interpreting domestic law. See Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. at 700 (courts must ascertain international law whenever questions
depending on it are presented); see also Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that courts must not interpret domestic law
to violate international law if any other construction remains). See generally Ralph G.
Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutoy Construction,
43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990). Nevertheless, several courts have relied upon
executive acts orjudicial decisions in "ousting" customary international human rights
norms. See, e.g., Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 746 F. Supp. 1006, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (holding that norm prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention is not controlling,
given Attorney General's plan to review status of Cuban detainees and given Supreme
Court's decision in Mezei), af/'d, 941 F. 2d 956 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
127 (1992); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (lth Cir.) (same), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
Courts are also required to give effect to international agreements, although
"non-self-executing" agreements will not be enforced without implementing
legislation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),supra note 366, § 111(3). The Senate has declared
that the International Covenant is not self-executing. Seesupra note 368. Although the
lack of implementing legislation means that no one may claim rights directly under
the term of the International Covenant, the President's signature and the Senate's
ratification both act as a reaffirmation of the norm prohibiting prolonged arbitrary
detention. One might argue that this reaffirmation explicitly establishes that this
customary norm has not been ousted from domestic law.
The question whether our domestic courts are willing to enforce international
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agreement of the international community as to the minimum rights
that should be enjoyed by all people. These norms provide a
yardstick to measure our own nation's conduct. We can-and
should-reexamine our laws to determine whether our government
meets the baseline standards required of all nations. Determining
that all people at or within our gates, or detained abroad by our
government, are persons within the Due Process Clause and
affording them judicial review would harmonize our immigration
practices with human rights norms.
Extending the reach of the Due Process Clause would not mean
that all people who seek to come to the United States must be
granted entry. The point here is only that applicants for admission
should be protected by our laws while they make their case for entry
and, further, that there is a limit to how our government may treat
these applicants. Congress determines the substantive criteria for
admission to the United States. Granting applicants the protection
of the Due Process Clause would not affect the merits of their
claims. It would merely permit many aliens a full opportunity to
prove that they meet the standards for entry set by Congress.
Some may argue that extending these protections to aliens
would be inconsistent with the grant of executive authority over
immigration. Not so. We may accept the first two prongs of the
plenary power doctrine, that the immigration authority rests with
the federal government and that the executive implements the
federal immigration power (whether that implementation is
pursuant to a legislative grant or an inherent sovereign right), but
these first two parts of the plenary power doctrine do not lead
ineluctably to the third. Because the federal executive implements
the immigration power does not mean that the exercise of that
power must be free of all judicial oversight.
There are other models that mix plenary power with some
measure of judicial review. For example, Congress is deemed to
possess plenary power to address the special problems of Indi-
ans. 1 4 The Supreme Court has held that "the plenary power of
law is not, however, relevant to the issue of what our laws should be. As a normative
matter, the United States should aspire to comply with international agreements and
customary international law.
374 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980)
(recognizing that "'[pilenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning'" (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 565 (1903))); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("The plenary
power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both
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Congress in matters of Indian affairs 'does not mean that all federal
legislation concerning Indians is . . . immune from judicial scruti-
ny.' " 7 5 Thus, individual Indians may file a lawsuit and allege that
federal legislation denies them rights under the Due Process
Clause.3 76 Similarly, while Congress has plenary power to regulate
interstate commerce, the legislation is still subject to other constitu-
tional constraints. 377  When Congress legislates pursuant to its
plenary power in these areas, the courts do not hold that whatever
process Congress chooses to provide is due process of law.
A more troublesome criticism is that bringing all immigrants
within the reach of the Due Process Clause, and affording judicial
review, would diminish the executive's power over foreign affairs.
Some have asserted that laws relating to aliens are inextricably
linked to foreign affairs and that the courts cannot decide such
questions without hindering our ability to function in the communi-
ty of nations.17 ' This assertion has some merit, but it is vastly
overstated.3 79  By definition, any restriction placed upon the
executive lessens the government's ability to act. Requiring the
executive to comply with international human rights norms is a
restriction on the government's power. Yet, not every restriction on
executive power is necessarily undesirable.
A strong argument can be made that forcing the executive to
comply with human rights norms strengthens our hand in foreign
affairs. In a world where international law is increasingly asserted
explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.").
" Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977) (quoting
Appellants' Brief at 19 n.19, No. 75-1495).
76 See id. at 83-85 (noting that Indians may argue that their exclusion from an
award of compensation violates the Due Process Clause). When such a challenge is
made, courts apply a deferential standard of review: "the legislativejudgment [is] not
disturbed '[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians. .. .'" Id. at 85 (quoting Morton,
417 U.S. at 555) (second alteration in original); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
717-18 (1987) (holding that, despite Congress's broad power to regulate Indian trust
lands, federal statute violates Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause).
377 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
Quill involved a nonresident corporation's challenge to state taxation. The Supreme
Court held that, although Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce, it "does not.., have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 1909.
" See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255, 261-69 (noting but not endorsing this
view).
379 Not all cases relating to aliens touch on foreign affairs. See infra notes 400-02
and accompanying text.
THE EXCLUSION AND DETENTION OF ALIENS
as the basis for intervention abroad, the disregard of our own
human rights obligations puts our diplomatic efforts at risk. The
United States government has been quite willing to recognize that
other nations violate international law when they detain people
arbitrarily.38 ° The United States has been among the most vocal
nations in protesting human rights abuses in other countries.
81
Moral suasion is one of the principal forces for the protection of
human rights abroad. In the international community, "do as I say,
not as I do" is a rather devalued currency.
Nevertheless, there may b'e special circumstances in which the
government's immigration decisions strongly implicate foreign
affairs. In those rare instances, the executive may argue for judicial
deference, as described below. The problem with the current law,
however, is that deference is assumed to be necessary under all
circumstances. The next section of this Article discusses a more
limited model for judicial deference.
B. An Alternative Model ofJudicial Deference
Basing judicial deference on the need for a free hand in foreign
policy amounts to a claim that immigration matters are nonreview-
able political questions. The political question doctrine serves as a
mechanism to enforce the separation of powers. Whether it is
considered a substantive rule of decision or a finding of lack of
'0 This is perhaps most apparent in the restrictions that Congress has placed on
our programs of foreign assistance. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988) (prohibiting
foreign development assistance to any country engaging "in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," including "prolonged
detention without charges"); 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), (d)(1) (1988) (prohibiting
security assistance to any country engaging in a "consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights," including "prolonged detention without
charges and trial"); 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a)(1) (1988) (noting that the assistance policy of
the United States government toward international financial institutions "shall
advance the cause of human rights, includingby seeking to channel assistance toward
countries other than those whose governments engage in ... a pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights," including "prolonged
detention without charges").
" Our current human rights dispute with China is one of the most recent exam-
ples. The United States has sought to hold China to the standards set forth in
international instruments. Premier Li Peng has stated that "China will never accept
the United States' human rights concept." Jim Mann & Rone Tempest, U.S., China
Trade Embittered Words on Human Rights, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at Al. Secretary
of State Warren Christopher countered by noting that the United States was only
asking "that China follow the basic standards of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that binds most of the nations of the world today." Id. at A10.
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jurisdiction, the political question doctrine disables the judiciary
from adjudicating certain disputes that are solely committed to the
other branches of government or that the judiciary lacks the
capacity to resolve. 82 The political question doctrine provides a
set of criteria to judge claims of nonjusticiability.
In domestic matters, the political question doctrine is rarely the
basis for a judicial decision. The Supreme Court has invoked the
doctrine in only the most limited of circumstances.3 s3 In a host
of other prominent cases, the Justices have rejected the doctrine;
they have resolved such seemingly intractable disputes as a Presid-
ent's resistance to a subpoena issued by a special prosecutor,
38 4
the refusal of the House of Representatives to seat an elected mem-
ber,385 and a state's malapportionment of its own legislative
districts.3 86
The reasons for the political question doctrine themselves signal
the rarity and significance of the doctrine's application. Alexander
' See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."); Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433,454-55 (1939) (noting that the dominant considerations for nonjusticiability
under the doctrine are the appropriateness of attributing finality to the decisions of
the political departments and the lack of criteria forjudicial determinations); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1959)
("I submit that.., the only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from
decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to
another agency of government than the courts."). For more complete explications
of the political question doctrine, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98 (2d ed. 1962); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 124-45 (1989); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REvIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 15-30 (1958); Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjudiciability: Judicial
Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DUKE LJ. 231, 237-48 (1994); Louis Henkin,
Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976); Fritz W. Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966). For more detailed discussions ofjudicial review in matters of foreign affairs,
see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 45-60 (1992);
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69-91 (1990);
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1980,
1981-87 (1993) (book review).
' See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735-40 (1993) (holding that the
validity of the Senate's impeachment of a federal judge is nonjusticiable); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973) (noting that the Constitution expressly leaves the
power to regulate state militia to Congress and state governments); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that federal courts cannot determine whether
a state has violated the Republican Form of Government Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974).
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1969).
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-11.
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Bickel has eloquently described the political question doctrine as
the [Supreme] Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in
unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractabil-
ity to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it,
which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so
much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps
it should but will not be; (d) finally... the inner vulnerability, the
self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and
has no earth to draw strength from.
3 8 7
When a political question claim is made, the Supreme Court
generally engages in a two-part inquiry. First, it will determine
whether the text of the Constitution commits the issue solely to
another branch of government.3 88 Next, it will consider, essential-
ly for the reasons described by Bickel, whether the individual case
is one that the judiciary lacks the capacity to resolve.38 9 The mere
allegation of a political question, or the fact that the litigants are
governmental entities, does not control."' 0
The same two-part test is applied when the political question
doctrine is raised in matters of foreign affairs that do not relate to
aliens. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court declared that "[not]
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance.""' The Court stated that its own
a BICKEL, supra note 382, at 184.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (explaining that the Court will look for "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment"); see also Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (following Baker);
Powell, 395 U.S. at 518-22 (same).
" 9See e.g., Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 738-40 (holding that the issue presents a political
question because the Impeachment Trial Clause commits authority solely to the
Senate and because "the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel
against justiciability"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696-97 (1974) (finding
no political question because the production of evidence in a federal criminal case is
justiciable by a federal court); Powell, 395 U.S. at 518-22, 548-49 (holding that no
political question exists because the text of the Constitution shows no commitment
of the issue to the House of Representatives and because the Court is fully capable
of interpreting the Constitution and adjudicating the dispute); Baker, 369 U.S. at 226
(determining that there is no political question because the apportionment decision
neither implicates a decision by a coequal branch of government nor requires a court
to make a standardless policy determination).
3'0 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693 ("The mere assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch
dispute,' without more, has never operated to defeat federaljurisdiction;justiciability
does not depend on such a surface inquiry."); United States v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) ("While this case is United States v. United States,
et al., it involves controversies of a type which are traditionally justiciable.").
391 369 U.S. at 211.
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political question decisions involving foreign affairs "show a
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of
... its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature
and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences
of judicial action."
92
The contrast with the judicial deference prong of the plenary
power doctrine could not be more marked. When aliens are the
subject of litigation, the courts do not ask whether the resolution of
the issue truly requires expertise in matters of foreign affairs or
whether judicial participation would somehow diminish the ability
of the United States to speak with one voice in foreign affairs. The
Supreme Court has stated that its own plenary power immigration
decisions show
no indication.., that the scope ofjudicial review is a function of
the nature of the policy choice at issue. To the contrary, "since
decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign
powers, ... such decisions are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the
Judiciary. ... "
In immigration matters, then, the courts give talismanic significance
to the plenary power doctrine's principle of judicial deference.
The courts ought not to afford the executive such blanket
deference. The political question doctrine offers an alternative
model to determine whether cases involving aliens are susceptible
to judicial handling. Applying this alternative model, the political
question test, would allow only a small category of cases relating to
aliens to qualify for judicial deference.
First, it is difficult to argue that the text of the Constitution
demonstrably commits all questions relating to aliens solely to
another branch of government. The Naturalization Clause 394 gives
Congress the power to establish rules concerning naturalization. No
provision of the Constitution, however, expressly addresses
immigration or commits immigration authority to the sole discre-
tion of any one branch of the federal government. Some recent
decisions have cited the Naturalization and Foreign Commerce
Clauses as additional sources of the federal government's immigra-
tion authority.39 5 But these references do not demonstrate a clear
39 Id. at 211-12.
113 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81 (1976)).
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 4.
31 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10
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textual commitment to a coordinate branch of government. Nor
does a finding of inherent sovereign power necessarily mean that
the exercise of the immigration authority can never be challenged
by a court constituted under Article III, especially when a litigant
asserts that the immigration authority has been exercised in
derogation of certain enumerated rights. Knauff, Mezei, and other
plenary power decisions rely upon one or both of the following lines
of precedent for inherent authority over immigration: Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 96 which inferred the federal immigration
power from the other grants of congressional authority in the
Constitution, and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
397
which found that such inherent authority passed to the new
collective government when the United States declared its own
independence. 98  That the power to exclude is similar to express
grants of power in the Constitution, as determined in Chae Chan
Ping, does not lead to the conclusion that the exclusionary power
has greater force than other express provisions such as the Due
Process Clause. Furthermore, the Court in Curtiss-Wright explicitly
acknowledged that inherent sovereign powers are subordinate to the
requirements set out in the text of the Constitution.
°99
(1982). In describing the federal power over immigration, these cases cite the
Naturalization and Foreign Commerce Clauses in addition to the doctrine of inherent
sovereign authority. Plyler and Toll do not analyze the Naturalization and Foreign
Commerce Clauses or the earlier decisions interpreting these provisions.
3- 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889); see also supra part I.B.
1 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936); see also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
.. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44
(1950) (relying on both lines of cases); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-
89 (1952) (same); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-15
(1953) (relying on the Knauff, Harisiades, and Chae Chan Ping line of cases);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972) (relying primarily on the Chae
Chan Ping line of cases); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-96 (1977) (following
Kleindienst).
'9 See Curtss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. Justice Sutherland wrote that the President
is endowed with the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ
of the federal government" in international affairs. Id. Nevertheless, Sutherland
described that authority as one "which, of course, like every other governmental
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution." Id. The Court in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), stated:
Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate foreign affairs
must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining
Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in
the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate
our relations with other nations.
Id. at 58; see also HENKIN, supra note 382, at 252-56 (noting that the exercise of the
foreign affairs power is not exempt from limitations that favor individual rights).
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Second, not all disputes relating to aliens have the same
potential consequences for our foreign relations. Cases involving
aliens are not all of the same stripe. The plenary power doctrine
has been invoked to curtail judicial review, for example, of ques-
tions concerning the eligibility of aliens for Medicare,400 an
immigration preference given to legitimate but not illegitimate chil-
dren,40 1 and the alleged deprivation of citizens' First Amendment
rights due to the denial of a visa to an invited foreign speaker.
4 0 2
It is difficult to conclude thatjudicial review of the questions raised
in these cases would impede our role in the community of nations
or that the courts somehow lack the basic tools necessary to afford
reasoned justice. Stephen Legomsky argues that when the govern-
ment seeks judicial deference, the court should conduct a "realistic
appraisal" of the effect of judicial review upon our foreign poli-
cy.403 Whether one engages in a "realistic appraisal" or the
"discriminating analysis" required by Baker v. Carr,40 4 these issues
should be subject to judicial review.
That these cases should receive judicial review is made more
clear by examining the sorts of disputes touching on foreign affairs
that the courts will resolve. The judiciary has reached the merits of
claims concerning the executive's refusal to impose trade sanctions
for violations of an international convention,0 5 the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board's interpretation of the Warsaw Convention,0 6 and the
validity of an executive agreement that ended the hostage crisis in
Iran.40 7  Only four Justices, not a majority, would find non-
justiciable a challenge brought by several members of Congress to
the President's termination of a treaty.4 8 Furthermore, the First
4oSee Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-84 (1976).
401 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 791.
402 See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765-70.
403 See Legomsky, supra note 378, at 263 (arguing that judicial deference should
be afforded only in "the special case in which the court concludes, after a realistic
appraisal, that applying the normal standards of review would interfere with the
conduct of foreign policy").
404 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
4" See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30
(1986) (expressly rejecting the argument that the issue was nonjusticiable).41 See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 254 n.25 (1984)
(finding no political question).407 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (omitting discussion
of any claim that the issue presented a political question because the President's
powers were derived from an act of Congress).
41 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring).
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Congress gave aliens the power to sue in federal court for torts
committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 40 9 Under this statute, and under a more recent
law, the federal courts have adjudicated charges of torture against
former leaders of other countries. 410  These suits may have a
substantial impact on foreign relations. Nevertheless, the courts
continue to adjudicate these matters.
Most exclusion and detention issues would be justiciable if
courts were to examine claims of judicial deference critically.
Deportable aliens, who are considered to be inside our territory, are
protected by the Due Process Clause.41 There is no foreign policy
reason to afford full review of claims raised in deportation cases,
but not in exclusion cases. Both instances present courts with
similar, if not identical, legal and practical difficulties. The grounds
for deportation overlap many of the grounds for exclusion, and the
issues in both categories of proceedings are much the same.
412
Further, most courts should be able to review claims that detention
has become so prolonged as to amount to punishment. Courts
adjudicating those claims would be asked to decide whether there
4"Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)).
411 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (permitting a
citizen of Paraguay to sue a former Inspector General of Police for the alleged torture
and death of a family member); Ford v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538-40
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (permitting Argentine citizens to sue a former general for alleged
torture, murder, and prolonged arbitrary detention); see also Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (establishing
a cause of action against any individual who, while acting under authority or color of
law of a foreign nation, subjects anyone to torture).
411 Compare Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation proceedings) with
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment does not apply to the exclusion of aliens).
412 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(9) (Supp. V 1993) (grounds for exclusion) with
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. V 1993) (grounds for deportation). Furthermore, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), a catch-all provision, states that an alien may be deported if
that person was excludable at the time of his or her entry into the country.
The issues in immigration cases that have perhaps the greatest potential impact
on foreign relations concern applications for political asylum. Asylum applicants may
seek permission to remain in the United States because of persecution based upon
"political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining the term
"refugee"); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing "refugees" within the
meaning of § 1101 to apply for asylum). The grant of an asylum application may
signal the United States' disapproval of the government in the alien's home country.
Aliens may apply for asylum in either deportation or exclusion proceedings. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(c)(1) (1993).
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is a rational, nonpunitive purpose for the detention, and whether
the detention has become excessive in relation to that purpose.
13
Foreign policy concerns should not prevent the courts from
addressing these issues in the overwhelming majority of cases. Once
again, the full stories of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei provide
telling illustrations.
The government sought to exclude Knauff based upon legal
grounds that also serve as a basis for deportation under current
laws.4 14 The disclosure of the government's evidence against
Knauff did not work any great evil to our nation's foreign relations.
Nor were the legal issues so complex that, had they been reviewed
by an Article III court, the court would have been disabled from
deciding the questions presented.
Similarly, the government considered Ignatz Mezei to be
excludable on several grounds.4 15 Two of the allegations, that
Mezei had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and that he
had made a false statement to consular officers, were unremarkable.
They are similar to grounds for deportation, litigated every day for
deportable aliens. 416 The allegation that Mezei was a member of
the Communist Party potentially touched on foreign affairs but was,
in the end, determined by Mezei's activities in New York and by his
affiliation with the IWO. In the deportation proceedings brought
against Andrew Dmytryshyn and in the New York state insurance
case, the INS had already helped litigate the question of whether the
IWO was dominated by the Communist Party.417 Requiring the
executive to litigate this same issue for Ignatz Mezei would have
neither diminished the federal government's authority in foreign
affairs nor presented a question beyond the competence of a court
to resolve. Nor would it have been difficult for a court to adjudi-
cate whether Mezei's detention was so excessive as to amount to
413 See supra notes 312-17 and accompanying text.
414 The government sought to exclude Knauff on the theory that she might engage
in espionage in the United States. See supra note 142. Under current laws, that is a
ground for both exclusion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A), and deportation, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(4)(A).
415 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
416 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that an alien may be deported for
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of entry,
if sentence of over one year is imposed); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A) (stating that an
alien may be deported if excludable at time of entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)
(stating that an alien may be excluded if he seeks to obtain entry by fraud or
misrepresentation).
41 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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punishment. Indeed, the Board of Special Inquiry found that Mezei
played only a minor role with the Communist Party, and the Board
recommended to the Attorney General that he be released on
parole.
418
There may be rare circumstances in which the government can
demonstrate a strong link between an exclusion or detention
decision and the power to conduct foreign affairs. In such a case,
a court might defer to the executive under the political question
doctrine. A possible candidate for deference might be, for example,
the President's decision in August 1994 to detain Cuban immigrants
in order to discourage their migration to the United States. A
lawsuit challenging their detention might be deemed to present a
nonjusticiable political question provided that the executive can
demonstrate that the detention is integral to our foreign policy. 419
The political question assertion should not prevail any longer than
necessary; once the consequences of judicial action no longer
significantly affect foreign policy, the issues should be considered
susceptible of judicial handling.
Under this test, not all claims that detention is linked to foreign
policy would succeed. Many Mariel Cubans, for example, are still
held in prison facilities fourteen years after their arrival in the
United States.420 It would be difficult for the government to
persuade courts that the executive's decisions to detain them are
nonjusticiable political questions. The INS has released the
overwhelming majority of Mariel Cubans and has established
regulations to govern the parole of those who are still in custo-
dy.4 21 Judicial review of these parole decisions would in no way
interfere with foreign affairs.
418 See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
419 It is not clear that the executive can make such a showing. On September 9,
1994, the United States and Cuba issued ajoint Communique. The Communique
refers to recent decisions by the United States that were taken "to discourage unsafe
voyages." Joint Communique, Sept. 9, 1994, U.S.Cuba, at 1. If our detention policy
is aimed merely at discouraging unsafe voyages, rather than at altering the
relationship between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, the issue of deten-
tion may not be integral to foreign affairs.420 See supra notes 333-37 and accompanying text.
421 See infra note 464.
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V. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF EXCLUSION AND DETENTION
The preceding section argued for the revision of the entry
fiction and the plenary power doctrine. This part of the Article
examines the impact these revisions would have, applying contem-
porary standards for determining what process is due under the
Constitution. 22 If all people at or within our borders are "per-
sons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and if we no
longer defer to the executive in all immigration matters, courts will
have to reexamine the constitutional requirements in exclusion and
detention cases.
Under current law, the first step in any procedural due process
analysis is assessing whether there is a constitutionally protected
interest. Only if there is such an interest does one proceed to the
next step, determining what process is due before a person may be
deprived of that interest.423 Courts determine the process that is
due under the familiar calculus of Mathews v. Eldridge.424 Factors to
consider include the nature of the individual's interest, the risk of
an erroneous decision through current procedures, the cost and
4
2 The use of contemporary due process standards in this Article, particularly the
balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), is not meant as an
endorsement of those standards. There are many reasons to criticize the Supreme
Court's current procedural due process methodology. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,Jr.,
Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1993) (describing limits to the application of the
Mathews test); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory
of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28,46-57 (1976) (criticizing Mathews's utilitarian approach
for omitting certain important values); Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional
Requirement of "Some Evidence;" 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 698 (1988) (noting that
Mathews does not provide a framework for all procedural due process questions);
Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach
to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 154-56 (1978) (criticizing the Mathews
approach for undervaluing individual dignity). Nevertheless, this part of the Article
assesses the impact of the previous section's normative arguments; it therefore applies
Mathews and other recent due process decisions. Unless one also revises the Supreme
Court's current due process methodology (a project that is beyond the scope of this
Article), this is the analysis that courts must employ.
" See generally Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (finding that the
language in the statute gave rise to a protected liberty interest, and then determining
what process was due); Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-97 (1980) (finding a liberty
interest, protected by the Due Process Clause, where a prisoner was involuntarily
transferred to a mental hospital, and then assessing the process due).
424 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For an example of the application of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test in an immigration case, see Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp 13, 18-20
(D.D.C. 1992) (assessing whether sufficient process was afforded to returning resident
alien).
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potential value of additional safeguards, and the government's
interest in maintaining current practices.
425
A. Exclusion
1. The Interests at Stake
Not all aliens have the same stake in gaining admission to the
United States. Some people arrive at our gates as tourists, some
come seeking asylum due to persecution in their homeland, some
intend to join family members who are citizens or permanent
residents, and others may themselves be returning permanent
residents. Their interests vary along a continuum. If the entry
fiction no longer prevents the Due Process Clause from reaching to
the border, whether these aliens have a constitutionally protected
interest will depend primarily upon the nature of their contacts with
the United States, rather than upon territorial standing. 426 Courts
considering their constitutional claims will likely apply the analysis
of Landon v. Plasencia,427 in which the Court overlooked the
territorial fiction and determined that permanent residents cannot
be excluded without a full hearing because of their significant
contacts with our country.428
In addition to the contacts-based analysis, a number of aliens
might also have a claim to a constitutionally protected interest in
admission based upon the language of federal statutes. Statutes
with mandatory language may create rights protected by the
Constitution.429  Some federal statutes presently provide, for
425 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
" David Martin has proposed a test based upon degrees of affiliation with our
national community; he would consider aliens in several broad categories, such as
permanent residents and first-time applicants for admission. See Martin, supra note
15, at 190-234. His categories have been criticized as overbroad. They do not, for
example, acknowledge the varying interests that even first-time applicants may
possess. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties".• A
Response to Martin, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 243-46 (1983) (arguing for the use of
"community ties," rather than the more rigid degrees of affiliation with the
community, in determining the level of due process owed the individual). Martin's
broad categories are useful starting points, but the only analysis fully consistent with
that given by Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-37 (1982), is one that examines
each individual alien's ties to the United States.
42 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
42 See id. at 32-37; supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.4
" See, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81 (1987) (holding that
a state statute containing mandatory ("shall") language creates a liberty interest in
parole, protected by the Due Process Clause, even though parole officials retain some
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example, that certain classes of aliens "shall" be granted a prefer-
ence in receiving an immigrant visa.4 30 Aliens who arrive at the
border with an immigrant visa are admitted, unless they fall within
certain established disqualifying criteria.4 3 This statutory scheme
may create a constitutionally protected interest. Similarly, aliens are
eligible for asylum if they meet specified statutory criteria.
43 2
These established criteria may also permit a court to find a
protected interest. Furthermore, some of these aliens will also have
family ties to the United States that may lead courts to that same
conclusion. 43 3  Several other classes of aliens will be unlikely to
prevail with a claim to a constitutionally protected interest in
admission. Most tourists, for example, would be unable to assert a
constitutional claim because they have no substantial ties to the
country and canndt obtain admission under the mandatory language
of any statute or regulation.
3 4
discretion in determining who meets release criteria); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979) (same).
4" See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1988) (stating that the Attorney General "shall"
approve a petition for preference status or immediate relative status if the facts in the
petition are true and the alien meets the statutory criteria).
431 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. V 1993) (describing some of the grounds that
"shall" call for exclusion).
42 An alien is eligible for asylum if the Attorney General determines that he or
she is a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,427-28 (1987) (citing § 1158(a)). A "refugee" is a person "who
is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). While § 1158(a) gives the Attorney
General discretion to grant asylum to a refugee, the criteria for such a grant are well
defined in the statute. In addition, the asylum law implements the United States's
international obligations to grant safe harbor to refugees. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407,416-30 (1984) (describing relationship between our domestic asylum statutes and
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223 (acceded to by the United States in 1968)).
A remedy similar to political asylum is "withholding" of deportation or exclusion.
A statute directs that the Attorney General "shall not deport or return" an alien
whose life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, or political
opinion, unless the alien meets certain narrow statutory criteria. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1988).
' Alexander Aleinikoff has noted the established "ties" that these people may
have with the United States. He has pointed out the illogic of granting the protection
of the Due Process Clause to an alien who has entered the United States clandestinely
but, at the same time, denying such protection to a person who arrives at the border
with an immigrant visa in hand. See Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 867. Aleinikoff
argues that aliens with immigration visas have a greater interest in admission than
most other first-time entrants and may well have an interest protected by the
Constitution. See Aleinikoff, supra note 426, at 246-47.
434 A tourist is considered a "nonimmigrant." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1988).
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These categories are not exhaustive. Whenever aliens arrive at
our border and claim an interest in admission, courts will be
required to examine their assertions individually. But at least the
cases will be determined by the immigrants' legitimate interests,
rather than by the less accurate proxy of territorial standing. And
those with strong ties to the United States will be afforded a fair
opportunity to seek admission.
2. The Process Due
For those aliens with constitutionally protected interests, the
next question is the process due. There are so many different
postures in which aliens present themselves that it is difficult to
sketch out, in the abstract, a comprehensive procedural code. The
stories of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei reaffirm that the core of
the Due Process Clause is the right to be heard in a meaningful
manner. At a minimum, then, all aliens with a protected interest in
admission ought to receive a full exclusion hearing before a neutral
decision-maker, who is required to find the facts according to some
articulable standard of proof. Further, they ought to learn the full
extent of any evidence that might support an order of exclusion, so
that their right to be heard will be meaningful." 5
Although Knauff and Mezei presently permit exclusion without
a hearing, Congress has provided for exclusion hearings in most
instances. Exclusion hearings are held before immigration judges,
who may "present and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine,
and cross-examine the alien or witnesses." 436  However, the
statutes still permit exclusion without a hearing under the same
circumstances present in Knauff and Mezei. An immigration officer
or judge may order the temporary exclusion of aliens who appear
to pose security or foreign policy risks."' The Attorney General
The Attorney General has discretion to admit nonimmigrants "for such time and
under such conditions" as may be prescribed by regulation. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)
(1988).
"" David Martin proposes that even first-time applicants for admission (who
generally have a lesser interest in admission than permanent residents) should receive
"an unbiased decision-maker, notice of the proceedings and of the general grounds
asserted by the government for denial of admission; a meaningful opportunity to
dispute or overcome those grounds, orally or in writing; and a statement of reasons,
even if oral and summary, for any adverse decision." Martin, supra note 15, at 218.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1988). Section 1226(a) provides that "special inquiry
officers" conduct exclusion proceedings. These officers are immigrationjudges. See
8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(1), 3.10, 236.1 (1993).437 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A)-(C), 1225(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section
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may permanently exclude those aliens, based upon confidential
information. 3  While the aliens and their counsel may submit
written materials to the Attorney General, the Attorney General
need not afford a hearing of any kind.4 39 For those aliens who do
receive exclusion hearings, INS regulations fill out the full contours
of the process. Excludable aliens may be represented by counsel,
though they are not entitled to appointment of counsel.44 ° The
regulations do not provide for prehearing discovery. 441
Several problems remain with this framework. The general
hearing requirement, which includes confrontation and cross-
examination, is as it ought to be. But the Attorney General should
not be permitted to exclude any alien without a hearing. The
statute does not impose a meaningful check on the Attorney
General's decisions to exclude without a hearing.44 There is no
way to determine, for example, just what sorts of security threats the
Attorney General considers serious enough to warrant bypassing the
usual hearing process. Because there is no hearing, the govern-
1182(a)(3) lists the substantive grounds for exclusion that may be accomplished
without a hearing. Sections 1182(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii) permit exclusion when there is
a reasonable belief that an alien will engage in any activity relating to espionage or
sabotage or the opposition or overthrow of the government by violent or unlawful
means. Section 1182(a)(3)(B) provides for exclusioni when there is reasonable belief
that an alien has engaged or will engage in terrorist activity. And § 1182(a)(3)(C)
permits exclusion when admission would lead to potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences.
4- See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)
(iii)-(iv) (1994) (providing for use of classified, undisclosed information in decision-
making process).
439 See id.
440 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.15(b)(5), 236.2(a) (1993).
441 The regulation governing exclusion proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 236.2, sets out
aliens' basic rights at exclusion hearings. Those rights do not include an entitlement
to discover, prior to the hearing, the evidence supporting the government's charge,
but the regulations do allow the alien to "examine and object to evidence against
him" during the proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1993).
442 The only procedural requirements in § 1225(c) are that the aliens and their
representatives may submit materials for review by the Attorney General, and the
Attorney General must consult "the appropriate security agencies of the Govern-
ment." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). There is only one check
contained in the related substantive grounds for exclusion. Aliens may be excluded
if admission would have "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences."
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1993). These aliens maybe excluded based upon
past associations or beliefs, even those that would be lawful within the United States,
if the Secretary of State personally determines that admission "would compromise a
compelling United States foreign policy interest." § 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii). If the
Secretary of State makes such a determination, the Secretary must notify the House
and the Senate. See § 1182(a)(3)(C)(iv).
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ment's witnesses are not tested by cross-examination. In addition,
it is difficult for aliens to present meaningful defense information
to the Attorney General when they do not know the full nature of
the government's evidence.4 4 Under this statutory framework,
the Attorney General would exclude the next Ellen Knauff without
a hearing.
Even if one might concede to the government the power to
exclude without a hearing in truly exceptional circumstances, the
statute is problematic. The law does not give the Attorney General
any incentive to schedule hearings for aliens who may be excludable
on security grounds. The government does not benefit from
affording them hearings. As far as the Attorney General is
concerned, why reveal information and witnesses and risk losing the
case when the exclusion may be accomplished without any ad-
versarial process whatsoever? The government has an important
interest in screening out serious potential threats to our national
security, but that interest ought not lead to the denial of process
altogether. Ellen Knauff's Board hearing did not compromise
national security, despite a charge of espionage. Further, contrary
to the claims that the government made in defending Ignatz Mezei's
40 At least one court has held that this summary exclusion procedure violates due
process when an alien has a protected liberty interest. In Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d
506 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court found that a returning resident alien had an interest
in admission protected by the Due Process Clause even though the government
alleged that he went abroad for a "nefarious" reason. Id. 519-24. The court of
appeals remanded for the lower court to decide whether he received the process due
under the Mathews test. See id. at 524-25. On remand, the district court found that
the INS's summary exclusion procedures violated due process because Rafeedie was
only given an opportunity to present a written statement and his readmission decision
was based on confidential information. See Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13, 18-20
(D.D.C. 1992).
In an analogous case, a federal district court recently struck down the INS's
attempt to deny legalization petitions based on confidential information. The
plaintiffs in that case were United States residents who applied for legalization under
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a. See Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, CV 87-
2107 SVW (Kx) (C.D. Cal.Jan. 24, 1995), at 1 [hereinafter Order, Amelican-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm.]. The INS sought to deny their applications, based on classified
and undisclosed information that the applicants were members of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine. See id. at 2-4. The court found that they had a
protected liberty interest in the legalization process, rejecting the government's
argument that applicants for legalization have no greater rights than excludable
aliens. See id. at 9-15. Applying the Mathews analysis, the judge concluded that the
INS's use of undisclosed confidential information violated due process. See id. at 15-
27. The court stated that the INS's use of this information placed a "nearly
impossible burden" upon the applicants. Id. at 21.
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habeas corpus case, granting a hearing did not compromise any
confidential sources. The most sensitive evidence that surfaced at
the hearing concerned the Communist Party and the IWO in the
1930s, and the main witnesses at Mezei's hearing were ex-Commu-
nists who had already assisted the government in other cases. The
lesson from these cases is that the government may tend to choose
the easiest route, exclusion without a hearing, even when following
the regular process would not raise legitimate security concerns.
444
We ought to do better. It is possible to protect the govern-
ment's interests and still provide a safeguard to avoid abuse of
discretion by the executive. Protective orders could be fashioned
which would allow the government to go forward with its case
without compromising classified information. Some sensitive
portions of documents might be redacted. Congress also might
consider enacting a statute (or the INS might promulgate a
regulation) similar to the Classified Information Procedures
Act,445 which protects sensitive information from disclosure in
criminal cases and, at the same time, safeguards defendants' trial
rights.
446
Alternatively, immigration judges could review sensitive
information in camera. This would permit at least some review of
the Attorney General's power, and the court might be able to strike
an appropriate balance between the government's security concerns
and the excludable aliens' right to a hearing. The unfortunate
aspect of such a process, however, is that it would tend to legitimize
executive actions in circumstances in which the reviewing judges
may not be able to make fully informed decisions. In an early draft
of his dissent in Mezei, Justice Jackson decried in camera proceed-
ings for just that reason. Jackson wrote:
[The government] should not obtain judicial blessing conferred in
further secret proceedings.... I think, as I did in Korematsu [v.
United States447], that there is more harm from the judiciary
444 In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the district court reviewed the
INS's evidence in camera. The judge ruled that at least some of the confidential
information could be disclosed to the legalization applicants without compromising
national security. See Order, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., at 24. The
district court found a due process violation in part because of the INS's refusal to
disclose any of its evidence linking the applicants to the Popular Front. See id.
... Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. IV app. §§ 1-16
(1988)).
446 See 94 Stat. at 2026-28 (providing procedural safeguards for defendants).
447 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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becoming partners in a plan of dubious legality than in letting it
rest on the political accountability of the administration.44
Jackson eventually removed this language, so thatJustice Frankfurt-
er would join the dissent.4 49 Despite Jackson's misgivings, an in
camera proceeding would provide at least a modicum of protection
against governmental overreaching. And aliens who face exclusion
without a hearing would probably prefer at least this much court
review, rather than stand on principle and receive no hearing at all.
These are not perfect solutions, but at least they strike a balance
448 Draft Dissent (Feb. 17, 1953), Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 10 n.8
(RHJP). JusticeJackson believed that courts should not proceed in camera where the
executive has far greater knowledge of the facts and the courts' scrutiny is likely not
to be particularly rigorous. In his dissent in Korematsu, Jackson commented on the
difficulty in reviewing military decisions. He noted that without any real evidence
before it, the Court "ha[d] no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn,
self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he did was
reasonable." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Further, by "the
very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial
appraisal." Id.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley points out that it may be better for courts not to
play this sort of "legitimating function." Burley, supra note 382, at 1992 (citing
BICKEL, supra note 382, at 30-33). In the rare case in which an immigration issue
would involve a court in foreign affairs matters beyond the court's competence,
perhaps the court should determine that the case presents a nonjusticiable political
question. This might be a "second-best solution" that would, at least, not legitimize
executive acts. See id. at 1993.
... Frankfurter, who had disagreed with Jackson's position in Korematsu, wanted
to join Jackson's dissent in Mezei but balked at those lines. See Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to RobertJackson 1 (Feb. 18, 1953) (RHJP); see also Korematsu, 323 U.S.
at 224 (Frankfurter,J., concurring). Frankfurter suggested removing those sentences
and simply taking no position on the propriety of an in camera hearing, since the
issue did not need to be resolved in Mezei. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, supra,
at 1-2. Although Frankfurter did not mention the point in his letter to Jackson,
Frankfurter had suggested in Knauff that an in camera proceeding might be the
appropriate mechanism to review the government's claims of danger to national
security. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 549 (Frankfurter,J., dissenting). After the offending
language was removed from Jackson's draft footnote, Frankfurterjoined the dissent.
See Draft Dissent (Feb. 25, 1953), Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 1, 11 n.9
(RHJP).
The final version ofJackson's Mezei dissent does not take a position on propriety
of an in camera hearing. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 228 n.9 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("I do
not knowjust how an in camera proceeding would be handled in this kind of case.").
Jackson's failure to speak to the question of in camera proceedings seems incongru-
ous given his preoccupation, in other parts of the dissent, with the need for
confrontation, cross-examination, and a "fair hearing." Id. at 225, 228. The other
dissenters in Mezei believed that Mezei could be held only after a full trial-type
hearing. See id. at 218 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Mezei should not be deprived of his
liberty indefinitely except as the result of a fair open court hearing in which evidence
is appraised by the court, not by the prosecutor.").
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of the competing concerns. For those aliens who have a constitu-
tionally protected interest in admission, these are the procedures
that, at a minimum, should be required by the Due Process Clause.
Under the Mathews v. Eldridge test,450 even when aliens are alleged
to be risks to our security, at a minimum, they should be afforded
an exclusion hearing with special procedures to protect the
confidentiality of government information. There is a substantial
risk of an erroneous decision when a hearing is denied altogether.
The cost of these safeguards is reasonable, given that the govern-
ment already affords hearings to the vast majority of aliens seeking
admission. Also, with protections in place to avoid dangerous
disclosures, the government has little or no interest in maintaining
the current practices. Hearings ought to be provided in every case.
There is one additional problem apparent with the current
statutory scheme: the lack of discovery. Without discovery, even
those aliens who do receive full exclusion hearings may not have the
time or the ability to counter the charges. Ellen Knauff did not
know all of the government's evidence prior to her Board of Special
Inquiry hearing. After that hearing, Knauff gathered additional
affidavits to support her defense and these affidavits helped
convince the Board of Immigration Appeals to overturn the
exclusion decision. Had she known all the government's evidence
prior to the initial hearing, Knauff might have prevailed before the
Board of Special Inquiry. Other aliens may not have her persever-
ance. They may be excluded and deported simply because they
cannot gather evidence to dispute an exclusion charge or because
they cannot afford to pursue the case.
There is no reason to deny aliens access to information in the
INS file or in the Service attorney's file, such as statements of
government witnesses and aliens' own prior criminal records. These
materials are routinely revealed in other types of federal cases. In
federal civil cases, these documents would generally be discover-
ab le.45  In federal criminal cases, where discovery is more limited,
defendants are entitled to their own statements, copies of their
prior criminal records, government exhibits and test results.
452
The government has an overriding obligation to disclose exculpatory
450 See 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (describing three factors to be considered in
identifying the dictates of due process).
4"1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (3) (parties may generally discover any relevant
nonprivileged matter, and materials collected for litigation-such as witness state-
ments-may be obtained upon a showing of substantial need).452 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(1).
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information in criminal cases (and, perhaps, in certain kinds of
immigration matters).453 And statements of government witnesses
are also discoverable, although the statements need not be pro-
duced until after the witness has testified on direct examination.454
The process of permitting government witnesses to testify in
immigration proceedings, without discovery of their prior state-
ments, is quite troubling.455  Again, under the Mathews test,
discovery should be required. These types of disclosures would cost
the government little. The additional safeguards would enable
aliens and their counsel to prepare properly for direct and cross-
examinations. There is a significant risk of erroneous decisions
without disclosure. With disclosure of ManningJohnson's complete
past, for example, Mezei's Board of Special Inquiry may have made
a different finding on at least one of the exclusion charges. Pre-
hearing disclosure would lead to more meaningful hearings and
more accurate results. The high stakes in exclusion proceedings
favor disclosure.
B. Detention
1. The Interests at Stake
Under current law, the INS has discretion to detain most aliens
pending exclusion proceedings or to release them on immigration
parole.456 Congress has required that all aliens convicted of
serious felonies be detained pending exclusion. 457 For most other
aliens in exclusion proceedings, the parole decision is left to the
4s Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), sets forth the basic principle that
the prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence in criminal cases. While the
Supreme Court has not applied Brady in civil cases, one circuit has recently held that
"Brady should be extended to ... denaturalization and extradition cases where the
government seeks denaturalization or extradition based on proof of alleged criminal
activities." Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 295 (1994).
4- See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988) (known as thejencks Act, afterJencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)); FED. R. CRrM. P. 26.2(a) (stating that after the witness
has testified, the defendant can move the court to order the government to produce
all relevant statements made by that witness).
4-s In a thoughtful book that examines the testimony of ex-Communist informants,
Herbert Packer proposes the adoption of a rule similar to theJencks Act to govern
in all loyalty cases. See HERBERT L. PACKER, Ex-COMMUNIST WITNESSES: FOUR
STUDIES IN FACT FINDING 233-35 (1962).
- See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that aliens may be
detained pending further inquiry); id. § 1182(d)(5) (parole power).
4.1 See id. § 1226(e)(2).
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sole discretion of the district director of the INS, who considers
requests for parole and does not conduct parole hearings.4 5
When exclusion proceedings move rapidly, detention may be limited
to a few days or a week. However, exclusion cases may take a long
time to process and detention may sometimes stretch into years.
4 59
In addition, other aliens-such as those held at GuantAnamo Bay-
may be detained for extended periods as part of an interdiction
effort.
If the territorial fiction no longer determines the reach of the
Due Process Clause, all of these detentions will implicate the
Constitution. Liberty is the norm in this country; detention or
physical restraint of any kind "is the carefully limited excep-
tion."460 This does not mean that an alien may never be detained.
There may be appropriate reasons to support detention, such as to
effect the return of an alien who may be repatriated in the reason-
ably near term, or to protect the public if an alien is a demonstrable
threat to public safety and will shortly be returned home. But, as
with pretrial detention, mental health commitment, and other forms
of regulatory confinements, the procedures afforded such a person
4- See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1993) (describing factors to be considered by the district
director; the regulations do not provide for a hearing of any kind). As discussed at
infra note 464, special procedures apply to Mariel Cubans.
459 See supra notes 75-83, 333-37 and accompanying text (discussing the problem
of the long-term "removal" and detention of Mariel Cubans). Aside from the
difficulties posed by aliens who cannot be returned home, there are often substantial
delays in processing affirmative requests for relief, such as asylum applications. In
April 1993, the INS reported to Congress that it had a backlog of 261,000 asylum
cases. See Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1153, H.R. 1355, and H.R.
1649 Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1993) (testimony of Chris Sale,
Acting Commissioner of INS). One witness told Congress that it takes two to five
years to complete the asylum administrative process. See id. at 330 (testimony of
Michael T. Lempres, former Executive Associate Commissioner for Operations, INS).
" United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (explaining that freedom from bodily restraint is at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 600 (1979) (finding a substantial liberty interest, protected by the Due Process
Clause, "in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment"); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (stating that "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"
(emphasis added)); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (noting that "involuntary confinement of an individualfor any reason[] is
a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of
law" (emphasis added)); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (describing
involuntary commitment to a mental health facility as "a massive curtailment of
liberty").
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must be measured by the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
2. The Process Due
Unless the government has established that detention is integral
to the exercise of the power over foreign affairs, and that the issue
of detention ought not to receive judicial review, all aliens in
exclusion proceedings should receive detention hearings. At such
hearings, the burden should be on the government to establish that
detention is warranted. Even if detention is justified, the length of
confinement must be carefully limited.
Currently, aliens in exclusion proceedings have no right to a
detention hearing of any kind. This is shameful. In no other
setting may our government confine a person without a hearing at
which the government also bears the burden of proof. Hence,
mental health commitments require a full hearing with the burden
on the State to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
person is mentally ill and dangerous to herself or others.
461
People arrested on criminal charges are at least entitled to a hearing
on the issue of bail, and the government generally bears a heavy
burden if it seeks to detain without bail.4 62
Aliens have at least the same interest in avoiding detention as
people facing mental health commitment or pretrial confinement.
They ought to receive at least the same panoply of procedural
protections. - They should be entitled to ask for bond before a
judicial officer, such as an immigration judge (who hears such
461 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992) (dangerousness, without
mental illness, will not always support commitment); Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33
(applying Mathews test and holding that Due Process Clause requires at least "clear
and convincing" evidence to support commitment); O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575-76
(mental illness alone, without dangerousness, may not support commitment).
462 There are several layers of review when a person is held in custody to face
criminal charges. If a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant, ajudicial officer will
have determined that there is probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). When a person is arrested
without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment generally requires ajudicial determination
of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
In addition to the probable cause determination, a criminal defendant at least
has the opportunity to ask for bail before ajudicial officer. In Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984) and Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court approved
pretrial detention statutes for juveniles and for adults. See supra note 327. Both of
those decisions found no due process violations largely because of the procedures
afforded the detainees, including the requirement of a formal adversarial hearing.
See id.
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applications in deportation cases).4 63 If the INS seeks to detain
without bond, the government should bear the burden of establish-
ing that a person will not attend his or her exclusion hearings, or
that the person poses a significant threat to the community. An
alien should be permitted to introduce evidence at a detention
hearing as well as to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the proceeding.4 1 Ignatz Mezei obtained his release on
parole after he was afforded these minimum procedures. Other
detainees should be granted the same fair opportunity to seek
release.
3. The Limits of Detention
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause provides
limits on detention, even when that detention has followed fair
hearings.4 6' The basic limits have already been noted. Unless
criminal charges are lodged and proved, the government may not
impose a form or length of confinement that amounts to punish-
ment. People held pending trial or defendants who are confined as
unfit to stand trial may not be detained for an excessive period of
time. These principles, too, must limit the detention of aliens who
are held pending exclusion.
163 See 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(a) (1993) (stating that the INS makes the initial bond or
custody decision in deportation matters, but the immigrationjudge may redetermine
the bond).
464 These suggestions parallel some of the hearing requirements of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The INS has put special procedures in place to govern the parole of Mariel
Cubans. The INS regulation is 8 C.F.R. § 212.12 (1993). Perhaps due to the
possibility of long-term confinement, the INS has sought to give Mariel Cubans more
process. But even that regulation falls woefully short of the requirements of the Due
Process Clause. Each Mariel Cuban is afforded a yearly "interview" with a panel of
INS officers (the INS will not call the proceeding a "hearing," which would imply
certain rights and process). Id. § 212.12(d)(4)(ii). A Mariel Cuban will be paroled
only if the detainee proves that he or she is nonviolent, will remain nonviolent, will
not pose a threat to the community, and will not violate the conditions of parole. See
id. § 212.12(d)(2). The burden of proof is on the detainee, rather than the govern-
ment. And the burden may be exceedingly difficult to meet. The INS regulation
permits the detainee to be accompanied at the interview by counsel or a representa-
tive, but does not require the appointment of counsel. See id. § 212.12(d)(4)(ii).
While the detainee may submit information to the panel orally or in writing, there is
no provision for examination of any witness or for any mechanism to test the veracity
of the information in the INS file. See id.
" See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (noting the substantive due
process bar on arbitrary and wrongful government actions, despite the fairness of the
procedures that implement them).
THE EXCLUSION AND DETENTION OF ALIENS
Justice Jackson's rule of reason must be met. If an alien is
detained for the purpose of exclusion and that exclusion cannot be
accomplished, detention can no longer be justified. Ignatz Mezei's
detention became unreasonable once it was clear that no nation
would accept him. At that point, the government could not
plausibly contend that he was being held pending return to another
country. Mezei's continued detention was also excessive in relation
to any other legitimate purpose that the government could offer for
his confinement.
Mariel Cubans, if Cuba will not take them back, must be
released unless their detention furthers a different legitimate
purpose and is not excessive in relation to that purpose. The
government might assert that simply keeping some Mariel Cubans
out of our society is a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose. If so, courts
must carefully examine the potential danger that each of these
detainees poses to our society and must carefully consider why
other sanctions, such as those provided by our criminal or mental
health laws, would not suffice. For Cubans who have made it to our
shore in the most recent wave of immigration, or for Cubans
detained in U.S. military facilities abroad, the government has
argued that detention is necessary to discourage the migration of
additional immigrants. That reason might serve as a facially
nonpunitive purpose for detention, but courts must consider
whether detention is excessive to accomplish that purpose. Given
the availability of other methods, such as diplomacy, to stem the
flow of immigration, detention appears punitive. Furthermore, as
the detention of the most recent immigrants becomes extended,
that detention may more clearly seem excessive and punitive, in
violation of the Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION
Because it has always been so does not mean that it always must
be. It is time for our nation to address the dissonance among the
executive's immigration authority, our developing constitutional
jurisprudence, and our obligations under international law.
This Article has explored the constitutionalization of the entry
fiction and the notion that excludable aliens are not "persons"
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. It has offered
several reasons why all human beings at or inside our gates must be
deemed "persons" and why they must be afforded meaningful access
to our courts. Perhaps the most important reason, however, is that
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our treatment of aliens ultimately becomes a tale about us and not
about them. It is discomforting to be part of a nation that permits
indefinite detention and unreviewable decision-making, particularly
when our own government seeks to enforce human rights norms
around the world.
Justice Robert Jackson is the hero of this piece. During the
height of the Cold War, at a time when internal security was at the
fore of public debate, his was the voice of reason. Jackson argued
that secret decision-making exacts too dear a price and that
detention cannot be allowed to become an end in itself. As the
complete stories of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei illustrate, it is all
too easy for the government to bring to bear the full measure of its
power. What is allowed is not always what is wise. Forcing
exclusion and detention decisions into the daylight can only
increase the accuracy of the process and help the executive temper
its rulings with those most elusive qualities, justice and mercy. And
there must be some reasonable limit to the power to detain.
